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Abstract
Each year, more than two million U.S. households have an eviction case filed against them. Many
cities have recently implemented policies aimed at reducing the number of evictions, motivated
by research showing strong associations between being evicted and subsequent adverse economic
outcomes. Yet it is difficult to determine to what extent those associations represent causal
relationships, because eviction itself is likely to be a consequence of adverse life events. This
paper addresses that challenge and offers new causal evidence on how eviction affects financial
distress, residential mobility, and neighborhood quality. We collect the near-universe of Cook
County court records over a period of seventeen years, and link these records to credit bureau
and payday loans data. Using this data, we characterize the trajectory of financial strain in the
run-up and aftermath of eviction court for both evicted and non-evicted households, finding
high levels and striking increases in financial strain in the years before an eviction case is filed.
Guided by this descriptive evidence, we employ two approaches to draw causal inference on the
effect of eviction. The first takes advantage of the panel data through a difference-in-differences
design. The second is an instrumental variables strategy, relying on the fact that court cases are
randomly assigned to judges of varying leniency. We find that eviction negatively impacts credit
access and durable consumption for several years. However, the effects are small relative to the
financial strain experienced by both evicted and non-evicted tenants in the run-up to an eviction
filing.
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... and no one knew whether the house was mine or yours because there was no disagreement
between me and you. But now I am being subjected to violence by your very own Ptolema,
who sent me word to this effect: “Give up the house. Otherwise your household furnishings
will be put out.”
- Letter from the third century A.D. by an Egyptian tenant to his landlord (Frier, 1980).
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Introduction

Each year, more than two million U.S. households have an eviction case filed against them
(Desmond et al., 2018a). Many of these households live in poor urban communities where eviction
is a frequent occurrence; in some census tracts, more than 10 percent of renter households are
summoned to eviction court annually. Many cities have introduced policy measures to reduce
the number of evictions,1 motivated by a growing body of research showing that being evicted is
associated with subsequent adverse economic outcomes for low-income households.2 Yet it is
difficult to know the extent to which such associations represent a causal relationship because
eviction itself is likely to be a consequence of adverse life events, such as job loss, negative
financial shocks, or deteriorating health. Quasi-experimental research capable of establishing
such a causal relationship has thus far not been available to inform this policy debate.
This paper provides new evidence on the consequences of eviction for financial distress,
residential mobility, and neighborhood quality. We collect the near-universe of Cook County
court records over a period of seventeen years, and link these records to credit bureau and
payday loans data. We first characterize trends in financial strain in the run-up and aftermath
of eviction court for both evicted and non-evicted households, documenting high levels and
striking increases in financial strain in the years before an eviction case is filed. This pattern is
reminiscent of an ‘Ashenfelter dip,’ which has been shown to drive erroneous conclusions about
causal impacts in other settings. Guided by this descriptive evidence, we employ two approaches
to draw causal inference on the effect of eviction. The first takes advantage of the panel data
through a difference-in-differences (DiD) design. The second is an instrumental variables strategy
(IV), relying on the fact that court cases are randomly assigned to judges of varying leniency.3
Our findings lead to two broad conclusions.
First, we find that eviction negatively impacts credit access, credit scores, and durable
consumption for several years, and increases debt in collections. However, when we consider the
1

See Appendix A for a review of recently proposed or passed reforms.
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See, e.g., Crane and Warnes (2000); Desmond (2012); Desmond and Kimbro (2015); Desmond et al. (2015); Desmond
and Gershenson (2016a), and Desmond (2016).
3

Our analysis focuses on the causal effect of a court-ordered eviction, also referred to as an order for possession. A
court-ordered eviction is well defined by the legal system and recorded in data sets derived from court records. However,
it is important to note that this is a more narrowly-drawn concept than an “involuntary move,” and distinct from a
tenant being illegally coerced to move by his landlord, which is sometimes referred to as an “informal eviction.” Both
concepts appear in the sociology literature and are occasionally used interchangeably with the term “eviction.” We
depart from that practice in using the term “eviction” solely to denote an eviction order issued by the court.

1

magnitude of these effects in the context of the financial strain experienced by both evicted and
non-evicted tenants in the years preceding an eviction case, the effects are small. For example,
the IV estimate for total debt in collections 13 to 36 months after the case is $209 and statistically
insignificant, yet both groups have, on average, approximately $3,000 dollars in collection four
years prior to the case, and both groups experience increases of $1,000 to $1,200 dollars between
two years before and two years after the case. In addition, we do not find evidence of a causal
impact on residential mobility or neighborhood poverty. The IV and DiD estimates are, for the
most part, similar in magnitude, but the IV estimates are less precise.
Second, bias due to selection on levels and trends, if ignored, leads to the erroneous conclusion
that eviction has large impacts on financial distress. Using an additional panel of credit records
for a random sample of Cook County residents, we replicate the empirical strategy used in
existing studies, which compare evicted tenants to tenants not in eviction court (controlling
for observable characteristics). The results from this analysis imply large effects of eviction. In
contrast, when we limit the sample to tenants in eviction court, OLS regressions comparing
evicted tenants to non-evicted tenants produce much smaller estimates. For example, the sample
restriction reduces the estimated effect on credit score by more than 75 percent. Our results
suggest that, while we find evidence that eviction exacerbates financial strain, the financial strain
faced by those in eviction court is largely pre-existing, and not a consequence of being evicted
per se.
Our research speaks to an active policy debate on how, if at all, local governments should
address the high frequency of evictions. Given the prevalence of evictions, it is important to
know how tenants might be affected by policies that intervene in eviction court, such as policies
that make proceedings more lenient toward them. Our results speak directly to this question.
While we find small causal effects on financial health and larger effects on access to credit, the
results are much more moderate than the existing work on evictions. Moreover, both evicted
and non-evicted households face increasing financial distress more than two years before the
eviction court case is filed. This suggests that interventions targeting eviction court are likely to
be ineffective at alleviating the financial distress of evicted tenants. The results also point to
the possibility that intervening earlier may be necessary to avoid the financial strain faced by
evicted tenants.
There is little research by economists on evictions. Our paper contributes to the broader
economics literature on the consequences of housing policy for the economic mobility of lowincome households. Several studies of housing vouchers and the Moving to Opportunity program
have found small benefits of moving to a better neighborhood for adults, and larger effects for
children (Kling et al., 2007; Gennetian et al., 2012; Chetty et al., 2016; Chyn, 2018; Van Dijk,
2019). Evans et al. (2016) show that emergency financial assistance is a cost-effective tool for
reducing homelessness. We contribute to this literature by studying the dynamics of financial
strain surrounding an eviction filing, by implementing a quasi-experimental research design to

2

identify the causal effect of an eviction,4 and by documenting the prevalence of eviction in a
major urban area. Moreover, we employ a set of outcome variables that has been under-used for
studying financial strain in the context of housing policy. Our credit panel allows us to follow
individuals across neighborhoods, not only within Cook County, but throughout the US, which is
uncommon in studies of the urban poor.5 We also observe a tenant’s interaction with subprime
lenders. This data allows us to observe demand for high interest loans, which are common among
poor households (Skiba and Tobacman, 2015; Bhutta et al., 2015).
This paper also contributes to a growing body of work in sociology and public health. Recent
studies find that eviction has a negative association with the physical and mental health of tenants
(Burgard et al., 2012; Desmond and Kimbro, 2015; Sandel et al., 2018), and a positive association
with depression, stress, material hardship (Desmond and Kimbro, 2015), suicide (Fowler et al.,
2015; Rojas and Stenberg, Rojas and Stenberg), job loss (Desmond and Gershenson, 2016a), and
homelessness (Crane and Warnes, 2000; Phinney et al., 2007). Desmond and Bell (2015) provide
an overview of this literature. Due to the limited availability of administrative data on evictions,
the evidence is largely based on ethnographic research and short-term surveys of households at
risk of eviction, including the Milwaukee Area Renters Study. We contribute to this literature by
assembling a large-scale administrative data set of eviction cases in Cook County that is linked
to a panel of credit reports, including payday loan account openings and inquiries. Our study
presents some of the first evidence on the effects of eviction that addresses the endogeneity from
selection and correlated unobservables. One closely related study is Collinson and Reed (2019),
an independent and contemporaneous working paper that studies public assistance recipients
who appear in New York City’s eviction court, and also uses a randomized case assignment design
to examine the impact of eviction on tenants’ income, mental health, future public assistance
receipt, and homelessness.6 In addition, Desmond et al. (2018a) have recently assembled and
made publicly available area-level data on the number of eviction court cases. Both of these
research efforts are complementary to our paper and make important advances in data collection
on evictions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides institutional details
relevant for understanding evictions in Cook County. Section 3 describes the data collection and
4

Several recent studies in other settings rely on random assignment of cases to judges for identification, including
Kling (2006); Berube and Green (2007); Green and Winik (2010); Dahl et al. (2014); Maestas et al. (2013); Dobbie and
Song (2015); Aizer and Doyle (2015); Bhuller et al. (2019); Mueller-Smith (2015); Dobbie et al. (2018); Hyman (2018).
5

Several studies use credit bureau data to measure financial strain, including work on health insurance (Mazumder
and Miller, 2016; Dobkin et al., 2018) and bankruptcy (Dobbie et al., 2017).
6

There are methodological differences between Collinson and Reed (2019) and this paper worth highlighting. First,
because Collinson and Reed (2019) do not observe the identity of judges, their instrument is based on courtroom leniency
rather than judge leniency, which is problematic because judges rotate across courtrooms. Second, the treatment in
Collinson and Reed (2019) is the execution of an eviction order by the City Marshal, rather than the court eviction
order. In Appendix B, we explain how this approach may lead to concerns related to identification, measurement, and
interpretation of the identified parameter. Despite these differences, Collinson and Reed (2019) find a similar pattern of
moderate causal effects and we view their results as complementary to those presented here.
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linkage process, and provides a description of the population of tenants in the baseline sample.
Section 4 explores selection into eviction court and documents that this is an important source
of selection bias. Section 5 provides new descriptive evidence on the evolution of financial strain
and residential mobility experienced by evicted and non-evicted tenants in the run-up to and
aftermath of court filing. Section 6 formalizes the quasi-experimental research design and tests
the key underlying assumptions. Section 7 presents the main findings of the causal impact of
eviction and a discussion of the mechanisms. Section 8 concludes.

2

Evictions in Cook County

To interpret the causal effects that we estimate in this paper, and to assess the external validity
of our findings, it is necessary to understand the institutional environment in which evictions
take place in Cook County. Below, we provide aggregate empirical facts based on our newly
assembled data, describe the eviction court process, and discuss the representativeness of Cook
County for other urban areas.

2.1

Scope and spatial incidence

Thirty to forty thousand evictions cases are filed every year in Cook County. Figure 1 shows
the number of eviction cases filed and the number of evictions ordered by a judge from 2000 to
2016, the period covered in our analysis. There is a slight downward trend in both the number of
evictions and the number of cases filed, but evictions have been a relatively stable feature of the
rental housing market over this period. As a benchmark for the scope and cyclicality of evictions,
Figure 1 also shows the number of foreclosure filings between 2005 and 2016. The number of
eviction filings exceeds the number of foreclosure filings, except during the financial crisis.
Evictions are concentrated in low-income neighborhoods. Figure 2 presents a map of the first
municipal district of Cook County, which includes the City of Chicago, and depicts the number
of evictions relative to the total number of occupied rental units in each census tract, for the
year 2010. While evictions occur across all of Cook County, they are concentrated in Chicago’s
poorer south and southwest side neighborhoods. We find that more than 44 percent of evictions
occur in census tracts with more than 20 percent of residents living below the poverty line, and
more than 22 percent of evictions occur in census tracts with more than 30 percent of residents
living below the poverty line. This finding is consistent with Desmond (2012), Desmond and
Shollenberger (2015), and Desmond and Gershenson (2016b) who find that eviction is a common
occurrence in poor communities in Milwaukee. In the City of Chicago, the census tracts with
the highest concentration of evictions have more than 10 percent of occupied rental units with at
least one eviction per year, which is four times the city-wide eviction rate of 2.5 percent.

4

2.2

The eviction process

This section summarizes the legal process surrounding eviction.7 To begin an eviction, the
landlord must serve the tenant a written notice, which includes the reason for termination of the
lease, and the requisite number of days until the lease will terminate. The notice must list all
tenants whose names are on the lease, and it will typically refer to tenants who are not on the
lease as “any and all unknown occupants.” The period before termination varies depending on
the reason for discontinuation of the lease; for instance, nonpayment of rent has a 5-day notice
period, using the property for the furtherance of a criminal offense has a 5-day notice period, and
breaking a rule in the lease such as a prohibition of pets has a 10-day notice period. The data
does not include the reason for eviction; however, studies of eviction court in other cities have
found nonpayment of rent the most common reason for eviction (Desmond et al., 2013).8 The
landlord has discretion over whether and when to serve a termination notice. Chicago has no
official policy specifying the number of days a tenant may be late on the rent before the landlord
is allowed to serve a notice.
If the number of days in the written notice elapses without resolution, the landlord has a right
to take legal action and file an eviction case with the clerk in the Circuit Court of Cook County.
The case filing is the starting point from which we observe evictions in our study. The landlord
must file the case in the district where the property is located.9 When filing, the landlord must
decide whether to file a single action case, in which he seeks only possession of the property, or
a joint action case, in which he seeks both possession and a money judgment. At the time of
filing, the landlord or his attorney can select a return date for the first hearing, which must be
at least 14 days from the date the case is filed. In our data, the earliest available date is almost
always selected.
At the time of filing, the case is randomly assigned to a courtroom on the selected date
by a computer algorithm, in accordance with the Circuit Court of Cook County official policy
(General Order 97-5, effective June 2, 1997). The landlord is notified of the court room number
and time slot to which the case has been randomly assigned, but is not provided with the name
of the judge who will preside over the hearing. Our data include the initial judge assignment,
which we use to construct our instrument.
Cases may end up being ruled on by a different judge than the one initially assigned, for one
of three reasons. First, if the defendant has not been successfully served a court summons by
7

Appendix C contains further details. The relevant legislation can be found in the Municipal Code of Chicago
Residential Landlords and Tenants Ordinance (RLTO) and the Illinois Compiled Statutes (ILCS). Particularly relevant
are the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act (735 ILCS 5/9) and the Civil Practice Act (735 ILCS 5/2).
8
Following the notice, if the tenant pays the full amount of rent due, the landlord must accept the payment and
loses the right to evict the tenant. In the City of Chicago, and in many other jurisdictions, accepting partial payment
will cause the landlord to lose the right to evict the tenant based on the filed notice. Such instances will not appear in
our data since the conflict is resolved prior to court filing.
9

See Appendix C.3 for a map of the six court districts in Cook County.
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the date scheduled for the first hearing, a new attempt must be made to serve the tenant, and
the first hearing is rescheduled.10 Rescheduling the first hearing can sometimes lead to the case
being assigned to a different judge; for example, if the currently assigned judge is transferring
out of eviction court or is on leave. Second, either party has a right to request assignment of a
new judge once. The case is then randomly assigned to another judge.11 Third, either party can
request a trial by jury, which will result in the assignment of a jury trial judge, but such cases
are rare; they comprise only 3 percent of total case volume. Since requests for a new judge may
be endogenous to the initial judge assignment, we use the initial judge assignment to construct
our leniency measure.12
Hearings in eviction court are typically concluded quickly. Court observation studies have
found that the average eviction hearing is completed in less than 2 minutes in Cook County
(Doran et al., 2003). The judge’s main decision is whether to grant the landlord an eviction
order. For joint action cases, in which the landlord is additionally seeking a money judgment,
the judge also decides the amount, if any, to award the landlord. If the judge decides against an
eviction order, the case is dismissed, and no money judgment is awarded. We discuss dismissals
in greater detail below.
The vast majority of tenants (97%) are not represented by an attorney. This stands in
contrast to the high proportion of represented landlords (75%). Figure 3 provides an overview of
possible trajectories an eviction case can take through the court system, as well as a breakdown
of the fraction of cases that follows each path in our data. About two out of three cases result in
an order for eviction.
If an eviction order is granted, the landlord has to subsequently file the order with the Sheriff’s
Office and pay a nonrefundable $60.50 administrative fee. A sheriff’s deputy will then execute
the eviction order, which involves changing the locks and removing any possessions. The sheriff
does not execute all orders for possession, because the landlord may neglect to file the order or
to pay the sheriff, or because occupants voluntarily leave after the judge’s order. According to
data from the Cook County Sheriff’s Office from 2011 to 2015, only 50.6 percent of the cases in
our data with an eviction order are filed with the Sheriff’s Office, and 51.8 percent of those are
executed. For executed evictions, the median time between when the judge issues the eviction
order and when the eviction takes place is 71 days.13 Tenants do not know the exact date on
10

If the tenant cannot be served after multiple attempts, the judge can allow the case to proceed without the
defendant, though in that circumstance no money judgment can be awarded. In about 10 percent of cases, the case is
dismissed prior to the tenant being successfully served, which may occur if the tenant has moved out or if the tenant
and landlord reach an agreement.
11

In the court dockets, 5.9% of cases involve a judge transfer.

12

The method for deriving this information from the case histories is detailed in Appendix D.2.

13

Although enforcement of the order may occur as soon as 24 hours after the order has been filed with the Sheriff’s
Office, the length of time it takes to complete the eviction is determined by the capacity constraints of the Sheriff’s
Office and by a rule that prohibits enforcement of eviction if the temperature is below 15 degrees Fahrenheit. Also, no
evictions are executed between Christmas and New Year’s Day.
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which the eviction will be executed. The Cook County Sheriff’s Office publishes their planned
schedule only 3 days in advance.

2.3

How representative is Cook County?

Cook County’s eviction court procedures are similar to many other eviction courts across the
United States. The process from filing an eviction case to the execution of an order typically
takes several months, which is similar to the duration in other county courts. Other notable
commonalities are the high proportion of unrepresented tenants, the public accessibility of court
records, and the swiftness with which eviction hearings are concluded (Hartman and Robinson,
2003; Greiner et al., 2012; Desmond, 2012; Krent et al., 2016).
The regulatory environment of the rental housing market in Cook County is also broadly
similar to that of most medium to large American cities, with a handful of exceptions. Cook
County has no rent-controlled housing, which can affect landlords’ incentives to evict as well as
tenants’ ability to find new housing if evicted (Diamond et al., 2019). The absence of rent control
is common in American cities, but notable exceptions are Washington, D.C., and some cities
in California, Maryland, New Jersey and New York. Like most cities, Cook County does not
have a comprehensive social safety net aimed at preventing housing instability or homelessness.
For example, there is no “right to shelter” which would guarantee recently evicted individuals
access to a homeless shelter.14 Finally, in Cook County it is legal for a landlord to decline to
extend a lease beyond its stated termination date without citing a specific reason. Such “no
cause” evictions are allowed in most U.S. cities.15 Taken together, these facts suggest that Cook
County’s institutional environment is similar to most American cities, though potentially less
representative of some large cities with more heavily regulated rental markets.

3

Data collection and linkage

The analysis in this paper relies on extensive data collection efforts that have brought together
detailed court case histories spanning a period of seventeen years. These records have been linked
to longitudinal data on defendants’ credit reports. Below, we outline the structure of these data
sets, linkage procedures, and sample selection criteria. Further details on data cleaning and
linkage are available in Appendix D.2.
14

As of this writing, only Massachusetts, New York City, and Washington D.C. have a right to shelter.

15

Cities that prohibit or place restrictions on “no cause” evictions include Seattle, San Francisco, Berkeley, San Diego,
New York City, New Jersey, and New Hampshire.
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3.1

Court records

Our data set on court histories includes the near-universe of eviction cases filed in Cook County
in the years 2000-2016. We assembled this data through the collection of public records,
supplemented with proprietary data sourced from Record Information Services (RIS), a private
company that compiles court records in Illinois. The resulting case-level data set includes the
defendant’s name and address, which are used to link the court records to other data sets. The
data includes all events entered into the electronic case file, beginning with the filing by the
landlord or his attorney. The electronic case files include information on the case type (single or
joint action), filing date, judge’s name, plaintiff’s name, defendant’s name, attorneys’ names if
any, the amount of money claimed by the plaintiff in a joint action case (ad damnum amount),
and details of each hearing, motion, and decision in the case. Importantly, the court records
include eviction orders and money judgments issued by the judge. We supplement these data
with records from the Sheriff’s Office on court summons and the timing of forcible evictions
from 2010-2016, which were obtained by FOIA request. Using tenant addresses, we also append
neighborhood characteristics using data from the American Community Survey.

Sample restrictions on court records.

Our sample of court cases includes all cases

filed between January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2016. We exclude from our analysis cases that
were not concluded by the end of this period. The full sample of cases includes 772,846 named
individuals in 583,871 cases.16 As laid out in Appendix Table D.1, we first drop eviction cases
associated with businesses, cases associated with condominiums, cases for which the defendant’s
name is not provided, and cases involving more than $100,000 in claimed damages. After these
restrictions, we are left with 707,213 named individuals across 546,190 cases, which represent
our main sample of court records. We use this sample to construct leniency measures and to
link credit bureau data. For our IV analysis, we further restrict the sample to cases in which
the judge presided over at least 10 cases that year, and to cases in which at least two judges
presided over eviction cases in that week and district. This sample of cases includes 599,366
named individuals in 466,548 cases, and includes 250 judges who presided over 10 cases in at
least one year. The average judge in our sample presided over more than 700 cases per year.

Conceptualizing treatment and counterfactual. We define a case as ending in eviction
if the judge issues an eviction order. In the court records, this is entered as an “order for possession.”
This definition of an eviction is similar to the one used by Desmond et al. (2018b), who compile
the most complete national database of eviction filings and executions to date, based on court
records.17
16

There are more named individuals than cases because cases commonly list multiple individuals.

17

An alternative definition of treatment is the execution of the eviction order by the Sheriff’s Office – i.e., the
combination of a judge’s order and the Sheriff’s deputy execution of that order. However, this definition introduces
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Cases that do not end in eviction are dismissed, and there are multiple types of dismissals.
Dismissals “with prejudice” bar the landlord from bringing another eviction case with the same
allegations against the tenant. Dismissals “without prejudice” permit the landlord to present
the same case in court again. Dismissals may also be recorded as “dismissed by stipulation or
agreement,” which reflect a settlement in which the tenant may agree to move out or the parties
agree on a payment plan.18
There are several reasons an eviction may generate costs for the tenant. Landlords may screen
tenants based on prior evictions, making it harder for tenants to secure a future rental contract;
other potential creditors may do the same. An eviction is also recorded as a civil judgment on
the tenant’s credit report if it is a joint action case and it ends in a money judgment. An eviction
also requires the tenant to move and incur the costs associated with relocating and reorienting
the household’s work and schooling arrangements. A dismissal increases the likelihood of the
tenant remaining in their current residence, though this is not guaranteed.

3.2

Credit bureau records

Our primary measures of financial strain come from credit files held by Experian, one of the
three largest credit bureaus in the United States.19 The credit report data are biennial snapshots
from March, 2005, to March, 2017, and an additional period, September, 2010. In addition to
the linked sample, we also have a panel of a 10 percent random sample of individuals living in
Cook County in March, 2011, which is linked to the other observation periods. An advantage of
the credit bureau data is that it allows us to follow individuals across eviction cases. We are also
able to follow individuals across neighborhoods, not only within Cook County, but throughout
the US, which is uncommon in studies of the urban poor.20 Another feature of the data is that
we are able to observe a tenant’s interaction with subprime lenders, which we believe is a first in
the housing instability literature.
We analyze the following sets of financial outcomes: overall financial health, unpaid bills,
durable consumption, and access to credit. We also study demand for high-interest loans using
subprime borrowing data, described below. Finally, we study mobility and neighborhood poverty.
These outcomes are described in detail in Appendix D and are briefly described here. All dollar
amounts are expressed in 2016 dollars using the CPI-U for the Chicago metro area.
We measure overall financial health using VantageScore 3.0, which is on a scale of 300-850;
challenges related to identification, interpretation, and measurement. We discuss these challenges in Appendix B.
18
In order to characterize the fraction of dismissals that result in the tenant moving out, we hand-collected additional
court microfilm documents for a random sample of court cases ending in dismissal, which we describe in Appendix D.3.
We find that, for cases with available information, approximately half of dismissals involve the tenant agreeing to pay
the landlord some amount, and slightly more than half of dismissals involve the tenant agreeing to move.
19

Avery et al. (2003) provide a detailed description of this data.

20

The random sample does not include the time-varying ZIP code of residence, so we are unable to compare move
rates in the random sample to those in our linked sample.
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scores under 600 are considered subprime by the credit bureau. We measure unpaid bills as the
total balance in collections. Collections represent unpaid debt, such as credit card balances, which
the original lender decides to turn over to a collections agency following a period of delinquency
(typically at least 30 days).21 Our proxy for durable goods consumption is any positive balance
on an auto loan or lease, following an approach taken by Dobkin et al. (2018) and Dobbie et al.
(2018). We measure whether the tenant has no open source of revolving credit, such as a credit
card, which serves as a proxy for having limited access to credit.22
The credit bureau data are also linked to the largest available database of subprime borrowing
behavior. We measure inquiries into and openings of high-interest single payment microloans.
These account inquiries and openings include those originating from either online or storefront
subprime lenders. We observe subprime loan inquiries for all months between September 2011
and November 2018, and subprime account openings for all months between January 2010 and
November 2018. Note that we only observe subprime borrowing activity for consumers who have
a record in our main credit file. Approximately 66.8 percent of the matched credit sample have
a payday loan account inquiry at some point in the sample period, and 17.28 percent have an
account opening.23 These data are described in more detail in Appendix D.1.
The credit bureau has supplementary information including ZIP code of residence and
demographic information including gender and year of birth.24 We measure moves as a change in
ZIP code, and neighborhood poverty as the ZCTA-level poverty rate. There are 215 ZIP codes
in Cook County, and hence the ZIP code represents a relatively fine unit of geography.25

3.3

Data linkage

The court sample was linked by Experian to credit report data by searching name and address
identifiers against its master file that includes a name and address history. The overall match
rate is 61.3 percent, which is slightly lower but comparable to match rates of studies that use
21

Collections remain on the credit report for up to 7 years from the date the debt first became delinquent and was
not brought current; after 7 years is it automatically removed from the report.
22

A revolving account includes any account in which the individual can carry a balance and is not required to pay
the entire amount at the end of the month.
23

The high-interest loans we study are single payment microloans that originate from traditional storefront or online
subprime lenders. This data is from Clarity, a credit reporting agency that maintains a subprime database of over 62
million unique consumers. We refer to these loans as “payday loans,” even though not all of these microloans are tied to
the individual’s paycheck.
24

Evictions are not directly observable on a credit report, but they may be included in the aggregated category of
civil judgments if the decision includes a money judgment. In those cases, the credit bureau reports the presence of a
money judgment and the judgment amount awarded by the court.
25

From our discussions with data experts at Experian, addresses are recorded through the reporting and inquiry
process, and the ZIP code is not necessarily the most recent address reported, but is the modal address of recently
reported ZIP codes. See Lee and van der Klaauw (2010) for a detailed description of the FRBNY consumer credit
panel, which is a similar data set to the one used here, and Molloy and Shan (2010), which uses it to track residential
moves surrounding foreclosure.
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a similar strategy to link administrative data sets.26 In our analysis, we restrict the sample to
those individuals who are matched to a credit report prior to the eviction filing date, so that the
match is not endogenous to the eviction order.
The matched sample are those who are “credit visible,” meaning they have a credit record.
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau reports that in low-income neighborhoods, slightly
more than 70 percent of adults have a credit record (Brevoort et al., 2015). We expect this
number to be higher in our population since, in Chicago, having a utility bill alone is sufficient
to generate a credit record, and individuals with their name on a lease are likely to have had a
utility bill.27
To better understand our matched sample and how it relates to the overall population of
tenants in eviction court, we explore the characteristics of credit record matches in Appendix
E. Appendix Table E.2 shows that evicted tenants are 1.9 percentage points less likely to be
matched to a credit record, and tenants without legal representation are 1.5 percentage points
less likely to be matched, while tenants in richer neighborhoods are only slightly more likely to
be matched: a $1000 increase in median household income at the ZIP code is associated with a
0.1 percentage point increase in the match rate.
There is minimal attrition in the matched credit panel; an individual who appears in one
period has over 99 percent likelihood of appearing in each future period. We explore attrition
in Appendix Table E.1, which shows that attrition is unrelated to stringency. We regress an
indicator for appearing in a subsequent filing year on judge stringency for each pair of years in
the sample, and cannot reject a null effect of stringency on appearing in a future credit bureau
record for any pair of years.

3.4

Summary statistics

Table 1 presents summary statistics for the sample used in the IV analysis (columns 1 and 2), and
compares this sample to our 10 percent random sample from Cook County, which we reweight
to match the ZIP code distribution of eviction cases (column 3). Comparing the eviction court
sample to the random sample, the eviction court sample is far more likely to be female (64 percent
compared to 50 percent) and is younger than the random sample (40 years old, on average,
compared to 46 in the random sample). Individuals who have an eviction case are more likely
26
For example, Dobkin et al. (2018), using additional identifiers unavailable to us here (SSNs), are able to match 72
percent of their Medicaid sample, and the Oregon Health Experiment has a match rate of 68.5 percent.
27

Up until the summer of 2016, People’s Gas, the main natural gas provider in Chicago, provided “full-file” reporting
to credit bureaus, allowing individuals who would otherwise have no credit score due to thin or no credit history to
have a credit score, potentially helping many build credit (Turner et al., 2008, 2012). As pointed out by PERC (2006),
Illinois was one of the few states with any utility company making full-file reports, which suggests that a much larger
portion of our sample may have credit scores and credit histories compared to cities in other states.
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to be black than a randomly selected individual from their neighborhood.28 Within the sample
of defendants in eviction court, evicted tenants are more likely to be black than non-evicted
tenants, although we note that our race measure is imprecise because we use a probabilistic
imputation based on name and Census tract, with a 75 percent probability threshold.
Tenants in eviction court have substantially more debt relative to individuals in the random
sample from the same neighborhood: the average collections balance for tenants in eviction court,
averaged over the 13-36 month period after filing, is over $3,000 compared to about $1,200 for the
random sample. As we will show in the event studies presented in Section 5, most of this debt is
accumulated before the eviction filing. Similarly, the use of payday loans is much higher among
tenants in eviction court compared to the random sample: payday inquiries among tenants in
eviction court are nearly double that of the random sample, and payday accounts opened are
substantially higher as well (38 percent higher for the evicted group, 93 percent higher for the
non-evicted group).
Table 1 also reports the fraction of our eviction sample with a subsequent eviction case, either
at any address, or at a different address than the reference case. Tenants who appear in eviction
court are likely to appear in a future eviction court case: a tenant who is evicted has a 16.8
percent chance of appearing in eviction court within 36 months, at a different address, compared
to 17.4 for the non-evicted tenants.

4

Selection into eviction court

The empirical approach that has been available to researchers studying eviction thus far is a
comparison of evicted tenants to observationally similar renters, using survey data. This prior
literature uses multivariate regression (Burgard et al., 2012; Desmond and Shollenberger, 2015) or
matching methods (Desmond and Kimbro, 2015; Desmond et al., 2015; Desmond and Gershenson,
2016a), which rely on the assumption that, conditional on observables, eviction is effectively
random. This is a strong assumption, because evicted individuals and individuals not facing
an eviction case are likely to differ in unobservable aspects, which are likely to impact future
outcomes. The extent to which these research designs are able to isolate causal relationships
therefore depends on strong, largely untestable assumptions. In this section, we document the
extent of selection into eviction court, and we show that the effect attributed to eviction is much
smaller when the comparison group is non-evicted tenants.
For our first analysis, we append the 10 percent random sample from Cook County to our
court sample, restricting the random sample to those over age 21 without a mortgage, and
randomly assigning a placebo filing month. We also reweight the regression sample so that the
random sample of individuals matches our eviction court sample in their distribution across ZIP
28

Note that the neighborhood characteristics of the eviction court sample are similar to those of the random sample
by construction, because of the reweighting.
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codes.
Comparing the eviction court sample to the random sample, we can replicate the finding
from the existing literature that the effect of eviction is large and negative. The first bar of
Figure 4 shows a nearly 100 point difference in average credit scores between evicted individuals
and a representative sample from the neighborhood. For context, the credit score is on a scale of
300-850, and 300-579 is considered “very poor.” The second bar adds controls for age, gender,
and year, which does little to close this gap. These results document large differences in levels
between evicted individuals and similar individuals from the neighborhood, and this difference
remains large after controlling for observables. One limitation of this exercise compared to the
literature is that the administrative data contains substantially fewer controls than the survey
data used in past papers.29
The third bar of Figure 4 compares evicted and non-evicted tenants within the eviction court
sample; the average difference in credit score is reduced to less than 20 points, providing strong
evidence that there is substantial selection into eviction court. This difference changes little
when controlling for observable covariates. Finally, the fifth bar additionally controls for lagged
credit score prior to the eviction case. Controlling for lagged credit score further reduces the
gap, demonstrating that there is selection into the eviction decision even once we restrict our
comparison to those in eviction court.30
These results suggest that there are two important sources of selection that must be addressed
when attempting to quantify the causal impact of eviction: selection into appearing in eviction
court, and selection into the court case ending in eviction. To deal with the first source of
selection, we use court records that allow us to compare evicted individuals to individuals in
eviction court who were not evicted. To deal with the second source of selection, we employ an
IV strategy, which we describe in more detail in Section 6. For the remainder of the paper, we
use the eviction court sample. We now turn to the dynamics of financial strain surrounding the
eviction filing.

5

Trends in financial strain and residential mobility

This section presents an event study analysis comparing defendants who are evicted to defendants
whose cases are dismissed. Studying the dynamics into and out of eviction court, we document
substantial increases in financial strain for both evicted and non-evicted defendants beginning
two years prior to the case, and we show no substantial relative increase in financial strain for
the evicted individuals after the case.
29

For example, Desmond and Bell (2015) control for income, race, highest level of education, gender, marital status,
children, age, past criminal record, past job loss, past relationship dissolution, and housing assistance receipt.
30

Appendix Figure G.1 depicts the time path of selection into eviction court for all main analysis variables. This
figure shows selection by financial strain, as measured by levels of indebtedness and demand for payday loans, for both
evicted and non-evicted tenants, relative to the random sample.
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We use the following regression, where r indexes the month relative to the eviction case filing:
yit = γt + δ × Ei +

F
X

βr +

r=S

F
X

δr × Ei + it .

(5.1)

r=S

In the above equation, Ei represents an indicator for the case outcome being eviction, βr
represents coefficients on indicators for month relative to the case filing month, and δr are the
coefficients on indicators for relative month interacted with the eviction outcome. For this
analysis S = −41, F = 72, and the omitted month is S = −42. The only controls included are
calendar year dummies (γt ). Figure 6 plots the βr , depicted as open circles, as well as these
coefficients added to δ + δr , depicted as closed circles. For both sets of coefficients we add in the
non-evicted group mean in S = −42 so that the magnitudes are easy to interpret.31
Overlaid on these nonparametric event studies, we depict a parametric specification of
Equation 5.1, where the right hand side variables include a cubic polynomial in relative month
prior to eviction filing (r < 0), a cubic polynomial in relative month for the months following
eviction filing (r ≥ 0), and these two cubic polynomials interacted with the eviction case outcome.
Again, we add in the baseline mean for ease of interpretation, and the only controls are calendar
year dummies. We require the polynomials on either side of the eviction filing to connect at
r = 0, a choice motivated by the nonparametric event studies, which do not suggest a discrete
jump at the time of filing.
Figure 6 reports results of the event study for several sets of outcomes, while Appendix Table
2 reports DiD estimates, based on the parametric specification, at different time horizons relative
to r = −12. As shown in the top left panel of Figure 6, tenants who appear in eviction court
have very poor credit in the run up to eviction and those whose cases end in eviction have worse
baseline credit scores than the non-evicted group. Both groups experience declining credit scores,
by about 12 credit points, in the 24 months prior to the filing date. Remarkably, the two groups’
credit scores remain broadly parallel throughout the sample period, suggesting that an eviction
does not have an additional scarring effect on credit scores for the evicted group. However, it
takes 4-5 years for the two groups to return to their pre-filing peak.
The top right panel of Figure 6 shows the event study for total balances in collections. Prior
to the eviction case being filed, both evicted and non-evicted groups have over $2,750 of debt
in collections, and both groups see roughly parallel increases in balances in collections. After
eviction court, both groups experience a steep rise in their balances in collections – the evicted
group by approximately $1,000, the non-evicted group by $750. While the gap in collections
balances between the groups widens, the gap is small compared to their average pre-filing balances.
The difference is also small compared to the overall large increase in collections observed for
31

There is a tradeoff between including a longer time series and introducing composition effects in the coefficients.
Appendix Table G.1 shows robustness to several alternative specifications that include restricting to a balanced panel,
adding individual fixed effects, and restricting the sample to individuals’ first cases.
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both groups. In the five years after the case filing, the average collections balance never returns
to the pre-filing average for either group.32
An eviction may be mechanically related to collections debt if the defendant does not pay
the money judgment associated with the eviction case. In this situation, the plaintiff can use
the court process to collect the money, including obtaining a citation to discover assets, wage
garnishment, and using a collections agency. In Appendix Figure G.3, we explore this possibility
by presenting the collections event study separately for joint action and single action cases. This
figure shows a broadly similar evolution of collections debt regardless of whether the plaintiff
seeks a money judgment, suggesting the observed effect is not mechanical.
The bottom two panels of Figure 6 depict the results for having an auto loan or lease and for
having no revolving line of credit. The auto loan variable exhibits flat or slightly increasing trends
in the run-up to eviction court, followed by a drop after filing, along with a widening gap between
evicted and non-evicted tenants. This suggests a decrease in expenditures or consumption of
durable goods. Non-evicted tenants also exhibit this pattern of decreased consumption following
the filing, which shows that both groups of tenants are experiencing strain that coincides with
the timing of the case.33 The bottom right panel of Figure 6 shows that both groups of tenants
have limited access to credit in the run-up to eviction court. Prior to court, about 55 percent of
the non-evicted group and 60 percent of the evicted group have no source of revolving credit
such as a credit card. This rate notably increases for both groups following the court filing and
the gap between evicted and non-evicted widens, suggesting that an eviction has an effect on
credit access.
We now turn to payday loans. The data includes single payment microloan inquiries and
account openings. The inquiries and account openings include both online and storefront loans,
and provide insight into the demand for cash advances among tenants in eviction court. The left
panel of Figure 7 shows the event study for inquiries into payday loans, depicting a dramatic
increase in the 3 years leading up to eviction filing, from about 1 percent per month to about 1.6
percent per month, which is followed by an immediate decline for both groups after the filing
date.
Payday account openings also exhibit a striking increase in the run-up to eviction court.
After the eviction filing, while payday account openings fall for both groups, the non-evicted
group has higher long-run levels of payday loan openings relative to the evicted group. The fact
that inquiries fall in parallel following eviction court but openings remain higher for non-evicted
32

Appendix Figure G.2 further disaggregates the collections event study into the four largest collections categories,
revealing that utilities, retail, and medical debt categories all increase $100 to $150, on average, in the 24 months prior
to filing, and continue to increase by another $50 to $100 in the 24 months after.
33

These descriptive results are not sensitive to how we define a court-ordered eviction. In Appendix Figure G.7 we
show event studies separately by whether a dismissal is “with prejudice,” meaning the case is dismissed and the landlord
may not bring the case again with the same allegations. These event studies disaggregated by case outcome display the
same broad descriptive patterns.
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tenants suggests that an eviction may have a negative effect on the probability of having a loan
approved.
The event studies provide several important takeaways. First, regardless of the case outcome,
households in eviction court show signs of financial strain two to three years prior to having a
case filed against them – with credit scores falling, collections rising, and increased inquiries into
payday loans. Second, even though this analysis restricts the comparison to tenants in eviction
court, we still find that evicted tenants are negatively selected on prior financial outcomes, with
lower credit scores and higher total balances in collections four years before the filing of the cases.
Finally, the event studies do not support the hypothesis that an eviction generates large and
lasting financial strain, but instead suggest that eviction may exacerbate the initial decline and
slow the recovery.
Appendix Figures G.3-G.5 reproduce the regressions behind Figure 6 in order to contrast
these descriptive patterns for several subgroups: (i) joint versus single action cases, (ii) individuals
without prior eviction cases versus individuals with prior cases, (iii) multi-headed versus singleheaded households (as determined by the number of names listed as defendants in the case), (iv)
subprime versus prime credit score two credit periods prior to filing. This sample division is
based on a credit score threshold of 600. These analyses of subgroups look similar to the main
effects with a few nuanced takeaways.
First, the joint action cases reveal more significant impacts of an eviction on credit access
than single action cases. For example, there is a widening gap between evicted and non-evicted
tenants in having a source of revolving credit in the aftermath of the eviction filing date, which
is present for joint action cases but not single action cases. In addition, the impact of eviction on
having an auto loan is much larger for joint action cases than single action cases. These results
are consistent with a civil judgment affecting individuals’ ability to borrow and to finance durable
goods purchases. Second, in the run-up to eviction court, those without prior eviction cases
have both higher levels and steeper growth in their demand for payday loans compared to those
with prior cases. Third, in contrast to multi-headed households, single-headed households have
a steeper rise in their lack of access to revolving credit following eviction court. Single-headed
households also appear to be harder hit in terms of durable goods consumption.
Lastly, we compare defendants with subprime credit scores and defendant with non-subprime
credit scores 25-48 months before the case. Defendants with non-subprime credit scores have a
precipitous drop of 100 points in their credit score in the 24 months prior to filing. This decline
suggests an acute source of distress, such as a drop in income or an increase in expenditures.
Following eviction, these non-subprime borrowers experience a large – 200 percent – increase in
unpaid bills and a doubling in the probability of not having a credit card.
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DiD Estimates
In Figure 6, evicted and non-evicted defendants exhibit similar pre-trends, suggesting that the
event studies can be used to provide causal estimates of the impact of an eviction using a
difference-in-differences design. Appendix Table 2 reports DiD estimates of the effect of eviction,
comparing the difference between evicted and non-evicted tenants at 12, 36, and 60 month
outcome horizons relative to the difference at r = −12. These estimates are based on the
parametric specification presented in the event studies depicted in Figure 6.
The DiD estimates reported in Table 2 provide magnitudes for what is observed in the event
study figures, and Table G.1 explores the sensitivity of these estimates to including individual
fixed effects, restricting the sample to a balanced panel, and restricting to those with no prior
cases. Under the assumption of common trends, these tables confirm that an eviction has almost
no effect on credit score and has a statistically significant 126 to 262 dollar effect on collections
balances at the 36-month horizon. An eviction has a larger impact on access to credit, reflected
in the decline in the probability of an auto loan of 1.1 to 1.5 percentage points at the 36-month
horizon, and an increase in the probability of having no source of revolving credit by 1.4 to
3.7 percentage points at the 36-month horizon. The negative effect on having a revolving line
of credit or a car loan persists at the 60-month horizon. Overall, these results provide initial
evidence that the impact of an eviction on financial strain is small, but may have a meaningful
impact on having a credit card or auto loan.

Analysis of residential moves
For the event study analysis of residential moves, we modify Equation 5.1 so that r is now
measured in years relative to the filing year, rather than months relative to the filing month. We
drop the September 2010 period, so that the sample years are March 2005-2017 biennially, which
allows us to interpret residential ZIP code moves over constant, 24-month intervals. For this
analysis, we include only individuals who are observed 4 or more years prior to eviction filing;
hence individuals are observed in years r = −5, −3, . . . , 5, 7 or r = −4, −2, . . . , 6, 8.34 We define
a ZIP code move as a change in the individual’s 5-digit ZIP code relative to the ZIP code 24
months prior. We choose the baseline (omitted) years r = −5, −4. Thus, the coefficient on βr in
Equation 5.1 is the probability of moving from year r − 2 to year r for the non-evicted group. In
the figures, as before, we add the non-evicted group mean in the base period to the coefficients
for ease of interpretation.
The left panel of Figure 8 presents the estimates of βr and δ + δr + βr , along with the 95
percent confidence intervals. There are several patterns worth pointing out. First, 2-year ZIP
code move rates are high, even several years prior to eviction filing. The non-evicted group has a
move probability of nearly 45 percent over the period from r = −5 to r = −3, while the evicted
34

We find qualitatively similar results if we restrict to individuals observed at least 3 years prior to filing.
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group has around a 46 percent move probability over the same period. For comparison, the
percent of renters that move within a 2-year span in Cook County is approximately 24 percent,
according to our estimates based on the American Community Survey. Hence, tenants in eviction
court are a highly mobile population, and this is true long before the eviction case filing.
Second, the point estimate spikes at r = 1 and peaks at r = 2, reflecting much higher ZIP code
move rates in the 1-2 years following eviction filing. In particular, the 2-year ZIP code move rate
jumps about 7.5 percentage points between the period from r = −2 to r = 0 and from r = −1
to r = 1. The evicted group has a higher move probability over the entire period represented in
Figure 8, and these estimates are statistically significant at the 5 percent significance level. The
gap in move rates between evicted and non-evicted is widest over the period from r = 0 to r = 2
– a gap of around 3.5 percentage points, which is about 8 percent of the non-evicted group mean.
These estimates reflect ZIP code-level moves, and may mask significant differences in move
probabilities within ZIP codes. Appendix J provides an alternative analysis using linked address
histories from InfoUSA. This alternative data source allows us to consider unit-level moves, but
suffers from high levels of missingness and lower match rates. In the InfoUSA data, we find that
more than 20 percent of observed moves in the matched sample are within ZIP code, suggesting
we underestimate overall mobility for both group.
Overall, the results show both evicted and non-evicted groups have relatively high move
probabilities in both the run-up and the aftermath of eviction court, and it takes 5 years to
return to the pre-filing level. The figure also suggests that the difference in move rates of those
with an eviction order compared to those with a dismissal is small relative to the overall high
degree of housing instability for both groups.
The right panel of Figure 8 re-estimates the event study but with a measure of neighborhood
quality as the outcome: the neighborhood (ZCTA-level) poverty rate. The main takeaways from
this panel are that households from higher poverty neighborhoods are more likely to be evicted,
and the gap between evicted and non-evicted widens slightly following eviction. Yet the overall
trend is downward for both groups after three years, indicating that over time both groups are
able to relocate to neighborhoods with lower poverty rates. Note that the only included controls
are calendar year fixed effects; hence the trend downward may reflect improvements over the
lifecycle.
We report DiD estimates of neighborhood moves and neighborhood quality in Table 3 and
robustness results in Appendix Table G.2. The DiD regressions are the same regressions as those
underlying Figure 8, with estimated differences at several time horizons relative to the difference
in the year prior to eviction filing. The estimates reflect what we visually report in Figure 8,
that the effect of an eviction on neighborhood moves is small. There is a small effect on the
tenant’s neighborhood poverty rate at one year after filing relative to the year prior to filing,
increasing the poverty rate by 0.20 off a base of 17.43, but this effect disappears three to five
years after filing.
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6

Instrumental variable analysis

In this section, we present an IV strategy to address the bias resulting from selection and
simultaneity. We discuss how the assumptions that underlie the model are supported by the
institutional environment for court-ordered evictions, and provide empirical evidence in support
of these assumptions.

6.1

Empirical framework

Our empirical strategy exploits the random assignment of judges to eviction cases. Let Ei be an
indicator equal to 1 if the judge orders an eviction for household i, Zj(i) the stringency measure
of judge j assigned to i’s case, and Yi the outcome of interest. To estimate the local average
treatment effect (LATE), we use two stage least squares (2SLS) with first and second stage
equations:
Ei = γZj(i) + Xi0 δ + νi
Yi = βEi + Xi0 θ + ηi
Here Xi is a set of controls that includes district-year fixed effects and household characteristics.
For judge leniency to be a valid instrument, several assumptions need to be satisfied. First,
the instrumental relevance condition needs to hold, which means that judge stringency must be a
relevant predictor of the case outcome. Second, we need exogeneity of the instrument, i.e., Zj(i)
and ηi are independent after conditioning on controls Xi . This assumption implies that judge
leniency affects outcome Yi only through the eviction order decision Ei .
If the effect of eviction is heterogeneous across individuals, we also require monotonicity in
order to interpret the estimate as a local average treatment effect: i.e., those who are evicted
would also be evicted by a stricter judge, and those who are not evicted would also not be evicted
by a more lenient judge.
Under these assumptions, the analysis will recover the local average treatment effect (LATE)
of an eviction: the effect of an eviction for tenants who could have received a different ruling
had their case been assigned to a different judge (Imbens and Angrist, 1994). The effects of
an eviction for this group of tenants is policy relevant, since changes in policy are likely to
affect marginal cases in which the judge’s discretion makes a difference in the case outcome. In
addition, many recent policy proposals explicitly target the eviction court setting.

6.2

Measuring judge stringency

We estimate judge stringency by computing the yearly leave-out mean eviction rate for the initial
judge assignment, and then residualizing it by district-year fixed effects. We use a residualized
stringency measure to account for differences in case types across districts and changes in
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regulation over time. Residualized stringency is constructed using all cases that meet the sample
restrictions laid out in Section 3.3, and not just the linked sample.
The histogram in Figure 5 plots the distribution of judge stringency across cases. The
figure shows that there is a substantial amount of variation in our judge stringency measure. In
particular, there is a 7 percentage point difference between the 10th percentile and 90th percentile
of judge leniency. Appendix Section H.2 provides additional robustness checks, showing that the
first stage does not change notably when we use an alternative procedure for assigning judges
to cases, when we control for additional judge characteristics, or when we adopt a different
threshold for the the minimum number of cases a judge must see in a given year for the case to
be included in the sample.35

6.3

Validating the empirical design

This section provides evidence in support of the required assumptions for our research design to
identify and interpret the LATE. In particular, we validate the random assignment of cases, and
the relevance, exclusion, and monotonicity assumptions underlying the IV strategy.

Random assignment. As discussed above, court cases are randomly assigned a room and
hearing time when the court case is filed. Here, we provide additional empirical evidence that
random assignment holds in practice. Table 4 shows that case characteristics and defendant
characteristics predict the eviction outcome but do not predict the residual stringency of the judge
assigned to the case. The first column presents a regression of the eviction outcome on case and
defendant characteristics, and shows that all of the observed covariates are statistically significant
predictors of an eviction outcome. The second column presents results from a regression of judge
stringency on the same covariates, and shows that all covariates have small and statistically
insignificant effects on the stringency of the judge assigned to the case. The landlord’s total
number of cases in the sample is not a significant predictor of judge stringency, lending support
to the idea that even experienced landlords are unable to select a favorable judge.

Relevance. Next we show that our IV regression has a strong first stage. The black line in
Figure 5 shows the result of a local linear regression of an eviction order on judge stringency,
while the histogram shows the underlying distribution of judge stringency in our data. The
figure shows that there is a strong relationship between judge stringency and the case outcome.
Appendix Table H.3 shows results for the corresponding linear regression. Stringency has a large
and statistically significant impact on eviction, with a p-value of less than 0.0001. The F-statistic
for the full first stage is 86.7 and the partial F-statistic on judge stringency is 1158.9, suggesting
that the stringency instrument passes standard rule-of-thumb tests for weak instruments.
35

Appendix Section H.1 additionally shows that the IV estimates do not change substantially with alternative
constructions of judge stringency, or when using judge fixed effects as instruments.
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Appendix H.2 provides additional robustness checks on the first stage. In particular, Appendix
Table H.4 shows that the first stage is not sensitive to the sample selection criteria, nor is it
sensitive to controls for other potential dimensions of judge stringency (e.g., residual judge
stringency in case length, granting continuances, judgment amount in joint action cases, and
granting stays). In addition, the first stage is largely unchanged when using an alternative
judge stringency measure based on the first judge observed in the case history rather than the
judge assigned at filing. Lastly, we estimate the first stage using a split sample, using stringency
constructed from single action cases to instrument for eviction in joint action cases, and the
converse. Across all of these robustness checks, we find that the coefficient on residual stringency
remains positive, similar to the main specification in magnitude, and is statistically significant
with small standard errors. These checks provide evidence that our first stage is robust to
additional controls, different sample-selection criteria, different construction of judge stringency,
and split-sample estimation of stringency.

Exclusion. In addition to requiring random assignment, our estimation strategy requires
exclusion to hold, i.e., that judge stringency only affects tenant outcomes through the eviction
order. As discussed above, judges make two key decisions: the eviction order and, in joint action
cases, the judgment amount. Multi-dimensional sentencing makes it more challenging to isolate
the impact of the component of interest, in this case, the eviction (see, e.g., Mueller-Smith
(2015) and Bhuller et al. (2019)). Aside from the two main areas of judge discretion, judges may
also influence other minor aspects of the case. For instance, judges may grant a continuance
to give the defendant additional time to find legal assistance. Judges may also grant a stay of
the eviction order, which provides evicted tenants more time to find new housing arrangements
before the sheriff is permitted to carry out the order.
We construct additional stringency measures with respect to the judgment amount, the
propensity to grant a continuance, and the propensity to grant a stay of the order. Similar to
the stringency measure for eviction orders, these stringency measures are calculated as leave-out
means by judge-year and are residualized by district-year fixed effects.36 Exclusion will be
violated if eviction stringency is correlated with the other three measures of stringency, the other
measures affect outcomes, and they are not directly controlled for in the analysis. Appendix
Table H.5 evaluates the correlation between the four residual measures of judge stringency. The
correlations between the various residual stringency measures are small. The largest correlation
is between eviction stringency and judgment amount stringency, which have a correlation of
0.098. Column 1 of Appendix Table H.6 shows the first stage regression of eviction on judge
eviction stringency controlling for the three other measures of judge stringency. While judgment
amount stringency and continuance stringency are weakly statistically significant predictors of
36
Stringency for granting stays is calculated using only cases ending in an eviction order. Judgment amount stringency
is defined as the judgment amount minus the ad damnum amount and is only calculated for joint action cases ending in
an eviction order.
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eviction, the coefficient on eviction stringency is largely unchanged from our main specification.
In the second column, we regress eviction stringency on the other three stringency measures and
find that none are statistically significant predictors.37
As we will show in Section 7, the IV results are largely unchanged when either controlling
for other dimensions of judge stringency in the first and second stage, or including judgment
amount as a second endogenous variable and instrumenting with judgment amount stringency.

Monotonicity. For the IV estimates to be interpreted as local average treatment effects,
we need the monotonicity assumption to hold. In our context, monotonicity requires that any
defendant who is not evicted would also not be evicted by a more lenient judge and, conversely,
that any defendant who is evicted would also be evicted by a more stringent judge. One test of
the monotonicity assumption is that the first stage estimates should be non-negative for any
subsample, e.g., by race or neighborhood income quartile. The data allow for detailed subsamples,
including interactions between judge characteristics and individual characteristics.
Appendix Table H.10 presents the coefficients from a regression of eviction on residual
stringency and the controls used in Appendix Table H.3, but restricted to several different
subpopulations. If judge stringency is negatively related to eviction for any subpopulation, it
would provide evidence that monotonicity of judge leniency does not hold. The first row shows
the coefficient from the main sample, while the remaining rows show the coefficient by case
type, gender, attorney status, race, and landlord size. Across all subsamples, the coefficient on
stringency keeps the same sign and does not vary widely, providing evidence that monotonicity
is not violated.
In Section H.4 of the Appendix, we provide additional tests of monotonicity by conditioning
on both judge characteristics and defendant characteristics for a subset of judges who see the most
cases in our data. For this exercise, we hand-collected additional demographic and background
information for more than 150 judges. As shown in Appendix Table H.12, the coefficient is
positive for all but three of these two-way interactions, which provides additional evidence that
monotonicity is satisfied in this setting.38
37

Appendix Table H.7 additionally shows results from the regression of judgment amount on eviction stringency in
cases in which there is an eviction and a money judgment. Regardless of which controls are included, eviction stringency
is statistically insignificant, further suggesting that a judge’s eviction stringency only affects the amount owed through
the eviction ruling.
38

The three instances in which the coefficient is not positive, the coefficient is statistically insignificant. All three of
these cases involve Hispanic judges, of which there are only 8, resulting in a substantially smaller sample. See Section
H.4 of the Appendix for more details.
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7

Results: IV analysis

In the regressions that follow, the dependent variable is averaged for each individual over two
periods: the 13-36 month period following the eviction filing month, and the 37-60 month period
following the filing month. Our results are not sensitive to alternative choices of short and long
horizons.

Financial strain
Table 5 presents the main evidence on the effects of eviction on tenants’ financial strain for both
the short run (panel I) and the long run (panel II). The OLS estimates presented in columns
1-3 reflect cross-sectional differences between evicted and non-evicted tenants, conditional on
covariates.39
Following the court case, tenants who are evicted are more distressed than those who are
not evicted. The first row of column 1 shows a gap of 16.7 credit score points (or about 0.2
of a standard deviation). With additional controls in column 2, the credit score difference is
cut almost in half, and the results on collections balances and having an auto loan exhibit a
similar pattern. Column 3 reweights the OLS regression so that the regression sample matches
the distribution of compliers based on observable characteristics.40 Column 4 presents the
reduced-form regression of the outcome on residualized stringency, and column 5 presents the
main IV specification, in which we instrument for eviction using residualized stringency. The
IV specification shows a modest negative effect of eviction on credit score over both the 13-36
month period (14.2 points) and the 37-60 month period (15.5 points). Both groups on average
remain in the subprime category of creditworthiness following eviction court.
We next examine the effect of eviction on access to credit, as measured by the tenant having
no open revolving account. The majority of tenants – 55 percent of the non-evicted group and 61
percent of the evicted group – have no open revolving line of credit in the 13-36 months following
eviction. Our IV estimates show that an eviction increases the probability of having no open
revolving account: 8.7 percentage points over the 13-36 month horizon, although statistically
insignificant, and 14.7 percentage points over the 37-60 month horizon, and significant at the 5
percent level. This effect is large, representing a 27 percent increase from the baseline non-evicted
group mean, and suggests one channel through which an eviction impacts tenants is in reducing
their access to credit.
39

All columns include controls for case type, ad damnum amount, gender, race, a cubic in age at filing date, dummies
for missing covariates, and district-year fixed effects. Columns 2-5 control for additional pre-filing measures of financial
strain; these are the individual means, over their pre-filing observations of credit score, collections debt, and an indicator
for having an auto loan.
40
Following Bhuller et al. (2019) and Dobbie et al. (2018), we predict the probability of eviction using our baseline
controls and divide the sample into 8 subgroups based on their predicted probability, where Dg is an indicator for
belonging to subgroup g. We then compute P r{Dg = 1|Complier}/P r{Dg = 1}, which are the weights used in column
3. See Appendix H.7 for more details.
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Turning next to collections balances, the OLS results show evicted tenants have approximately
664 dollars more in collections debt 13-36 months after eviction, conditional on controls. The
reduced form regression on stringency and the IV estimate, presented in columns 4 and 5, are
$134 and $209, respectively, statistically insignificant and small relative to the non-evicted mean
collections balances of $3,054. The standard error on the IV estimate is fairly large, however;
the 95 percent confidence interval is [−736, 1155], meaning we cannot rule out a causal impact
of eviction on collections debt of up to $1155 with 95 percent confidence, which is roughly a 0.26
standard deviation increase. Nevertheless, the IV point estimate aligns with the event study
depictions, and lend support to the finding of modest effects on unpaid bills.
We also study the effect of eviction on durable goods consumption, which we proxy by using
an indicator for having an auto loan or lease. The IV estimate shows that an eviction causes
a decline in the probability of having an open auto loan or lease by 6.0 percentage points over
the 13-36 month period. This result is large in magnitude relative to the non-evicted mean of
20 percent and lends support to one of the key takeaways of the event studies, that durable
consumption declines as a result of an eviction.
We next examine payday loan inquiries and openings. The OLS results in columns 1-3 reveal
that evicted tenants are approximately 1.01 percentage points less likely to have a payday inquiry
over the 13-36 months following the eviction filing, relative to a non-evicted group mean of 14.5
percent. This result may reflect that evicted tenants have lower demand for high interest loans
following eviction, e.g., because of moving into lower-rent units, or because of changes on the
supply side, due to lenders declining to lend to those with an eviction. The IV estimate for
payday inquiries is statistically insignificant but the confidence interval is somewhat large; over
the 13-36 month period, the confidence interval is [−1.68, 13.15], meaning we can rule out an
effect size of .37 of a standard deviation increase or larger with 95 percent confidence.
The OLS estimates on payday account openings show that evicted tenants are about .56 to
.64 percentage points less likely to open a payday account in the 13-36 months following eviction
court, from a baseline non-evicted mean of 2.34 percent (about a 25 percent decrease). Compared
to the OLS estimate, the IV estimate has the opposite sign and is statistically significant at
the 10 percent level, implying that an eviction causes an increase in short term high-interest
borrowing of 2.92 percentage points (a 125 percent increase). The contrast with the OLS estimate
highlights the importance of a causal design in the eviction setting. One plausible interpretation
of this finding is that an eviction causes tenants to be cut off from traditional sources of credit
(seen in the increase in the probability of having no revolving source of credit) and seek payday
loans as an alternative. In the longer run, i.e., over the 37-60 month horizon, an eviction has a
-11.69 percentage point effect on the probability of an inquiry, statistically significant at the 1
percent level. The effect on the probability of an account opening is statistically insignificant,
although the large confidence interval prevents us from drawing strong conclusions.
Appendix Tables H.14 and H.15 consider heterogeneity along several key dimensions: (i) joint
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action versus single action, (ii) multi-headed households versus single-headed households, (iii)
those without prior cases versus those with a prior case, and (iv) those living in above median
poverty neighborhoods versus those living in below median poverty neighborhoods. Somewhat
surprisingly, the negative effect of eviction on credit score is stronger among single action cases
compared to joint action cases; the IV estimate is -30.53 credit points relative to -7.37. This
result is unexpected because in single action cases, unlike joint action cases, the eviction does
not appear as a money judgment on the credit file and thus would not mechanically affect the
credit score. The effects on durable goods consumption are larger for joint action cases, however,
which suggests greater strain on households from losing a joint action case. This may be caused
by the obligation to pay the judgment amount, or because lenders who would underwrite an
auto loan can observe the money judgment on tenants’ credit files. The negative consumption
effects are also larger for those with a prior case, for single-headed households, and for those in
higher poverty neighborhoods.
It is important to consider whether the effect sizes we measure depend on our definition of
treatment. The control group in the main specification includes all dismissals. A particularly
strong form of dismissal is a dismissal with prejudice, which prevents the landlord from bringing
the same case with the same allegations against the tenant in the future. As a robustness check,
we perform our analysis after redefining the treatment as a dismissal with prejudice, relative
to all other case outcomes. The instrument is also redefined, so that residualized stringency is
based on dismissals with prejudice. Appendix Table H.16 shows the re-estimated results, with
the estimates changing sign due to the redefined treatment. The OLS estimates are similar in
magnitude, while the IV estimates are more imprecise than our main results, likely because
dismissals with prejudice are uncommon.
As a final robustness exercise, we explore the sensitivity of the IV results to the exclusion
restriction. Recall that the IV regression requires an assumption that judge stringency affects
the financial strain outcomes only through the order for possession. Since judges may also decide
on the money judgment, there is a potential for the effect to run through the judgment amount
as well. Hence, following the approach of Bhuller et al. (2019), we construct a second stringency
measure based only on judgment amount, where dismissals receive a value of 0. We perform two
exercises: first, we control for this second stringency measure in both first and second stages
of our main IV regressions; second, we allow for two endogenous regressors (eviction order and
judgment amount) and instrument for these two measures using the two stringency measures.
Appendix Table H.8, panel A, depicts the first stage with and without the second stringency
measure, showing that the relationship between our main stringency measure and the eviction
order is largely unchanged by including the second stringency measure as a control. Panel
B.I shows the reduced form regression of our three financial strain outcomes on the eviction
stringency, and then again with the second stringency measure added in. The results appear to
show the main effects running through our main eviction stringency measure rather than the
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judgment amount stringency. Panel B.II controls for the judgment stringency in the first and
second stage, and Panel B.III shows the two instrument, two endogenous regressors approach.
Both panels show our main IV estimates to be unaffected when we include the second stringency
measure, based on the judgment amount. The analysis of auto loans (columns 5 and 6) clearly
shows that the eviction order itself, rather than the judgment amount, is the driver of reduced
consumption.41

Residential moves
Table 6 presents the evidence for the effect of eviction on residential moves, neighborhood quality,
and future eviction case filings. The sample is identical to the financial strain sample. For each
individual the case filing ZIP code is the reference ZIP code. We examine the effect of eviction on
having a different ZIP code at 13-36 months after filing and at 37-60 months. If the individual
moves between filing and 13-36 months and moves back by the 37-60 month horizon, we code
this as a move by 37-60 months. We also examine the effect on any future eviction filing from 1
to 36 months after the case.
Similar to the event studies in Section 5, the OLS analysis shows that evicted tenants have a
higher probability of moving to another ZIP code: 13-36 months after the case filing, they are
4.2 percentage points more likely to move ZIP codes (columns 1-3) compared to the non-evicted
group, for which 57.8 percent moved ZIP codes. The LATE point estimate implies that an eviction
increases the probability of moving ZIP codes by 8.4 percentage points, but it is statistically
indistinguishable from 0, hence we cannot rule out that an eviction has no effect on moving
to a different neighborhood. The 95-percent confidence interval is quite large and we cannot
rule out that eviction increases the move rate by 21.9 percentage points or decreases the move
rate by 5.1 percentage points. For the 37-60 month horizon, the OLS results are very similar
while the IV results are small, negative, and statistically insignificant, with a short run effect of
-1.6 percentage points off a base of 73.2 percent for the control group. Nevertheless, the point
estimates for both the short and long run are aligned with the event study, which shows high
move rates for both evicted and non-evicted tenants surrounding the eviction, and relatively
small differences between evicted and non-evicted tenants over time.
The OLS estimates also show that evicted tenants live in higher poverty neighborhoods
relative to non-evicted tenants, and this is true both at 13-36 months and 37-60 months after
filing. These OLS results line up with Desmond and Shollenberger (2015), who study survey
data collected in Milwaukee. They find that renters who experienced a forced move (including
eviction) relocate to poorer neighborhoods, as compared to those who move voluntarily. However,
41

The IV results provide an estimate of the effect of eviction for those whose cases could have had different outcomes
if assigned a different judge. Appendix Section I provides estimates of the marginal treatment effect of eviction for
outcomes related to financial strain. Following Brinch et al. (2017), we find that the effects of eviction are somewhat
larger for those with unobservables that make them more likely to be evicted, though the overall heterogeneity across
latent resistance to treatment is limited.
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the IV estimate of the effect of an eviction on tenants’ neighborhood poverty rate 13-36 months
after filing is -2.03 and statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The point estimate at
37-60 months is similar in magnitude but no longer statistically significant.
Using the credit bureau data, we can follow individuals across eviction cases, despite many of
the defendants changing names due to marriage, divorce, or having a first name that exhibits
slight variations across cases (e.g., “Jim Smith” versus “James Smith”). The last two rows of
each panel of Table 6 examines whether being evicted has a causal effect on a future eviction
filing. Being evicted has a large negative causal effect on having an eviction filing in the next
3 years from any address (-16.3 percentage points off a base of 29.2). This result is driven by
the fact that non-evicted tenants are more likely to face an eviction case at the same address
in the future. The last row of each panel shows the effect of eviction on the probability of a
future eviction filing from a different address, and shows no statistically significant effect and a
near-zero point estimate. Taken together, these results provide some evidence against the idea
that eviction contributes to a “slipperiness” of tenants’ housing situation through an increase in
future filings.42
As a robustness check to the ZIP code level move results, Appendix J provides an alternative
analysis using InfoUSA address histories. This alternative data allows us to consider unit-level
moves, but suffers from high levels of missingness and a lower match rate. Using this data,
the OLS results show that an eviction is associated with a 2 percentage point increase in the
probability of being observed at a new address, an 8 percentage point reduction in the probability
of being observed at the same address, and a 6 percentage point increase in having no updated
information on address of residence in the two years after the case is filed. The IV estimates
with this data are imprecise with no statistically significant effects.
Using the InfoUSA data, we document two additional important facts. First, 27 percent
of observed moves for the matched sample are within ZIP code, suggesting that the analysis
above using moves across ZIP code are an underestimate of unit-level mobility. Second, the
matched sample is 37 percent less likely to have an updated address in any given year compared
to a random sample from Cook County, highlighting the difficulty of estimating the mobility of
individuals at risk of eviction.

8

Conclusion

Using seventeen years of linked Cook County court records, this paper uses DiD and IV designs
to study the causal effect of eviction on financial distress, residential mobility, and neighborhood
quality. The paper draws two broad conclusions.
First, we find that eviction negatively impacts credit access and durable consumption for
42

Note that if eviction makes it harder for tenants to get a new lease, tenants may be less likely to be the signatory
on a new lease, which may put downward pressure on the probability of a future eviction for the evicted group.
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several years. However, when we consider the magnitude of these effects in the context of the
financial strain experienced by both evicted and non-evicted tenants in the years preceding an
eviction case, the effects are small. In addition, we do not find evidence of a causal impact on
debt in collections, residential mobility, or neighborhood poverty, and find a small impact on
credit score.
Second, bias due to selection on levels and trends, if ignored, leads to the erroneous conclusion
that eviction has large impacts on financial distress. Using an additional panel of credit records
for a random sample of Cook County residents, we replicate analyses from existing studies,
showing that comparisons of evicted tenants to tenants not in eviction court (controlling for
observable characteristics) imply large effects attributed to eviction. In contrast, when we limit
the sample to tenants in eviction court, OLS regressions comparing evicted tenants to non-evicted
tenants produce much smaller estimates.
This paper provides estimates of how an eviction affects financial distress and residential
mobility, but several important questions remain for future research. First, this analysis does not
address how policies aimed at reducing the number of evictions, such as making court proceedings
more tenant-friendly, may affect the equilibrium in the rental market. For example, landlords may
be less willing to rent to low income tenants. Second, we do not provide estimates of the welfare
impacts of an eviction on tenants, but rather the effects for a specific subset of observable outcomes. Finally, we cannot directly speak to the effectiveness of policies targeting populations at
risk of eviction, such as emergency relief funds, or assistance programs for recently evicted tenants.
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Table 1: Summary statistics: IV sample

Evicted

Not Evicted

Person characteristics
Age at case
Female
Black

39.990
0.641
0.517

(12.659)
(0.480)
(0.500)

40.251
0.638
0.480

(12.726)
(0.481)
(0.500)

Case Characteristics
Eviction order
Ad Damnum Amount (1000s)
Joint Action
Tenant Pro Se
Landlord Pro Se

1.000
2.629
0.842
0.970
0.247

(0.000)
(3.996)
(0.365)
(0.170)
(0.431)

0.000
2.333
0.805
0.945
0.239

(0.000)
(4.151)
(0.396)
(0.228)
(0.426)

Neighborhood Characteristics
Median household inc. (1000s)
Poverty Rate
Median Rent
Pct. White
Pct. Black

47.622
18.418
965.304
0.357
0.485

(17.901)
(9.782)
(174.219)
(0.291)
(0.376)

50.028
17.447
987.655
0.389
0.448

528.307
0.625
3,789.295
0.140
13.609
1.676

(67.987)
(0.480)
(4,780.772)
(0.343)
(34.289)
(12.836)

0.205
0.168

(0.404)
(0.374)

Subsequent Outcomes (13-36 mo.)
Credit Score
No Open Revolving Account
Total bal. collections
Any Auto Loan or Lease
Any Payday Inquiry × 100
Any Payday Account × 100
Subsequent Eviction Cases
Any Eviction Case (36 mo.)
Eviction Case at Dif. Address (36 mo.)

Random sample

45.713
0.501

(17.116)
(0.500)

(19.171)
(9.788)
(197.148)
(0.294)
(0.371)

48.162
18.176
971.870
0.365
0.476

(18.012)
(9.762)
(182.106)
(0.292)
(0.374)

546.962
0.553
3,053.894
0.199
14.536
2.343

(80.024)
(0.493)
(4,391.669)
(0.396)
(35.247)
(15.126)

620.700
0.409
1,164.431
0.125
7.441
1.212

(106.213)
(0.489)
(2,886.026)
(0.329)
(26.244)
(10.940)

0.289
0.174

(0.453)
(0.379)

Notes: The table above presents means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of key variables in our linked credit bureau
sample used in the IV analysis. The random sample is restricted to those over age 21 with no open mortgage trade, and has
been reweighted to match the distribution of individuals across neighborhoods in the eviction sample. We randomly assign a
placebo eviction date to the random sample to compare financial outcomes. “Tenant Pro Se” is an indicator for the tenant
having no formal legal representation. “Landlord Pro Se” is an indicator for the landlord having no formal legal representation.
See notes in the text for the sample restrictions to the eviction court sample. Race is imputed using last name and Census
tract (Imai and Khanna, 2016; Khanna et al., 2017), but is unavailable for the random sample.
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Table 2: DiD estimates: credit bureau outcomes

12-Month Effect
36-Month Effect
60-Month Effect
Baseline non-evict mean
Number of individuals
Number of observations

Credit score

Total Collections

Any Auto Loan

No Revolving Credit

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-2.828∗∗∗
( 0.369)
-2.175∗∗∗
( 0.386)
-2.133∗∗∗
( 0.451)
552.23
251,036
1,302,930

191.218∗∗∗
( 22.971)
157.990∗∗∗
( 27.426)
-0.982
( 31.355)
2,674.78
252,718
1,310,057

-0.012∗∗∗
( 0.002)
-0.013∗∗∗
( 0.002)
-0.003
( 0.003)
0.18
254,578
1,320,322

0.014∗∗∗
( 0.002)
0.015∗∗∗
( 0.003)
0.009∗∗∗
( 0.003)
0.49
254,578
1,320,322

Notes: The table above presents DiD estimates of the polynomials in Figure 6, at different time horizons
relative to r = −12. The regression is yit = γt + β1 r + β2 r2 + β3 r3 + β4 r{r > 0} + β5 r2 {r > 0} + β6 r3 {r >
0} + δ0 E + δ1 E × r + δ2 E × r2 + δ3 E × r3 + δ4 E × r{r > 0} + δ5 E × r2 {r > 0} + δ6 E × r3 {r > 0} + it . The
table includes standard errors of the DiD estimates, which are clustered at the individual level.

Table 3: DiD estimates: moves and neighborhood quality

12-Month Effect
36-Month Effect
60-Month Effect
Baseline non-evict mean
Number of individuals
Number of observations

Move Zipcode in Past 24 months

Neighborhood Poverty Rate

(1)

(2)

0.004
( 0.005)
0.003
( 0.006)
0.000
( 0.006)
0.43
115,023
770,472

0.202∗∗∗
( 0.066)
0.127
( 0.085)
0.090
( 0.103)
17.43
115,022
790,598

Notes: This table presents DiD estimates of the regressions underlying Figure 8, at different time
horizons relative to the year prior to eviction filing. The table includes standard errors clustered at
the individual level.
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Table 4: Random assignment of judges
(1)
Evicted

(2)
Judge Stringency

Landlord number
of cases

-0.00262∗∗∗
(0.00045)

0.00003
(0.00002)

Joint Action

0.04533∗∗∗
(0.00700)

-0.00011
(0.00031)

Ad Damnum Amount
(1000s)

0.00364∗∗∗
(0.00037)

0.00002
(0.00002)

Age at case

-0.00850∗∗∗
(0.00147)

0.00005
(0.00009)

Age2 /1000

0.16616∗∗∗
(0.03059)

-0.00076
(0.00174)

Age3 /1000

-0.00102∗∗∗
(0.00020)

0.00000
(0.00001)

Female

-0.00485∗∗
(0.00212)

-0.00004
(0.00013)

Black

0.02680∗∗∗
(0.00227)

-0.00003
(0.00011)

Missing female

-0.01549∗∗∗
(0.00527)

-0.00012
(0.00033)

Missing age

-0.18362∗∗∗
(0.02413)

0.00064
(0.00138)

232,834
41.843
0.000

232,834
0.468
0.879

Number of observations
Joint F-Test Stat.
p-value

Notes: The left column shows results for a regression of eviction status on case and
defendant characteristics. The right column shows results for a regression of residual
stringency on case and defendant characteristics. “Landlord number of cases” is the
number of eviction cases in which the landlord served as plaintiff in the sample. “Joint
Action” is an indicator for if the case was a joint action case seeking an eviction order
and a money judgment rather than a single action case seeking only a money judgment.
“Ad Damnum Amount” is the amount the landlord listed as owed by the defendant at
the time of filing. The “Black” indicator is based on a Bayesian prediction of race based
on last name and census tract. Both columns use the linked IV sample and include
district-year fixed effects.
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Table 5: The effect of eviction on financial strain
Non-evicted mean

OLS: Evicted

RF: Stringency

IV: Evicted

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

546.964
( 80.025)
0.553
( 0.493)
3,054.056
(4,391.713)
0.199
( 0.396)
14.513
( 35.224)
2.344
( 15.129)

-16.706***
( 0.426)
0.064***
( 0.003)
664.343***
( 24.453)
-0.060***
( 0.002)
-1.009***
( 0.204)
-0.641***
( 0.074)

-8.821***
( 0.378)
0.038***
( 0.003)
444.512***
( 22.989)
-0.040***
( 0.002)
-1.246***
( 0.202)
-0.605***
( 0.072)

-8.715***
( 0.369)
0.037***
( 0.003)
442.562***
( 23.345)
-0.040***
( 0.002)
-1.253***
( 0.188)
-0.562***
( 0.069)

-9.067*
( 4.822)
0.056
( 0.035)
133.910
( 308.343)
-0.039*
( 0.022)
3.669
( 2.421)
1.890*
( 0.976)

-14.151*
( 7.459)
0.087
( 0.054)
209.391
( 482.336)
-0.060*
( 0.035)
5.738
( 3.784)
2.915*
( 1.523)

555.935
( 81.929)
0.541
( 0.494)
2,965.622
(4,436.617)
0.199
( 0.395)
13.176
( 33.824)
2.374
( 15.225)

-15.898***
( 0.455)
0.056***
( 0.003)
534.060***
( 27.958)
-0.054***
( 0.002)
-0.425**
( 0.171)
-0.475***
( 0.068)

-7.772***
( 0.410)
0.034***
( 0.002)
381.941***
( 26.124)
-0.040***
( 0.002)
-0.739***
( 0.170)
-0.436***
( 0.067)

-7.773***
( 0.402)
0.034***
( 0.002)
374.248***
( 25.832)
-0.039***
( 0.002)
-0.762***
( 0.157)
-0.419***
( 0.063)

-9.923*
( 5.172)
0.094**
( 0.038)
-126.018
( 365.032)
-0.056*
( 0.030)
-7.399***
( 2.650)
-0.223
( 0.971)

-15.460*
( 8.105)
0.147**
( 0.060)
-196.011
( 566.201)
-0.087*
( 0.047)
-11.687***
( 4.178)
-0.343
( 1.493)

Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes

I. Financial Strain: 13-36 mon.
Credit Score
No Open Revolving Account
Total bal. collections
Any Auto Loan or Lease
Any Payday Inquiry × 100
Any Payday Account × 100
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II. Financial Strain: 37-60 mon.
Credit Score
No Open Revolving Account
Total bal. collections
Any Auto Loan or Lease
Any Payday Inquiry × 100
Any Payday Account × 100
Additional controls
Complier re-weighted

Notes: The table above reports OLS and two-stage least squares results of the impact of eviction on measures of financial strain at 13-36 months after filing
(panel I) and 37-60 months after filing (panel II). Columns 1-3 present OLS estimates of the financial strain outcome on an indicator for eviction. Column
4 presents an OLS regression on stringency, which is the judge-year leave-out mean eviction rate after residualizing of district-year fixed effects. Column 5
presents the two-stage least squares regressions, instrumenting for eviction with stringency. The dependent variable is listed in each row. All specifications
control for district-year fixed effects, case type, ad damnum amount, a cubic in age at case, and indicators for the tenant being female, black, and for missing
covariates. Columns with additional controls include pre-filing averages for credit score, collections balance, and auto loan or lease, and indicators for these
pre-filing covariates being missing. Robust standard errors are clustered at the judge-year level.

Table 6: The effect of eviction on moves and neighborhood quality

Non-evicted mean

OLS: Evicted

RF: Stringency

IV: Evicted

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

0.578
( 0.494)
16.958
( 10.077)

0.042***
( 0.002)
0.821***
( 0.054)

0.043***
( 0.002)
0.421***
( 0.054)

0.043***
( 0.002)
0.434***
( 0.054)

0.052
( 0.043)
-1.252*
( 0.656)

0.084
( 0.069)
-2.027*
( 1.062)

0.732
( 0.443)
16.674
( 10.119)

0.043***
( 0.002)
0.866***
( 0.068)

0.040***
( 0.002)
0.469***
( 0.068)

0.039***
( 0.002)
0.472***
( 0.068)

-0.010
( 0.036)
-1.052
( 0.760)

-0.016
( 0.058)
-1.683
( 1.213)

0.292
( 0.455)
0.175
( 0.380)

-0.090***
( 0.003)
-0.008***
( 0.003)

-0.099***
( 0.003)
-0.017***
( 0.003)

-0.100***
( 0.003)
-0.017***
( 0.003)

-0.102***
( 0.035)
0.004
( 0.029)

-0.163***
( 0.055)
0.007
( 0.046)

Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes

I. Outcomes 13-36 months after filing
Move Zipcode
Neighborhood poverty rate (×100)

II. Outcomes 37-60 months after filing
Move Zipcode
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Neighborhood poverty rate (×100)

III. Future Eviction Cases
Any Eviction Case (36 mo.)
Eviction Case at Dif. Address (36 mo.)
Additional controls
Complier re-weighted

Notes: The table above presents OLS and two-stage least squares regressions of the effect of eviction on the probability of moving ZIP codes
between the filing month and the outcome period. It also estimates the effect of eviction on the ZCTA-level poverty rate and on the probability
of a future eviction filing. See Table 5 for details on the regression specification of each column and the controls. Robust standard errors are
clustered at the judge-year level.

Figure 1: Evictions in Cook County, 2000-2016
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Notes: This figure depicts yearly counts of evictions filed and ordered in Cook County, IL. For comparison, it also
depicts the number of foreclosure filings in Cook County, IL. Data on foreclosures is obtained from the data portal
maintained by the Institute for Housing Studies at DePaul University (IHS, 2018).
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Figure 2: Eviction rate in 2010

Notes: This figure depicts the locations of properties for which the court ordered an eviction in Chicago (indicated
as dots), along with the rate of evictions by census tract (indicated by the shaded regions). The rate is defined as
the number of evictions divided by the number of occupied rental units in the census tract (based on 2006-2010
American Community Survey 5-Year Data). Estimates exclude evictions of businesses and other non-residential
evictions. In 2010, the eviction rate from occupied rental units was approximately 2.46 percent. This estimate
uses occupied rental units as the denominator, which may omit houses that could be, or were previously, rented.
Using all housing units in the census tract, we find an eviction rate of 0.93 percent, which provides a conservative
estimate. There is substantial heterogeneity across tracts, with 9 tracts having eviction rates above 10 percent.
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Figure 3: The eviction court process in Cook County

Time of randomization

Judge

Order for possession
(66%)

Money judgment
(74%)

(97%)
Dismissal (34%)

Landlord files court case

First hearing

Jury
(3%)

Order for possession
(57%)

Money judgment
(53%)

Dismissal
(43%)

Notes: This figure depicts the possible paths eviction cases can take through the court system. Percentages are
calculated for our baseline analysis sample.
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Figure 4: Selection into eviction court

1

2

3

4

5

1) Evicted VS Matched

2) Evicted VS Matched (controls)

3) Evicted VS Not Evicted

4) Evicted VS Not Evicted (controls)

5) Evicted VS Not Evicted (controls and lag)

95% CI

Notes: Column 1 plots the difference in credit score at 13-36 months after filing, for the court sample versus the random sample
(for which the filing date is assigned at random). Column 2 is reproduces column 1 with demographic controls (age, gender,
and year). Column 3 plots the difference in credit score at 13-36 months after filing, for evicted versus non-evicted in the court
sample. Column 4 reproduces column 3 with demographic controls. Column 5 reproduces column 4 with an additional control
for individual mean credit score over the pre-filing period. See Appendix Figure F.1 for a similar analysis of other outcomes.
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Figure 5: Judge stringency
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0.56
−0.04
−0.04
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0.00

0.040.04

Stringency
Stringency
Notes: The figure above graphically depicts the first stage of the main estimation equation, showing how the
probability of eviction is affected by judge stringency. The histogram shows the density of year-specific judge
stringency for judges who see at least 10 cases per year, and is plotted along the left y-axis. The solid line plots
estimates of the first stage regression with eviction as the dependent variable, a local linear polynomial in judge
stringency, and district-year fixed effects. The plotted values are fitted values of eviction rate at the value of judge
stringency indicated on the x-axis and probability of eviction plotted along the right y-axis. Shaded area shows
the 95 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 6: Evolution of financial strain relative to the eviction filing month

P
Notes: The figure plots estimates of {βr } and {δ + δr + βr } from the regression: yit = γt + δ × Ei + F
r=S βr +
PF
r=S δr × Ei + it . The omitted month is -48. Overlaid is a parametric specification where the right hand side
variables include a cubic in relative month in the months leading up to eviction filing (r < 0), a cubic in relative
month for the months following eviction filing (r ≥ 0), and these two cubics interacted with eviction case outcome.
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Figure 7: Payday loans

Notes: The left panel shows the probability of an individual making a loan inquiry in a given month. The right
panel shows the probability of an individual successfully opening a new loan in a given month. The figure is
constructed as in Figure 6.

Figure 8: Residential moves relative to the filing year

P
PF
Notes: The figure depicts results from the regression: yit = γt + δ × Ei + F
r=S βr +
r=S δr × Ei + it , where
r is measured in years relative to the eviction filing year, and where yit is an indicator for having moved in the
past 24 months. The omitted years are -5 and -4. In addition to the sample criteria of Figure 6, we require the
individual be observed in the credit bureau sample 3 years prior to the eviction case and in all subsequent sample
credit bureau sample years, with non-missing 5 digit ZIP codes in each year. We drop the 2010 sample year for
ease of interpretation. Estimates are presented with 95 percent confidence intervals.
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APPENDIX
DOES EVICTION CAUSE POVERTY?
QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM
COOK COUNTY, IL
July 21st, 2019

A

Appendix: Recent eviction reforms in U.S. cities,

counties, and states
This section details some of most recent reforms at city, county, and state level that alter policies
surrounding eviction, rent, and other aspects of tenant-landlord relations. Table A.1 provides a
shortened summary of the detailed legislations, with the most recent changes listed first.

2019
New York On June 14, 2019, Governor Andrew Cuomo signed the “Housing Stability and
Tenant Protection Act of 2019” (S.6458), which increases protections for tenants facing eviction
and strengthens rent control statewide. Beyond making rent regulation permanent, the omnibus
bill strengthens rent control in several ways, including: repealing policy that previously allowed
landlords to significantly increase rent for vacant units, including high rent units in the scope
of rent regulation, and restricting the permissible rent increase when landlords renovate an
apartment or unit. The bill also expands tenant and eviction protections by banning tenant
blacklists, establishing illegal eviction (e.g., locking tenants out), extending the time allotted
for tenants to find a lawyer or pay unpaid rent, and allowing judges stay eviction orders for a
maximum of one year.

California In May 2019, the California State Assembly passed a bill (AB 1482) to strengthen
rent control, and the California State Senate last amended the bill on July 11, 2019, to add
restrictions on permissible causes for eviction. If passed, the bill will prohibit landlords from
raising rent more than once each year. Also, the allowed rent increase would be capped at the
lower of either 7 percent plus inflation (annual percentage change in regional CPI), or 10 percent
of the lowest rental rate for the unit during the previous year. In addition to rent control, the
bill includes a clause that prohibits landlords from evicting tenants without a “just cause” (AB
1481). Current state laws do not require landlords to have a specific cause for eviction, but 17
cities have already enacted city-wide provisions on “just-cause” eviction.
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Table A.1: Recent Changes to Eviction Policy
Location

Year

Summary

Implemented?

New York

2019

Bill 6458 extends rent control statewide; establishes stronger
tenant protections (e.g., defining illegal eviction and allowing
judges to stay eviction orders up to one year)

Yes

California

2019

Bill 1482 establishes Universal Rent Control; prohibits landlords from eviction without ”just cause”

No

Washington

2019

Bill 5600 requires landlords to notify tenants 14 days in advance when there is a default in rent payment; Bill 1440 requires landlords to notify their tenants 60-days before rent
increase

Yes

Mississippi

2019

Bill 2716 eliminates the ten day grace period tenants were
originally given to vacate their home.

Yes

Virginia

2019

Bill 2655 establishes a pilot eviction diversion program.

No

Oregon

2019

Bill 608 implements Universal Rent Control.

Yes

Philadelphia, PA

2019

Bill 170854 requires “good cause” for evictions; tenants must
be notified 30 days in advance.

Yes

Richmond, VA

2018

Eviction Diversion Program

No

California

2018

AB2343 extends the number of days tenants are given to remedy the cause for eviction and to respond to eviction court
filings.

Yes

Oakland, CA

2018

Measure Y extends “just cause” eviction protections to tenants
living in owner-occupied duplexes and triplexes.

Yes

North Carolina

2018

S.224 allows landlords to recover attorney’s fees and filing fees
incurred from a tenant during the eviction process.

Yes

Washington, D.C.

2018

Eviction notices must have a set date, at least 2 weeks in
advance; evictions will occur by changing the locks.

Yes

San Francisco, CA

2018

Proposition F gives all tenants the right to tax-funded legal
assistance.

Yes

Durham, NC

2018

Eviction Diversion Program

Yes

Santa Monica, CA

2018

Provides protection from eviction during the school year for
educators and families with school age children.

Yes

Portland, OR

2018

Ordinance 188849 requires landlords to pay renters’ moving
costs when evicted without cause or due to a rent increase.

Yes

Philadelphia, PA

2018

Philadelphia Eviction Project provides legal services for tenants facing eviction.

Yes

Denver, CO

2018

Eviction legal defense program.

Yes

Denver, CO

2017

Mediation services, Landlord-Tenant Guide, and financial support to low- and moderate-income households in crisis.

Yes

Detroit, MI

2017

Ordinance No. 33-17 prevents landlords from collecting rent
if they haven’t passed city inspections.

Yes

New York, NY

2017

Intro. 214-B provides all low-income tenants facing eviction
with legal representation.

Yes

Berkeley, CA

2017

Tenant Protection Ordinance prohibits landlords from conducting evictions using misleading information or coercive conduct.

Yes

Notes: This table shows summary of proposed and implemented changes to eviction policy.
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Washington On May 9, 2019, Governor Jay Inslee signed HB 5600, a bill aimed to protect
tenants facing eviction. Once the bill is implemented on July 28, 2019, landlords will be required
to provide tenants with a 14-day, instead of a 3-day notice when they default on rent payment.
The notice must be written in plain language and include information on legal aid resources and
court interpreter services. The bill also mandates that a tenant’s right to possession of his unit is
conditional only on rent and not other monetary amounts (e.g., cost incurred by late payments,
attorney fees, etc). Importantly, under HB 5600, judges will be given discretion to stay eviction
orders up to 90 days after the judgment, for considerations such as whether the tenant defaulted
on rent due to extraordinary circumstances. Separately, the governor signed HB 1440, which will
also be implemented on July 28, 2019. This bill will require landlords to provide a 60-day, rather
than 30-day notice if they plan to increase the rental rate.

Mississippi On March 22, 2019, Governor Phil Bryant signed SB 2716, a bill that amends
the Mississippi Landlord-Tenant Act to reduce protections for tenants in eviction court. This bill
will eliminate the ten day grace period tenants were previously given to vacate their homes once
they were issued an eviction order. Prior to the amendment, tenants used this time to move
out of their residences, or negotiate payment schedules with their landlords. Under the new law,
tenants may petition for three days to vacate as long as the request is just and equal for both
parties involved. If the tenants do not petition, they will be forced to move directly after the
eviction judgment.

Virginia On March 12, 2019, Governor Ralph Northam signed HB 2655 into law, which aims
to reduce the number of evictions at district courts in Danville, Hampton, Petersburg, and
Richmond. Under the eviction diversion program, the court will order eligible tenants to pay
back their landlords through monthly installments. The court will then dismiss the eviction
order if and when the tenant satistfies the payment plan. To qualify for the program, tenants
must not be in another eviction diversion program, and must not have missed their rent payment
more than two times in 6 months or three times in 12 months. Proponents of HB 2655 argue
that the program will help tenants who fall behind in their rent payments due to sudden job loss
or medical emergencies. The program is scheduled to run on a trial basis from July 1, 2020 to
July 1, 2023.

Oregon On February 28, 2019, Governor Kate Brown signed SB 608 into law, making Oregon
the first state to implement Universal Rent Control. Now, landlords can only increase rent once
a year, up to seven percent plus inflation, with some exceptions. Additionally, if a tenant lived in
the unit for over a year, his landlord is prohibited from evicting him without cause. If a tenant
has lived in a unit for less than a year, the landlord is able to end the month-to-month tenancy
without cause, provided he or she gives the tenant a 30-day notice. Finally, to increase public
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accountability, the Oregon Department of Administrative Services is required to publish the
maximum rent increase percentage annually.

Philadelphia, PA On January 22, 2019, Mayor Jim Kenney signed Bill 170854, which went
into effect on April 22, 2019. The new law requires there to be a “good cause” to evict a tenant
if the residential lease is less than a year. A few ”good cause” reasons include: if the renter has
not paid rent, has not followed the terms of the lease, or if there has been property damage.
Additionally, even if the landlord has “good cause,” he or she must notify the tenant at least
30 days before the eviction date. Finally, the tenants then have the right to contest the “good
cause” by filing a complaint with the Fair Housing Commission.

Richmond, VA In January 2019, Mayor Levar Stoney announced the initiation of the
Richmond Eviction Diversion Program. Led by the Central Virginia Legal Aid Society, Housing
Opportunities Made Equal of Virginia, and the city courts, the program promises to provide
an array of services to tenants facing eviction. The planned initiatives include pro-bono legal
representation in court, financial assistance for qualifying households, and a financial literacy
campaign. This program is similar to existing ones in Durham, NC and Kalamazoo, MI.

2018
California Governor Jerry Brown signed AB 2343 into law on September 5, 2018. This bill
amends the California Code of Civil Procedure Sections 1161 and 1167. It gives tenants three
court dates, instead of calendar days, to pay rent or comply with the other terms of the lease
before landlords can proceed with eviction court filing. Additionally, tenants will have five court
days to respond to the landlord’s eviction court filing, after which the landlord can obtain an
eviction order by default. This bill uses court days instead of calendar days to ensure that
holidays and weekends are not counted under the tenants timeline to respond to the landlords
eviction notice or breach of lease notice.

Oakland, CA On July 24, 2018, the Oakland City Council voted unanimously to add to the
local ballot a measure aimed to amend limitations on Oakland’s eviction law (Measure Y). With
58 percent voter approval, Measure Y was passed on November 6, 2018. The effects are two fold:
first, it extends “just cause” eviction protections to tenants living in owner-occupied duplexes
and triplexes. Second, it allows the city council to pass further limitations on landlords’ right to
evict without another election.

North Carolina SB 224 became law in June 2018, allowing landlords to recover “reasonable”
attorney’s fees incurred from a tenant during the eviction process. It also allows landlords to
recover filing fees charged by the court, which is the cost to issue a summons for the tenant to
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appear in court. There are some restrictions on this measure, however. If the tenant owes back
rent, the amount the landlord can recover must not be more than 15% of the rent owed. If they
don’t owe back rent, the amount recovered cannot be more than 15% of the monthly rent.

Washington, D.C. On July 10, 2018, the Council of the District of Columbia passed the
Eviction Reform Emergency Amendment Act of 2018, which was enacted on July 26, 2018. The
emergency act amends prior laws such that eviction notices must include a scheduled eviction
date and be delivered to the tenant two weeks prior to that date. The act also places limitations
on how the landlord handles and disposes of the tenant’s personal possessions. For instance,
rather than placing the tenant’s property outside of the unit during the eviction process, the
landlord is required to keep those belongings for at least seven days (excluding Sundays and
federal holidays). Finally, the act prohibits evictions when rain or snow is forecasted on the day.
Note that the emergency act expired on October 24, 2018. A temporary act with the identical
content was enacted on October 10, 2018 and became effective on November 27, 2018 (D.C. Law
22-183). Given the nature of temporary acts, the law is set to expire on July 10, 2019.

San Francisco, CA On June 5, 2018, San Francisco County voters passed Proposition F,
a local ballot measure that gives tenants facing eviction lawsuits the right to tax-funded legal
assistance. This program is estimated to cost the city $4.2 million to $5.6 million a year. The
legal services are available to tenants either 30 days after they are served an eviction notice,
or when they are served an unlawful detainer complaint. The program applies to renters of all
income levels, not just low-income households.

Durham, NC On May 31, 2018, the Durham City Council voted to allocated $200,000 to the
Eviction Diversion Program led by the Civil Justice Clinic. The organization is a collaborative
effort between Duke Law and Legal Aid of North Carolina. The program was launched earlier in
2017, and provides low-income tenants with legal representation in eviction court.

Santa Monica, CA On May 8, 2018, the Santa Monica City Council approved an ordinance
that strengthens protections for educators or households with school-age children facing potential
eviction. The ordinance prohibits a court from granting a no-fault eviction during the school
year to the aforementioned types of tenants. A no-fault eviction usually occurs when a landlord
wishes to occupy, renovate, or demolish the unit. This aims to prevent evictions from disrupting
the school year for both students and teachers.

Portland, OR In March 2018, the Portland City Council passed Ordinance 188849 to
permanently establish the tenant relocation assistance program. Under this amendment to the
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, landlords must pay their tenants’ moving costs either if
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they are evicted without cause, or if they are forced to move due to a rent increase of 10 percent
or more. The program existed for a year on a trial basis prior to March 2018.

Philadelphia, PA The Philadelphia Eviction Protection Project launched in January 2018.
It provides new and improved legal services for tenants facing eviction, including legal assistance
in the courtroom, a new tenant aid hotline, a website answering common legal questions, full-time
service in a Landlord-Tenant Help Center in the courtroom, and financial counseling. Community
Legal Services, along with a team of other local organizations, has been selected to implement
the program. The program is a product of the Eviction Task Force, which was formed in 2017 to
help come up with solutions to solve the city’s eviction problem. The City Council allocated
$400,000 for the project, while the Department of Planning and Development allocated $100,000.

Denver, CO In January 2018, thirteen Denver City Council members, through donations
from office budgets and personal contributions, pooled together $131,500 to help start the
Eviction Legal Defense Pilot. Led by the Colorado Legal Services, this program provides full legal
representation for tenants who fall below 200 percent of the federal poverty standard. Attorneys
are available either on site at the Denver County Court or at Colorado Legal Services. This pilot
program was funded to last for six to nine months, but has been continued.

2017
Denvor, CO In October 2017, Mayor Michael B. Hancock launched a series of programs
aimed at reducing evictions, through several government departments and county courts. They
created a Landlord-Tenant Guide, which clearly outlines the rights and responsibilities of both
parties and provides a list of resources for conflict resolution before court action. The city also
put mediation services in place to resolve landlord-tenant conflicts before and after the eviction
process. Finally, the Temporary Rent and Utility Assistance (TRUA) program provides low- to
middle-income tenants in danger of eviction with funds for utility payments and rent.

Detroit, MI In October 2017, the Detroit City Council passed Ordinance No. 33-17, which
prevents landlords from collecting rent if they have not passed city inspections. The motivation
for this amendment came from the low level of landlord compliance with lead inspection laws.
Under the law, after a six-month phase-in period, tenants who live in units that have not passed
inspections can put their rent in an escrow account for 90 days. If the landlord continues to refuse
city inspection, the tenant can collect the escrowed rent after 90 days. Although most rental
units must undergo annual inspection by law, the ordinance provides exceptions to compliant
landlords who meet certain criteria.

vi

New York, NY On August 11, 2017, New York Mayor Bill de Blasio signed Int. No. 214-B
into law. The new law requires the implementation of programs to provide low-income tenants
facing eviction with legal representation. Low-income is defined as households with gross incomes
at or lower than 200 percent of the federal poverty standard. In addition, tenants of all income
levels would be entitled to one legal consultation.

Berkeley, CA In March 2017, the Berkeley City Council passed the Tenant Protection
Ordinance, which prohibits landlords from conducting illegal evictions using fraudulent/misleading
information or intimidating/coercive conduct. Landlords are also prohibited from exploiting
tenants on the basis of their immigration status and disabilities. Finally, landlords must now
give a copy of the ordinance to tenants when they move in, and must also include it with any
eviction notice.

B

Appendix: Alternative constructions of treatment

and instrument
Our analysis uses the judge’s eviction order as the treatment variable. An alternative definition
of treatment could have been the execution of the eviction order by the Sheriff’s Office – i.e., the
combination of a judge’s order and the Sheriff’s deputy’s execution of that order. However, that
approach introduces challenges related to identification, interpretation, and measurement, which
we show in this section.

Interpretation. Suppose we define treatment as the execution of the eviction order. The
counterfactual to this treatment includes the judge’s dismissal, the landlord failing to pay the
fee to the Sheriff’s Office, and the tenant leaving the property voluntarily after the judge issues
the eviction order. As such, it is unclear which of these margins is relevant for the definition of
the LATE parameter identified by IV analysis. Moreover, since only the first of these margins
corresponds to a feasible policy change (marginally changing judge leniency), the identified
parameter under this definition of treatment does not correspond to a feasible policy change,
hence it lacks policy relevance. By contrast, if we define treatment to be the judge’s eviction
order, the counterfactual is dismissal, and the identified parameter under that definition of
treatment corresponds to the policy change of marginally changing judge leniency.

Measurement. Measuring whether an eviction was executed can only be done based on
data that is self-reported by the executing Sheriff’s Office deputy, with potential incentives to
misreport, lacks validation, and has scope for human error. By contrast, eviction orders are
entered into the electronic court system, are publicly available, and can be contested by either
party if incorrectly recorded.
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Identification. The discussion of interpretation above assumes that the conditions for identifying the LATE parameter are met, both in the case where treatment is defined as the eviction
order, and in the case where treatment is defined as the combination of the order and its execution.
However, under the latter definition of treatment, much stronger assumptions are needed to
identify the LATE parameter. This can be seen by constructing a simple model of the two-part
process of eviction. For an eviction to be executed, the plaintiff must first receive an order for
eviction. Second, the plaintiff must file the eviction order with the Sheriff’s Office, pay the
required fee, and wait for the sheriff to execute the eviction order, which typically takes one to
three months. At any point prior to the Sheriff’s Office executing the eviction, the tenant may
choose to leave the unit, negotiate, or pay the plaintiff to persuade them to call off the execution
of the eviction.
Consider a simple model of eviction where an agent facing a case goes through a two-part
process: first, the court issues an eviction order or not, and second, conditional on receiving
an eviction order, the sheriff executes the eviction or not. Let D1 ∈ {0, 1} be in indicator for
receiving an eviction order and let D2 ∈ {0, 1} be an indicator for having the eviction order
carried out by the Sheriff. Assume Z1 ∈ {0, 1} is an instrument for D1 where Z1 = 1 for judges
that are more stringent on eviction orders. Similarly assume Z2 ∈ {0, 1} is an instrument for
D2 , such as the judges’ propensity to grant a stay or provide advice to the tenant regarding the
execution of the eviction order, where Z2 = 1 for judges that are less likely to grant a stay or
advice that reduces the need for the sheriff to execute the eviction order.
Let the agent’s outcome be given by
Y =Y0 + (Y1 − Y0 )D1 + (Y2 − Y1 )D2 ,
where Y0 is the outcome if there is no eviction order, Y1 is the outcome if there is an eviction
order, but it is not executed, and Y2 is the outcome if there is an eviction order and it is executed.
For simplicity, we assume there are no observable covariates and the eviction order outcome
(D1 ) and the eviction execution outcome (D2 ) are given by:
D1 =1{α0 + α1 Z1 − 1 }
D2 =1{β0 + β1 Z2 − 2 }.
We make no assumptions regarding the dependence between 1 and 2 , but assume Z1 and Z2
are independent. We discuss the case where we relax the assumption of independence between
Z1 and Z2 below.
Given this setup, we can define the set of always takers (A), compliers (C), and never takers
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(N) for each decision. Let T1 be an indicator for an agent’s type for the eviction court ruling:



A,


T1 = C,



N,

if α0 > 1
if α0 + α1 > 1 > β0
if α0 + α1 < 1 .

We can similarly define T2 ∈ {A, C, N } as the agent’s type for the sheriff enforcing the eviction
order. Note that we define this type regardless of the realization of D1 .43

Case 1: Treatment defined as D1
Assuming the stylized model above is the true data generating process, consider the case where,
rather than using both instruments, we use only D1 and Z1 . In this setting, the standard Wald
estimator is given by
W ald(Z1 ) = E[Y1 − Y0 | T1 = C, T2 = N ] ×

q1
Q

q2
Q
q3
+ E[Y2 − Y0 | T1 = C, T2 = A] ×
Q
q4
+ E[Y2 − Y0 | T1 = C, T2 = C] × ,
Q
+ E[Y1 − Y0 | T1 = C, T2 = C] ×

where
q1 = P r(T1 = C, T2 = N )
= P r(T1 = C) × P r(T2 = N |T1 = C)
q2 = P r(T1 = C) × P r(T2 = C | T1 = C) × P r(Z2 = 0)
q3 = P r(T1 = C) × P r(T2 = A | T1 = C)
q4 = P r(T1 = C) × P r(T2 = C | T1 = C) × P r(Z2 = 1)
and Q = q1 + q2 + q3 + q4 .
This result relies on the assumption that that Z1 and Z2 are independent. For the case when
Z1 and Z2 are not independent Z2 must be directly controlled for, otherwise Case 1 will violate
the exclusion assumptions.
In Case 1, the treatment effect is a weighted combination of two effects: (1) the average effect
of an eviction ordered and execution for a specific subset of first-event compliers, and (2) the
average effect of an eviction ordered but no execution for a specific subset of first-event compliers.
The relative weights for these two groups will depend on individuals’ types in the in the second
43

I.e., the type of an individual at at T = 2 is defined, even if they are a never taker at T = 1.
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event (T2 ) and the distribution of Z2 .

Case 2: Treatment defined as D1 ∧ D2
Now alternatively consider the case where, in our empirical analysis, we define a single binary
treatment that is 1 if the eviction order is executed and is 0 otherwise. Mirroring treatment,
similarly construct the judge instrument as the combined effect of both order and execution
stringency:
D̃ = f (D1 , D2 ) = D1 × D2 and Z̃ = g(Z1 , Z2 ) = Z1 × Z2 .
Let the outcome be given by Ỹ ∈ {Y0̃ , Y1̃ } where Ỹ = Y0̃ + D̃(Y1̃ − Y0̃ ). Finally, define the
variable indicating if the individual is a never-taker, complier, or always-taker in this setting as:
T̃ = {Ã, Ñ , C̃}.

Violation of exclusion: With this setup, the two potential outcomes are Y0̃ and Y1̃ , but
these outcomes mask underlying heterogeneity. Specifically, Y0̃ ∈ {Y0 , Y1 }, and Y1̃ = Y2 . As such,
exclusion restriction requires an additional assumption about outcomes Y0 and Y1 . Intuitively,
this is because the overall individual types (ie Ã, Ñ , C̃ in the sense of how you respond to a
change of Z̃ from 0 to 1) have different outcomes conditional on Z̃, which violates the exclusion
restriction. More formally, for the exclusion restriction to hold, the expected value of a potential
outcome for any subgroup should not depend on the value of the instrument. For example, for
the exclusion restriction to hold, i.e.
˜

˜

E[Y d |Z̃ = 0, T̃ = k] = E[Y d |Z̃ = 1, T̃ = k],
where k ∈ {Ã, Ñ , C̃}.
If the exclusion restriction holds, then
E[Y 0̃ |Z̃ = g(0, 0) = 0, T̃ = Ñ ] = E[Y 0̃ |Z̃ = g(1, 1) = 1, T̃ = Ñ ],

(B.1)

yet consider an agent for whom T1 = C1 and T2 = N2 (and thus T̃ = Ñ ). On the left-hand side
of Equation B.1 the outcomes is Y 0̃ = Y 0 , but on the right-hand side, it’s Y 0̃ = Y 1 , so unless
Y1 = Y0 , the exclusion restriction is violated. The assumption that Y1 = Y0 is strong since, once
an eviction order is made, it becomes part of public record, hence the tenant will be subject to
any the stigma of having the eviction on public record. Assuming Y0 6= Y1 , the Wald estimator
is not a weighted sum of LATEs and the weights will sum to a value greater than 1.
In addition, case 2 also results in unconfoundedness being violated for the decision, even
when Y0 = Y1 . To build intuition, consider the subpopulation (A1 , C2 ). Note that Z̃ = g(1, 0) =
0 =⇒ D̃ = 0 but Z̃ = g(0, 1) = 1 =⇒ D̃ = 1, and finally Z̃ = g(1, 1) = 1 =⇒ D̃ = 1, thus
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an an agent who is (A1 , C2 ) will be neither an always taker nor a complier, but it will depend
on which realization of Z1 and Z2 resulted in Z̃ = 0. An intuitive way to think about this
assumption in our setting is “An individual i can only be part of one of the subpopulations, i.e.,
T̃i ∈ {Ã, Ñ , C̃}.”

Extending case 2 and violation of monotonicity: Note, that above we constructed
Z̃ = Z1 × Z2 , but it would also be possible to define an alternative multi-valued instrument Zm
where:

Zm



z0 ,




z1 ,
=
z ,

2




z ,
3

if Z1 = 0 and Z2 = 0
if Z1 = 1 and Z2 = 0
if Z1 = 0 and Z2 = 1
if Z1 = 1 and Z2 = 1.

In this setup, the Zm are not inherently ordered, but an ordered instrument can be constructed
by assigning each value of Zm to the overall population probability a case assigned to a given
judge type results in an eviction order and its execution. This is what is regularly done in
practice with the assignment of leave-out judge stringency. Doing this, we know that z0 will
have the lowest probability of an eviction order and execution and z3 will have the highest, but
the ordering of z1 and z2 will depend on the data. Assume without loss of generality that the
probability of eviction order and execution when Zm = z1 is lower than when Zm = z2 . Define
the ordered instrument Zc = (p0 , p1 , p2 , p3 ), where each value of pj is the associated probability
of an eviction order and execution when Zm = zj .
Assume both Z1 and Z2 are both valid instruments, they are not perfectly correlated, and
that all pairs of T1 ∪ T2 exist in the data. In this setting, the continuous instrument Zc will
violate the monotonicity assumption by construction. For example, consider an individual with
{T 1, T 2} = {C, A}, then D̃(p1 ) = 1 and D̃(p2 ) = 0, but for an individual with {T 1, T 1} = {A, C},
D̃(p1 ) = 0 and D̃(p2 ) = 1. Thus, not all defendants are more likely to have an eviction ordered
and executed when assigned p2 rather than p1 .

C

Appendix: Institutional details

C.1

Source materials

This appendix contains a detailed description of the institutional context surrounding residential
eviction procedures in Cook County, IL. We draw on the following sources:
• the relevant legislative codes;44
44

Specifically, the Illinois Compiled Statutes (ILCS) and the Municipal Code of Chicago Residential Landlords and
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• observation of court hearings by the authors in the years 2016-2018;
• newspaper articles and observation studies performed in Cook County eviction court for
earlier years;
• discussions with landlords, attorneys for plaintiffs and defendants, judges, and staff of the
Cook County Circuit Court;
• landlord guidebooks specific to Cook County;
• the Chicago Eviction Court Bench Book, by Lawrence Wood (2001);
• publicly available eviction case histories;
• records from the Sheriff’s Office on summons and evictions obtained by FOIA request.
The observations in this appendix do not represent the opinions of employees of the Cook County
Circuit Court and the Sheriff’s Office, nor the opinions of any of the other experts consulted by
the authors.

C.2

Estimates of the number of eviction cases nationwide

Although data on the annual number of eviction filings in the U.S. are not collected or reported
by statistical agencies, available estimates for 2016 are between 2.1 and 2.7 million orders, shown
in Table C.1. The only nationwide estimate for the number of eviction orders in 2016 that we
were able to find is 841,516. The numbers in the first column of Table C.1 are based on Desmond
et al. (2018a), and they are lower bounds: we compiled them by aggregating state-level data for
2016. The underlying data set covers many, but not all counties in the U.S.. Importantly, New
York County and Queens County are not included. We were not able to find an estimate of the
number of evictions that are executed by a sheriff, marshall, or constable.

Table C.1: Estimates of total number of evictions annually.
Desmond et al. (2018a)
(estimates are lower
bounds for 2016)
Estimated # evictions

841,516

Estimated # filings

2,146,830

American Housing Survey (estimates for 2012)

Marr (2016) (based on
RIS data, estimates for
2015)

2.7m

Estimated # notices

704,000

Notes: In the first row, eviction refers to a court judgment in which the tenant is ordered to move out – analogous
to our definition of eviction in this paper. In the second row, the number of eviction filings includes multiple cases
filed at the same address in the given year. Finally in the third row, notices refers to eviction notices served to
tenants prior to the court proceedings.

Tenants Ordinance (RLTO).
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C.3

Tenant-landlord law in Cook County

Cook County court districts
The Forcible Entry and Detainer Section of the Circuit Court of Cook County handles eviction
cases. The court divides the county into six districts. Each district has its own court house with
evictions courtrooms, and its own set of judges who handle eviction cases. Landlords must file
eviction cases in the district in which the property is located. The vast majority of cases in our
data are from the first court district, which handles cases relating to properties located in the
City of Chicago. Figure C.1 presents a map of the court districts. Our data set spans all six
districts. In the paper and the remainder of this document, we regularly refer to the Forcible
Entry and Detainer Section of the Circuit Court of Cook County simply as ‘Cook County eviction
court’.

Relevant codes of legislation for Cook County
The relevant legislation is recorded in two sources. RLTO – the Municipal Code of Chicago
Residential Landlords and Tenants Ordinance, and ILCS – the Illinois Compiled Statutes. RLTO
applies only to Chicago (i.e., first district), while ILCS applies to Cook County and thus also
Chicago. RLTO trumps ILCS in Chicago, but only when it is more strict (towards landlords).
For our data period, the most relevant legislations are the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act (735
ILCS 5/9) and the Civil Practice Act (735 ILCS 5/2).45

The legal framework for the rental housing market in Cook County
Listed below are points on the historical timeline that are relevant for understanding the evolution
of the IL/Cook County legal framework for rental housing markets. These changes occurred
before the start of our data period, and are provided here to place the current policy discussion
in historical context. Of these legislative and judicial changes, the 1963 and 1972 entries are
arguably the most important for understanding how Illinois law has evolved to become more
“tenant-friendly” over time.
1874 Illinois Forcible Entry and Detainer Act (735 ILCS 5/9) passed, stating, “no matters not
germane to the distinctive purpose of the [eviction court] proceedings shall be introduced by
joinder, counterclaim, or otherwise”. Until 1972, judges interpreted this as implying the
proof of payment of rent is the only defense a tenant could mount against an eviction case
related to nonpayment of rent.
1963 Retaliatory Eviction Act (756 ILCS 720/1) enacted, which forbade a landlord from
terminating a tenant’s lease in response to the tenant complaining to authorities about
45

The Forcible Entry and Detainer Act was replaced by the Eviction Act on January 1st, 2018. Our data set does
not cover the Eviction Act’s start date.
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Figure C.1: Administrative districts of the Cook County Circuit Court

Notes: The figure shows the six Municipal Districts that determine where landlords in our sample must file
eviction court cases. District 1 serves the City of Chicago. District 2 serves the northern suburbs of Cook County,
district 3 serves the northwestern suburbs, district 4 serves the western suburbs, district 5 serves the southwestern
suburbs, and district 6 serves the southern suburbs. Source: http://www.cookcountycourt.org/ABOUTTHECOURT/
OrganizationoftheCircuitCourt.aspx.

building or health code violations.
1972 IL Supreme Court ruled, in Jack Spring, Inc v. Little, that there is an implied warranty of
habitability for leased residential premises. As such, the landlord’s failure to keep the unit
up to standard is considered a breach of the lease. And complaints regarding conditions of
the premise, such as the landlord neglecting to pay for utilities or to repair faulty conditions,
are valid arguments in eviction court. This increases the scope of possible defenses for
tenants. Prior to this decision, tenants could only dispute the claim of nonpayment of
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rent, provide proof of retaliatory motives, or bring up technicalities (like failure to serve
summons or mistakes in the landlord’s paperwork) as a reasonable defense.
1978 Lawyers’ Committee for Better Housing (LCBH) and Legal Assistance Foundation Chicago
(LAFC) released a report after monitoring eviction court cases, highlighting the limited
amount of time available to make judgments. The report prompted a response by the
presiding judge and expansion of the number of time slots available to handle eviction cases.
1986 Passage of the Chicago Residential Landlords and Tenants Ordinance (RLTO), which
further expanded on tenants’ possible defenses by providing them with additional rights.
For example, if a landlord accepts even partial rent after posting a termination notice, he
forgoes the right to go to court.
1997 IL Rent Control Preemption Act, a law that prohibits municipalities from enacting any
form of regulation on residential or commercial rent prices. The presence or absence of rent
control regulations is likely important for predicting the market-level effects of changes to
eviction laws, since landlords will likely respond differently to policies depending on the
degree to which they are able to adjust rents.46

Permissible causes for eviction
If a tenant commits certain violations as described in the ILCS and Chicago’s RLTO, the landlord
can provide the tenant with a notice to terminate the lease. The notice should outline the reason
for termination and the number of days the tenant has to remedy the problem. If the issue is
not addressed within the stated time period, the landlord can file an eviction case against the
tenant to reclaim his property if the tenant has not yet vacated. The legally permitted reasons
to terminate and their respective required days of notice are as follows:

1. Illinois/Cook County
• Nonpayment of rent → 5-day notice, and the right to file for eviction is void only if the
landlord accepts all of past, due rent (735 ILCS 5/9-210)
• Any violation of the lease → 10-day notice (735 ILCS 5/9-210)
• Foreclosure of property. The purchaser who assumes control of the residential real
estate in foreclosure enters into bona fide leases with the tenants in the property. This is
a de-facto continuation of the leases agreed upon by the previous landlord, prior to the
change of ownership. The rules on when the purchaser may terminate the bona fide lease
depend on the lease type:
46

Most states have laws against rent control; the ones that don’t (as of 2014) are AK, CA, DE, DC, HI, ME, MD,
MT, NE, NJ, NY, NV, OH, PA, RI, WV. These states don’t necessarily have rent control in all or even some of their
cities – they merely don’t have laws against rent control. States where some cities currently have implemented a form
of rent control include CA, DC, MD, NJ, and NY.
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– Weekly or monthly lease → 90-day notice (ILCS 5/9-207.5)
– Any other lease → 90-day notice and the purchaser may not terminate before the end
of the bona fide lease (ILCS 5/9-207.5)
• Ending tenancy at end of lease.
– Weekly lease → 7-day notice (735 ILCS 5/9-207)
– Any lease less than one year (not including weekly lease) → 30-day notice (735 ILCS
5/9-207)
– Yearly lease → 60-day notice provided before end of lease (735 ILCS 5/9-205)

2. Chicago (all Chicago-specific laws come from RLTO, especially 5-12-130)
• All ILCS laws hold, and Chicago laws can only be stricter.
• For 5-day notice, the right to file for eviction is voided if tenant pays any part of the rent.
• For 10-day notice, the right to file for eviction is voided if tenant fixes issues within 10 days.
• For foreclosures, the owner of the foreclosed property must pay a relocation assistance fee
of $10,600 or provide tenants with the option to renew or extend the existing lease (with
some restrictions on the price of that renewed contract).47

Lines of defense for tenants in eviction court
According to 735 ILCS 5/9-106, “Except as otherwise provided in Section 9-120, no matters
not germane to the distinctive purpose of the [eviction court] proceeding shall be introduced by
joinder, counterclaim or otherwise.” Although there is a certain ambiguity in interpreting what
arguments are germane in eviction court, the general consensus regarding appropriate defenses
has been relatively stable. According to the 2001 Eviction Court Bench Book (Residential
Tenancies), the most common defenses in eviction court are:
• Potential defenses to any eviction action:
– The plaintiff is not a proper party or lacks capacity to sue.
– The defendant has a claim arising under the Retaliatory Eviction Act, which prohibits
counter measures by the plaintiff in response to certain actions by the defendant, such
as notifying the authorities of a building code violation on the plaintiff’s property.
47

According to RLTO 5-14-050, ”the owner of a foreclosed rental property shall pay a one-time relocation assistance
fee of $10,600 to a qualified tenant unless the owner offers such tenant the option to renew or extend the tenant’s
current rental agreement with an annual rental rate that: (1) for the first 12 months of the renewed or extended rental
agreement, does not exceed 102 percent of the qualified tenant’s current annual rental rate; and (2) for any 12-month
period thereafter, does not exceed 102 percent of the immediate prior year’s annual rental rate.”
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– The plaintiff is discriminating against the defendant on an unlawful basis. In Cook
County, discrimination based on income is also prohibited, which protects tenants from
being evicted for being voucher recipients.
– After the lease agreement expired or was terminated, the plaintiff recognized the
existence of the defendant’s tenancy (e.g., by accepting rent that accrued after the
date of expiration or termination).
• Potential defenses when the plaintiff fails to properly serve a termination notice:
– The notice was not served in accordance with applicable law. Note that the defendant’s
receipt of the notice, however, cures the plaintiff’s failure to serve its notice in accordance
with the methods set forth in the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act.
– The notice does not afford the defendant the statutorily required number of days of
notice (e.g., the plaintiff gave a 5-day notice for issues that require a 10-day notice).
– The plaintiff filed the eviction action before the statutorily required notice period
ended.
• Potential defenses when the plaintiff served a termination notice regarding nonpayment of
rent:
– The defendant owed no rent.
– The defendant paid the plaintiff all the rent due before the termination notice expired.
– The defendant tendered to the plaintiff all the rent due before the termination notice
expired, but the plaintiff refused to accept it.
– The plaintiff failed to maintain the premise in substantial compliance with applicable
municipal building codes, such that the resulting drop in the unit’s value exceeds the
rent demanded in the notice.
– The rent demanded represents an amount the defendant withheld in compliance with
the Rental Property Utility Services Act, which requires the landlord to cover costs
related to various utilities listed in the lease.
• Potential defenses when the plaintiff served a 10-day termination notice alleging that the
defendant violated the lease agreement:
– The defendant never committed the alleged violation.
– The defendant’s conduct does not constitute a material lease violation.
– The plaintiff waived his right to pursue an eviction action based upon the lease violation,
by accepting rent that accrued after the plaintiff learned about this violation.
• Potential defenses when the plaintiff served a 7-day or 30-day notice that did not state a
reason for terminating the tenancy:
– The plaintiff accepted rent after the lease terminated, thus creating a new monthly
lease.
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• Additional defenses that are specific to Chicago, as governed by the RLTO:
– The plaintiff violated the RLTO’s prohibitions against retaliation, which expands on
the Retaliatory Eviction Act by broadening the set of prohibited motives for eviction
(for example, if the eviction was the result of the defendant asking the plaintiff to make
necessary repairs or because the defendant joined a tenants’ organization).
– The plaintiff accepted partial rent after serving the eviction notice.
– The defendant cured the 10-day notice violation within the 10 days of receiving the
notice, or that the notice did not inform the defendant of his right to cure the lease
violation.

C.4

Cook County eviction court procedures

Filing an eviction case
After serving the proper notice to the tenant and waiting the required number of days, if the
tenant has not yet vacated the premises, the landlord may file for an eviction case. To file,
the landlord (the plaintiff) or his attorney must provide the clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook
County with a complaint form and a summons form, and pay the filing fee.
On the complaint form, the plaintiff must provide the address of the tenant, the reason for
claiming action, and, for joint action court cases, the amount of rent and/or compensation for
damages claimed. Then, the sheriff serves the summons form to the tenant, which alerts him of
the eviction court case, as well as the date, time, and location of the hearing. Here are examples
of a single action complaint form, a joint action complaint form, and of an evictions summons
for trial form.
The filing fee amount depends on the court case type and varies over time. For joint action
cases (for possession and rent) with claims for over $15,000 in compensation, the cost was $255
in 2000 and $463 in 2016. For joint action cases with claims under $15,000 or single action cases
(for possession only), the cost was $106 in 2000 and $268 in 2016.

Randomized case assignment
Once the plaintiff submits the required eviction filing forms and pays the filing fee, he is given a
range of dates to choose from. These dates are usually between 2-4 weeks after the filing date,
and always on weekdays. Once the clerk enters the date selected by the plaintiff, a computer
program randomly assigns a courtroom and time to the case. Since each judge is designated to a
specific courtroom, the random selection of courtroom and time effectively randomizes judge
assignment. The process is analogous for plaintiffs who use e-filing. It is possible for the plaintiff
to determine the judge who will be presiding over the assigned courtroom either by looking it
up or by asking the clerk (either in person or by phone call). However, he cannot change the
assignment by attempting to re-file or requesting a new date prior to the first hearing.
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Court proceedings
Although there are differences between cases, the general eviction court process is as follows.
Except for rare circumstances, the landlord and/or his attorney will be present on the return
date provided at the time of filing. Depending on whether the tenant was successfully served
the court summons, the tenant may or may not show up on the return date. The landlord only
finds out about whether the defendant was successfully served on the return date. If the tenant
is not present, the court will re-attempt to serve the tenant, usually through a special process
server, and the landlord is given a new date to return to court. The judge will usually authorize
multiple attempts at serving the tenant before deciding that a good-faith attempt at serving the
tenant has been made, and granting a default order for possession to the landlord.
If and when the tenant shows up to court, there are several courses of action he can pursue.
He can request a continuance which delays the start of the case to give the tenant additional time
to find an attorney or seek legal advice.48 If granted, the tenant is usually given one week to do
so. At any point prior to the bench trial, the tenant can also request a trial by jury, and the
case may moved to a jury courtroom, which takes additional time. Alternatively, before moving
to the bench trial, the landlord and tenant may agree to a settlement order.49 This allows the
landlord and tenant to negotiate certain binding conditions, which, if adhered to, result in the
eviction case being dismissed. Typically, this involves the tenant agreeing to vacate the premises
by a certain date and the landlord agreeing to dismiss the case if this is done, or the tenant
agreeing to pay a certain amount by a certain date. If the tenant fails to fulfill the settlement
conditions, the landlord can return to court and receive an immediate order for possession.
Finally, the case may also be dismissed by the landlord for a variety of reasons. Common
reasons include: the landlord realized he made a mistake in how he filed the case, the tenant left
the premises so the landlord no longer needed to obtain an order for possession, the landlord
and tenant came to an understanding outside of court, etc. This typically results in the case
being dismissed without prejudice, which allows the landlord to file a separate case at a later
time for the same reasons as before.
If none of the above occurs, the case usually moves to a bench trial, in which both sides
present their arguments and evidence in front of the judge. Then, the judge makes a ruling to
either grant an order for possession (and a money judgment for joint action cases) or to dismiss
the case in favor of the tenant. The latter case usually results in a dismissal with prejudice,
which does not allow the landlord to re-file for the same reasons.
48

Tenants are encouraged to do this by pro bono legal aid helpers at the court because judges usually grant
continuances when requested. Some judges will also ask tenants if they would like a continuance.
49

See settlement form.
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After a judge grants an order for eviction
After a judge grants an order for eviction50 , there are still ways to delay or revoke the order. The
judge can grant a “stay,” which gives the tenant a certain number of days before the landlord can
file the order for eviction with the sheriff. Most judges usually give a one week stay. Additionally,
before the eviction is carried out, the tenant may also submit a motion to vacate to the Court
asking the judge to vacate the eviction order.51
Once the order has been entered and any stay periods have expired, the landlord may file the
order for possession with the Sheriff’s Office for a nonrefundable fee of $60.50. The sheriff may
enforce the eviction order as soon as 24 hours after the landlord’s filing. Realistically, however, it
takes around 2 months (median time of 71 days, based on data from the Sheriff’s Office).
Next, the tenant will receive a letter from the Cook County Sheriff’s Office notifying them
that the landlord has filed an eviction order with the sheriff, and he may be evicted at any time
starting 24 hours after the receipt of the letter. Importantly, this is the only notification the
tenant receives regarding the eviction. However, the tenant could check the sheriff’s eviction
schedule everyday to see if he would be evicted within 72 hours. The schedule is posted daily on
the sheriff’s website, and lists the cases to be enforced within the next 3 days. In most cases
however, the initial notice scares the tenant into believing his eviction is imminent, which may
compel him to leave before the sheriff shows up weeks later.
Similarly, the landlord does not receive advance notice of the eviction date, though he can
check in continually using the sheriff’s schedule. On the working day before the scheduled
eviction, the Sheriff’s Office would call the landlord (or his attorney) to inform him of the time
block during which a deputy is likely to appear. At any point leading up to the eviction, the
landlord can cancel the eviction, most likely because the tenant already left the premises.
Assuming the temperature is above 15◦ F on the day of eviction, the landlord (or his representative) is required to greet the sheriff’s deputy at the property with a locksmith alongside. Once
papers authorizing the deputy’s use of force (if necessary) are signed, the deputy would enter the
property and remove any occupants listed on the order.52 Once that is complete, the landlord
would change the locks to the door(s). This completes the eviction process. Importantly, the
deputy is not in charge of removing personal belongings; this task must be separately worked
out between the landlord and the tenant.
50

To see what the eviction order form looks like, see eviction order.
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Though generally not granted, one reason this may be granted is if the tenant was extremely ill and missed the
court date during which the judge rules a default order for possession.
52

Importantly, if an occupant not listed on the order is on the premise, the deputy would stop the eviction process
and the landlord may have to file a new complaint seeking to evict the previously unnamed occupants. To avoid this,
plaintiffs will commonly also include “any and all unknown occupants” when filing an eviction case.
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Money judgments
If the landlord filed a joint action case, the judge must also decide if and how much the tenant
owes to the landlord for back rent and claimed damages. For residential evictions, if the complaint
is filed properly, the landlord may also claim court fees and rent accrued during the eviction
process.
It is plausible in joint action cases for the judge to grant the landlord an order for possession
but no money order. In contrast, it is rare for the landlord to obtain a money order but no
order for possession. For instance, if the tenant never shows up to court after being served the
summons several times, the judge can often grant an order for possession, but the ILCS generally
forbids her from making a money judgment in such situations. Also, the landlord and tenant
could reach a settlement in which the landlord agrees to drop the money judgment if the tenant
moves out by a certain date. Finally, landlords would often mention before the judge that they
are willing to drop the money judgment, as their main goal is eviction.53
Once the landlord obtains a money judgment against the tenant (the debtor), his options to
collect the debt are:54
• Citation to discover assets: In a supplementary proceeding, the debtor would be
summoned to testify the amount and location of his assets. If the debtor fails to appear
and testify, he may be arrested for contempt of court. The court can order for any of the
declared assets to be liquidated or transferred to the landlord. Parts of the debtor’s assets
may be exempt from collection, including up to $4000 in equity interest of the debtor’s
personal property and up to $2400 in equity interest of a motor vehicle.
• Levy and execution: If the debtor owns assets without secured debts, the landlord can
obtain an order to have the sheriff seize and sell any such assets to satisfy the money order.
• Wage garnishment: If the debtor is employed, an order can be filed to the debtor’s
employer specifying an amount to deduct from each paycheck. Some restrictions apply: the
order can only deduct up to 15% of debtor’s gross weekly income, and the debtor cannot be
left with a weekly take-home pay that is less than 45 times the state minimum hourly wage.
• Non-wage garnishment: If the debtor has a bank account or earns commission, the
court can order for these assets to be taken as payment.
53

Though this should theoretically not affect the judge, we have observed this argument numerous times.

54

Sources: Landlord & Tenant Eviction Handbook, 735 ILCS 5/2-1402.
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Figure C.2: Court order for random assignment of cases
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C.5

Comparing evictions in Cook County to other counties

Comparison of Cook County eviction court proceedings to other counties
While there are a small number of notable differences, the general legal framework surrounding
eviction in Cook County is comparable to that of other counties. The similarities revolve around
the rules that landlords must follow to summon their tenants to eviction court, the trial process,
and the procedures following an order for possession.

Differences: The main departures from the national norm are found in Chicago’s RLTO,
which is considered to lean somewhat tenant-friendly. Specifically, Chicago has an unusual rule
that the landlord loses his right to evict if he accepts even a partial payment of past rent after
the (5-day) notice period expires. In addition, landlords in Cook County cannot include a clause
in the lease that requires the tenant to cover legal fees in the case of a successful eviction, which
is not the case in may other parts of the country.

Similarities: Almost all states require the landlord to serve some form of a written notice of
termination after the tenant has failed to pay rent. The notice gives the tenant a certain amount
of days to remedy the situation by paying late rent before the tenant can pursue legal eviction,
ranging from 3 days (CA, NY, TX) to 5 days (IL) to 14 days (MA) or longer (interestingly,
MD requires no notice period, but this is a rarity). Most states also require that if the tenant
can offer full payment of rent owed before the notice expires, the landlord must accept it and
loses the right to evict. As noted above, Chicago’s rules surrounding partial and late payments
causing the landlord to forgo eviction rights is unusual.
Once the notice expires without remedy and the landlord goes to the clerk to obtain a court
date, almost all states require some type of summons and complaint to be served to the tenant.
The method of delivery may differ, but it tends to involve, as in IL, a third party serving the
summons. Exceptionally, in CA, the landlord is required to serve the summons.
Although there are some differences in steps leading to the trial, most processes are relatively
similar and involve a method for the tenant to request a jury trial. For instance in TX, tenants
must request for jury trial within 5 days of receiving the summons and complaint, while in IL,
tenants may request it before the judge. Most counties also require the tenants to show up on
the court date, lest the judge enters a default judgment in favor of the landlord.
The trial process is generally similar in most states, with one notable difference in the
implications of a favorable ruling for the landlord. In some states, including PA and MD, the
judge’s ruling in favor does not automatically include an order for possession. In these states,
the landlord must request an order for possession if the tenant has not vacated the property
within a certain amount of days (in PA, the landlord can only request an order for possession if
the tenant does not leave within 10 days of the ruling). Once an order for possession has been
obtained, the process is comparable across most states and involves the landlord paying a certain
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fee to the sheriff (or Constable in many cities such as New York City and Los Angeles), who
implements the eviction after a certain time frame elapses.

Comparing Cook County eviction rates to other large counties
Based on Desmond et al. (2018a), Cook County’s eviction rate in 2016 was 1.22%, and its eviction
filing rate was 3.42%. Amongst the 34 counties in the database with over 1 million in population,
Cook County ranked 11th in terms of lowest eviction rate.55 Again, it is important to keep in
mind that Desmond et al. (2018a)’s data cover most, but not all counties in the U.S., so this
ranking isn’t a perfect statistic.
Cook County’s eviction rate, like that of most other counties, seems to be increasing from
2000 to 2009-10 before dipping back down starting from 2011 (probably because of the recession).
In general, most large counties have similar or slightly lower eviction rates in 2016 than they did
in 2000. See Figure C.3 for a time series of eviction rates by year for the 25 counties with lowest
average eviction rates among the 34 large counties as defined in the answer above.

C.6

Eviction and government housing assistance in Cook County

Tenants’ ability to receive government housing assistance can be affected if the judge issues an
eviction order. If a tenant receives unit-based housing assistance prior to eviction, i.e., they live
in public housing or receive a unit-tied voucher, they lose this type of housing assistance once
evicted. If a tenant receives a person-tied housing choice voucher (HCV) and lives in a private
rental unit prior to eviction, he faces a fixed time window to find a new home that satisfies the
HCV-associated quality standards. If the tenant fails to do so, he could lose the voucher as a
result.
According the 2016 Chicago Housing Authority Housing Choice Voucher Program Procedure
Guide (last revised in 9/12/16), the CHA may terminate a family’s assistance if the family (or any
family member) is “evicted due to serious or repeated violation of the lease. The CHA is required
by HUD to terminate a family’s assistance if they do not meet this obligation. See 24 CFR
982.552(b)(2). A family will be considered evicted if the family moves after a legal eviction order
has been issued, whether or not physical enforcement of the order was necessary.” Additionally,
the family (or any family member) must not “Commit any serious or repeated violation of the
lease, even if the violation does not lead to eviction. Serious or repeated lease violations will
include, but not be limited to, nonpayment of rent, disturbance of neighbors, destruction of
property, or living or housekeeping habits that cause damage to the unit or premises and criminal
activity.”
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The ranking, from the county with the lowest eviction rate to Cook County, is: Santa Clara County (CA), King
County (WA), Contra Costa County (CA), Los Angeles County (CA), Alameda County (CA), San Diego County (CA),
Orange County (CA), Hennepin County (MN), Travis County (TX), Oakland County (MI), and Cook County (IL).
New York County and Queens County are not represented in the database for 2016.
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Figure C.3: Eviction rate by year for large counties

Notes: Plots include the top 25 large counties (population > 1 million) with lowest average eviction rates between 2000 and
2016. Data are from the Eviction Lab (Desmond et al., 2018a).

A different channel through which access to housing assistance is reduced comes into play if an
evicted tenant tries to access new housing assistance, e.g., public housing, affordable housing, or
a new HCV. An eviction history can count against them in the application procedure. According
the 2016 Chicago Housing Authority Housing Choice Voucher Program Procedure Guide (last
revised in 9/12/16): “The CHA will deny assistance to an applicant family if: ... Any family
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member has been evicted from federally-assisted housing in the last five years.”

D
D.1

Appendix: Data
Financial strain outcomes: Detailed descriptions

This section describes the key outcomes in the credit report data: (i) credit score, (ii) balance in
collections (iii) having a revolving line of credit such as a credit card, (iv) durable consumption
proxied by having an auto lease or loan, and (v) ZIP code of residence.

Credit score We interpret credit score as a measure used by lenders for the overall creditworthiness of the individual borrower and as a proxy for the interest rate faced on new loans. We
use VantageScore 3.0, which was provided by the credit bureau and developed as an alternative
to FICO; according to the credit bureau, FICO requires a substantial amount of recent data to
score an individual.56 VantageScore 3.0 is on a scale of 300-850. While different lenders impose
their own cutoffs for credit quality, the credit tier breakdown provided by Experian is as follows:
a score of 300-499 is “deep subprime,” 500-600 is “subprime,” 601-660 is “nonprime,” 661-780
is “prime,” and 781-850 is “superprime.” Individuals can have a credit report while not having
sufficient information to be assigned a FICO credit score. VantageScore was developed as an
alternative to FICO in part to be able to score individuals without a substantial amount of recent
data, using machine learning tools. Two types of individuals do not have credit scores: deceased
individuals, and those who Experian does not have enough information to score. Less than 1
percent of linked individuals are deceased and therefore do not have a score, and an additional
1-2 percent of linked individuals do not have a score due to not enough information.

Balance in collections Credit reports include the total balance in collections. Collections
remain on a credit report up to 7 years from the time it is first placed in collections or until paid.

Access to credit Our measure of access to credit is whether the individual has any open
revolving account. A revolving account includes any account that begins with 0 balance and
borrowers are allowed to carry the balance and do not have to pay it off in full every month.
Revolving accounts include credit cards.

Auto Lease or Loan We follow an approach based on Dobkin et al. (2018) and Dobbie
et al. (2017), and use an indicator for the individual having a positive balance on an auto loan
or lease as a proxy for durable goods consumption.
56

Several recent studies use VantageScore as a proxy for credit-worthiness, including Dobkin et al. (2018).
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ZIP code of residence Addresses are reported to Experian through the inquiry process.
The lender has to be verified and the inquiry has to be for a permissible purpose. The ZIP
code of residence is not the most recent address, but the modal address of recent inquiries (e.g.,
last month). Experian does not use the USPS change of address file, but they do use addresses
from court records. For example, they use address information from bankruptcies and money
judgments, and tax liens.

Subprime borrowing data The subprime borrowing data comes from Clarity, an FCRAregulated credit reporting agency that maintains the largest subprime database of over 62 million
unique consumers and is owned by Experian. Clarity collects data from alternative finance
providers, including Online Installment, Online Small Dollar (Single Pay), Storefront Installment,
Storefront Small Dollar (Single Pay), Title, Marketplace, Auto, Rent-to-Own, Telecom, Subprime
Credit Card, and Collections Records.
The data consists of two data sets: tradelines, which are the monetized loans, and inquiries,
which are the borrower’s inquiry about getting a loan. Note that there may be one or many
inquiries to a tradeline, or a tradeline with no associated inquiries, which may occur on “roll-over”
loans or where a borrower is well known to the lender.
From the inquiries file, we keep only new credit inquiries, which excludes inquiries due to
collections or leases. The most common inquiries types are Internet Single Payment Micro
Loan (SPML) (46.8%), Internet Installment Loans (46.3%), Telecommunications/Cellular (2.5%),
Storefront Title Loans (1.2%), and Storefront Installment Loan (0.98%), which together constitute
98 percent of inquiries.
Among tradelines, the most common portfolio types are Single Payment Loans (43.6%),
Real-Time Installment loans (35.7%), Installment loans (19.4%), and Line of Credit (0.75%),
with Real-Time Line of Credit and Bill Pay being the remaining types and constituting less
than half a percent each. The most common account types are Internet SPML (42.6%), Online
Installment (32.3%), Unsecured (10.2%), Note Loans (5.0%), Secured (4.2%), and Storefront
Installment (1.5%), which together constitute 96 percent of tradelines opened. Internel SPML
and Storefront SPML would constitute payday loans.

D.2

Details on data cleaning and sample restrictions

Data restrictions on the court sample
Table D.1 reports the number of cases, named individuals, and judges in the full sample, and how
these numbers change as additional restrictions are imposed on the data. The first row reports
the sample size for the full data set. Rows two though four impose that the case is not against a
business, is not for a condo, is not missing names in the court docket, and has an ad damnum
amount of less than $100,000. The fifth row imposes that a single judge can be clearly identified
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from the randomly assigned room and time. The sixth row imposes that the assigned judge saw
at least 10 cases that year, while the seventh row imposes that district had at least two active
active judges seeing cases during the week of the initial hearing. The seventh row corresponds to
our “analysis sample” prior to linking to outcomes. The final row futher restricts to cases that
were successfully linked to Experian records prior to the filing date of the eviction case.

Table D.1: Summary of data restrictions
Sample

Named Individuals

Cases

Judges

772, 846
729, 379
728, 603
707, 213
706, 141
640, 669
599, 366
203, 648

583, 871
555, 164
554, 856
546, 190
545, 378
495, 905
466, 548
179, 471

313
313
313
311
310
260
250
167

Full
No businesses or condos
Non-missing names
Damages <$100,000
Non-missing judge
Judge sees more than 10 cases per year
Multiple judges per week
In Experian sample

Notes: The full sample consists of all cases recorded in Cook County by Record Information Services and not
individual people. Our sample includes only individuals who are named on the lease and are in the court filing,
and excludes unnamed tenants such as children. The last column includes those matched to the Experian data,
and are matched prior to the eviction case. This sample is notably smaller, since the first Experian report is from
2005.

What do court records contain?
The case docket records the filing date, ad damnum amount (i.e., the amount the plaintiff is
seeking from the defendant), and information on the defendants, plaintiffs, and their lawyers.
When the case is filed, it is assigned a room, date, and time, which are also included in the
docket. Finally, the docket shows key case events, including attempts (and successes) at serving
the defendant, motions, and proceedings. If the judge makes a money judgment, the judgment
amount is also included in the docket.

Defining case outcomes
The court dockets include a detailed history of events and rulings associated with each case.
Some events are administrative, while others involve court hearings. For each case, we take the
history of events and establish if the case ended in eviction or not. We define cases as ending in
eviction if the case has a judge rule for:
• “ORDER FOR POSSESSION”
• “ORDER OF POSSESSION”
• “JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF”
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• “SHERIFF EVICTION WORKSHEET FILED”
• “EX PARTE JUDGMENT-PLAINTIFF”
• “VERDICT FOR PLAINTIFF”

Over 99% of cases that we classify as ending in eviction had an “ORDER FOR POSSESSION”
ruling, and results are robust to using alternate definitions of eviction.
In addition to determining if a case ended in eviction, we study the various forms of case dismissal.
Dismissal codes include:
• “VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL W/LEAVE TO REFILE-ALLOWED”
• “DISMISS ENTIRE CAUSE - PLAINTIFF -”
• “DISMISS BY STIPULATION OR AGREEMENT”
• “DISMISSED FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION”
• “VOLUNTARILY DISMISSED BY PLAINTIFF”
• “CASE DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE - ALLOWED”
• “CASE DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE -ALLOWED”

Table D.2: Breakdown of case outcomes

Case Outcome

Proportion

Evicted
Never Served
Dismissed without Prejudice
Dismissed by Plaintiff
Dismissed by Stipulation or Agreement
Dismissed for Want of Prosecution
Dismissed With Prejudice
Verdict for Defendant
Other

0.61
0.10
0.08
0.07
0.05
0.03
0.02
0.01
0.03

Notes: The table above shows the breakdown of case outcomes. Cases classified as “never served” are
cases in which the defendant is never successfully served but the case does not proceed ex-parte. Most
“never served” cases are dismissed by the plaintiff after multiple attempts at serving the defendant.
Case outcomes in the table are mutually exclusive.
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Removing businesses and unnamed occupants
Eviction court records evictions involving tenants that are businesses as well as cases where
the names of the occupants are not known. Similar to Desmond et al. (2018b), these cases are
identified using regular expressions to select records in which the defendant’s name includes
strings such as “LLC”, “LTD”, “CORP”, “INC”, “ASSOCIATES”, “DBA”, and other phrases
associated with being a business. Similarly, cases where the only listed name is a variation of
“ALL UNKNOWN OCCUPANTS” or the last name is “DOE” are excluded from the analysis.

Standardizing addresses
Addresses were first checked for common misspellings, typos, and formatting inconsistencies such
as leading, lagging, or extra white space. Addresses were then processed using the SmartyStreet
address standardization API to return formatted and standardized addresses.

Deriving assigned judge from the raw data
When a case is filed, it is randomly assigned a court room and time, which determines the judge
who will be presiding over the given case. We assign judges to cases based on the room, time, and
date assigned at the time of case filing. Note that this allows us to assign judges to cases even if
the cases are withdrawn before the first hearing, which means our analysis is robust to strategic
behavior, e.g., if experienced plaintiffs were to withdraw after observing the judge assignment.
As a robustness check, we construct an alternative measure of judge stringency using the first
court record involving a judge after the defendant has been served, and excluding procedural
events handled by the presiding judge. We find that this alternative construction results in the
same judge being assigned in more than 90% of cases.

D.3

Characterizing dismissals using court microfilms

To understand the impact of an eviction, it is essential to characterize the dismissal, the
counterfactual outcome in an eviction case. The electronic court docket, from which we collect
our main court sample, only records broad dismissal categories.57 While the dismissal categories
provide some insight into how the case was resolved, they do not reveal whether, as part of the
dismissal decision, the tenant was required to vacate the unit, or whether the tenant was required
to pay a settlement amount.
To provide a richer description of dismissals, we hand-collected court microfilm records for
a random sample of court cases ending in dismissal. This sample includes cases from the first
district, which is Cook County’s largest and includes the City of Chicago. For each type of
57

The five categories of dismissals that are recorded in the electronic docket are: dismissed by stipulation or agreement,
dismissed with prejudice, dismissed without prejudice, dismissed by plaintiff, and dismissed for want of prosecution.
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dismissal, we collected court microfilm records for 100 cases, except for “Dismissed for want of
prosecution”, where we only collected 50 cases, as this dismissal type did not contain information
on the terms of the dismissal as expected. Not all of the randomly selected files contained
underlying court documents. In total, our sample includes the following types of cases:
• Dismissed by stipulation or agreement: 100 cases (4 missing)
• Dismissed with prejudice: 100 cases (7 missing)
• Dismissed by plaintiff: 100 cases (26 missing)
• Dismissed without prejudice: 100 cases (14 missing)
• Dismissed for want of prosecution: 50 cases (18 missing),
where the number in parentheses indicates the number of cases where there were no underlying
court documents available for the dismissal recorded in the court docket.
For each case, all documents relevant to the terms of the dismissal were manually reviewed
by at least two researchers for information on whether the agreement allowed the tenant to
stay in the unit, whether the agreement required the tenant to pay the landlord, whether the
agreement included a payment plan for any payments from the tenant to the landlord, whether
the landlord kept the security deposit, and whether the agreement included any payments from
the landlord to the tenant. Double-checking the microfilms with the court docket, we found that
the form of dismissal in the docket agreed with the form of dismissal implied by the underlying
text documents more than 99% of the time. Below, we consider each of these outcomes for the
first four types of dismissals as well as a weighted average.58
Some cases ending in dismissals do not have any documents associated with the dismissal of
the case. Table D.3 summarizes the proportion of cases that have microfilms, and conditional
on having microfilms, the proportion of cases that have information on if the tenant did or did
not move and if the tenant did or did not make payments to the landlord. The first six rows
summarizes the proportions for each case outcome. The “Weighted Average” row displays the
average across dismissal types, weighted by the prevalence of each type of dismissal in the court
data.

58

The weights represent the share of each type of dismissal in the full sample.
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Table D.3: Details on information contained in case microfilms
With microfilms With move-out info. With payment info
Dismissed by Plaintiff
Dismissed by Stipulation or Agreement
Dismissed with Prejudice
Dismissed without Prejudice
Weighted Average

0.7400
0.9600
0.9300
0.8600
0.8509

0.5000
0.5938
0.6774
0.4651
0.5248

0.4595
0.6771
0.6774
0.4535
0.5266

Notes: The table above reports the proportion of cases that had microfilms of documents associated
with the dismissal (column 1), the proportion that specifically included information on whether the
tenant agreed to move out or stay (column 2), and the proportion that specifically included information on whether the tenant did or did not agree to make payments to the landlord (column 3). The
table is based on a random sample of 400 cases randomly drawn from the district 1 courthouse. The
final row provides the weighted average of cases accounting for the fact that some types of dismissals
are more common than others.

Dismissals resulting in payment from tenant to landlord On average, 47% of
dismissal cases did not contain information on whether the tenant was or was not required to pay
rent. For the cases that contained information, approximately half of dismissals stipulated that
the tenant make payments to the landlord, with payment being more likely in cases dismissed by
stipulation or agreement and much less likely in cases dismissed with prejudice.

Table D.4: Proportion of dismissals involving tenant paying landlord

Dismissed by plaintiff
Dismissed by stipulation or agreement
Dismissed with prejudice
Dismissed without prejudice
Weighted average

No

Yes

NA

0.2297
0.1667
0.4946
0.2907
0.2616

0.2297
0.5104
0.1828
0.1628
0.2649

0.5405
0.3229
0.3226
0.5465
0.4734

Notes: The table above reports the proportion of dismissals in which the underlying court documents
stated the tenant did not owe the landlord money, the tenant did owe the landlord money, or in which
no information was available. The “Weighted average” row is the weighted average of the four types
of dismissals. Data is based on a random sample of 400 cases from the district 1 courthouse.

Dismissals resulting in the tenant vacating the unit On average, 48% of dismissals
did not include information on if the tenant was or was not able to stay in the unit. For cases with
information, approximately 54% moved from the unit and 48% stayed. The proportion moving
was highest for cases dismissed with prejudice and lowest for cases dismissed by stipulation or
agreement.
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Table D.5: Proportion of dismissals involving tenant moving

Dismissed by plaintiff
Dismissed by stipulation or agreement
Dismissed with prejudice
Dismissed without prejudice
Weighted average

No

Yes

NA

0.2703
0.3958
0.0860
0.1512
0.2387

0.2297
0.1979
0.5914
0.3140
0.2860

0.5000
0.4062
0.3226
0.5349
0.4752

Notes: The table above reports the proportion of dismissals in which the underlying court documents
stated the tenant did not agree to move out, the tenant did agree to move out, or in which no
information was available. Tenants who had already moved out are counted in the “Yes” column.
The “Weighted average” row is the weighted average of the four types of dismissals. Data is based on
a random sample of 400 cases from the district 1 courthouse.

Was there a payment plan? For cases ending in dismissal with the tenant agreeing to
pay the landlord, the court documents sometimes potentially provide additional information on
terms of repayment. Such documentation was available in 52.5% of cases in which the microfilms
included information on the tenant paying the landlord. Overall, approximately 55% of dismissals
that involved the tenant agreeing to pay the landlord involved a repayment plan in which the
tenant agrees to pay in installments, with the remainder having already paid, agreeing to pay in
lump-sum at a later date, or having partially paid with an agreement to pay in lump-sum at a
later date.

Table D.6: Proportion of dismissals involving payments with payment plans

Dismissed by plaintiff
Dismissed by stipulation or agreement
Dismissed with prejudice
Dismissed without prejudice
Weighted average

No

Yes

NA

0.2353
0.5714
0.4706
0.3571
0.4245

0.7059
0.4286
0.3529
0.6429
0.5482

0.0588
0.0000
0.1765
0.0000
0.0273

Notes: The table above reports the proportion of dismissals where, conditional on the tenant agreeing
to pay the landlord, an installment plan was put into place. The “Weighted average” row provides
the weighted average across the four types of dismissals weighted by their relative frequency.
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E

Appendix: Sample linkage robustness

Table E.1 explores the extent of attrition in the credit bureau data and shows that attrition is
unrelated to judge stringency. Specifically, we regress an indicator for the individual appearing
in the column year on judge stringency, conditional on the individual appearing in the row year.
We perform this regression for every pair of years.

Table E.1: Sample attrition and judge stringency

2007

2009

2010

2011

2005

0.001
-0.003
-0.000
0.007
( 0.007) ( 0.007) ( 0.008) ( 0.007)
[ 0.9962] [ 0.9963] [ 0.9956] [ 0.9951]
2007
-0.002
-0.003
0.007
( 0.008) ( 0.008) ( 0.007)
[ 0.9963] [ 0.9955] [ 0.9951]
2009
0.000
0.008
( 0.006) ( 0.007)
[ 0.9961] [ 0.9953]
2010
0.008
( 0.005)
[ 0.9976]
2011

2013

2015

2013

2015

2017

-0.003
( 0.009)
[ 0.9941]
0.001
( 0.009)
[ 0.9939]
0.001
( 0.009)
[ 0.9938]
0.000
( 0.008)
[ 0.9944]
-0.000
( 0.008)
[ 0.9947]

0.003
( 0.009)
[ 0.9918]
0.005
( 0.008)
[ 0.9916]
0.004
( 0.008)
[ 0.9917]
0.005
( 0.008)
[ 0.9921]
0.004
( 0.008)
[ 0.9923]
0.002
( 0.007)
[ 0.9933]

-0.000
( 0.007)
[ 0.9917]
0.001
( 0.007)
[ 0.9916]
0.003
( 0.007)
[ 0.9917]
0.002
( 0.007)
[ 0.9917]
0.001
( 0.007)
[ 0.9917]
0.003
( 0.006)
[ 0.9921]
0.000
( 0.006)
[ 0.9935]

Notes: This table regresses an indicator for the individual appearing in the column year on judge
stringency, conditional on the individual appearing in the row year. Standard errors are robust and
clustered at the judge-year level.

Table E.2 regresses an indicator for being matched to the Experian data on case, defendant,
and plaintiff characteristics. The table suggests that the matched sample is less likely to have
their case end in eviction, owe less money, have legal representation, and are from somewhat
more affluent neighborhoods.
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Table E.2: Exploring characteristics of matches

Evicted

-0.019∗∗∗
(0.002)

Pred.
Af-American

0.237∗∗∗
(0.015)

Pred. White

0.194∗∗∗
(0.015)

Pred. Hispanic

0.065∗∗∗
(0.015)

Pred. Asian

0.128∗∗∗
(0.016)

Ad Damnum
(1000s)

-0.004∗∗∗
(0.000)

Joint Action

0.073∗∗∗
(0.002)

Defend. Pro Se

-0.015∗∗∗
(0.004)

Plaintiff Pro Se

-0.036∗∗∗
(0.002)

Med. Household
Inc. (1000s)

0.001∗∗∗
(0.000)

Pct. Af.-Am

-0.007∗
(0.004)

Filing Year 2006

0.009∗∗
(0.004)

Filing Year 2007

0.014∗∗∗
(0.004)

Filing Year 2008

-0.001
(0.004)

Filing Year 2009

0.023∗∗∗
(0.004)

Filing Year 2010

0.042∗∗∗
(0.004)

Filing Year 2011

0.057∗∗∗
(0.004)

Filing Year 2012

0.060∗∗∗
(0.004)

Filing Year 2013

0.049∗∗∗
(0.004)

Filing Year 2014

0.052∗∗∗
(0.004)

Filing Year 2015

0.043∗∗∗
(0.004)

Filing Year 2016

0.029∗∗∗
(0.004)

Number of observations
R2
Mean of dep. var.

390,277
0.0196
0.6130

Notes: This table explores individual and case characteristics that predict being able to successfully match to an Experian
credit file. The sample is the court file with the IV sample restrictions imposed, and where we keep only post-March 2005
cases (the only cases that may have a pre-case filing match). The dependent variable is an indicator for a successful match to
any credit file.
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F

Appendix: Selection into eviction court

This section presents bar charts analogous to Figure 4 for the other key financial strain outcomes.

Figure F.1: Selection into eviction court
Tot. balance in collections
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Notes: Column 1 plots the difference in the outcome at 13-36 months after filing, for the court sample versus the random sample
(for which the filing date is assigned at random). Column 2 reproduces column 1 with flexible demographic controls (age, gender,
and year). Column 3 plots the difference in the outcome at 13-36 months after filing, for evicted versus non-evicted in the court
sample. Column 4 reproduces column 3 with flexible demographic controls. Column 5 reproduces column 4 with an additional
control for individual credit score in the pre-filing period.

G

Appendix: DiD estimates and event studies

DiD estimates: This section discusses the main DiD estimates of the effect of an eviction.
We then present additional event studies, analogous to those presented in the main text but
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modified to include the random sample from Cook County. This modified regression allows us to
depict both selection into eviction court as well as selection into the eviction outcome.
Table 2 in the main text reports DiD estimates of the effect of eviction, comparing the
difference between evicted and non-evicted tenants at 12, 36, and 60 month outcome horizons
relative to the difference at r = −12. These results are estimated from the parametric specification
of the event studies depicted in Figure 6. Table G.1 provides additional robustness showing the
baseline results, results using individual fixed effects, results using a balanced panel, and results
restricted to the first eviction cases only. Across specifications, the estimated causal effects are
very similar. Table3 in the main text and and Appendix Table G.2 provide similar estimates for
mobility and neighborhood poverty.

Event Studies Figure G.1 presents event studies comparing evicted and non-evicted individuals in the court sample to the 10 percent random sample from Cook County. The random
sample is restricted to those over age 21 with no open mortgage trade, and randomizing a placebo
filing month. We also reweight the regression sample so that placebo individuals’ distribution
across ZIP codes matches that of the eviction court sample. We exclude the baseline month
from the regression sample since baseline credit score is included as a control. The event study
regression is:

yit = Xit α̃ + γ̃ × courti + δ̃ × Ei +

F
X
r=S

β̃r +

F
X
r=S

γ̃r × courti +

F
X

δ̃r × Ei + ˜it

(G.1)

r=S

where r represents the month relative to the case filing month. The vector Xit represents
individual controls, including age at filing month, gender, and baseline credit score. The variable
courti is an indicator for the individual being in the eviction court sample, and 0 if the person is
in the random sample; evicti represents an indicator for being in the court sample and the case
outcome being eviction, β̃r represents coefficients on indicators for month relative to filing month,
γ̃r are the coefficients on indicators for relative month interacted with the court sample indicator,
and δ̃r are the coefficients on relative month interacted with the eviction indicator. For this
analysis S=-41 and F=72, and the omitted month is S=-42. Figure G.1 plots β̃r , {γ̃ + γ̃r }, and
{δ̃ + δ̃r }. For all series we add in the omitted group mean in time r=-42 so that the magnitudes
are interpretable.
Figure G.2 shows event studies for collection debt, decomposed by the type of debt. Figures
G.3-G.6 show the event studies conditional on observable case characteristics. Finally, Figure G.7
shows the event studies for the key financial distress outcomes, but splitting the “Not Evicted”
groups into those whose case was dismissed with prejudice, and all other forms of dismissal.
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Table G.1: DiD estimates under alternative specifications

I. Credit Score
12-Month Effect
36-Month Effect
60-Month Effect
Number of individuals
Number of observations
II. Total Collections
12-Month Effect
36-Month Effect
60-Month Effect
Number of individuals
Number of observations
III. Any Auto Loan
12-Month Effect
36-Month Effect
60-Month Effect
Number of individuals
Number of observations
IV. No Revolving Credit
12-Month Effect
36-Month Effect
60-Month Effect
Number of individuals
Number of observations

Baseline

Indiv. f.e.

Balanced Panel

No prior cases

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-2.828***
( 0.369)
-2.175***
( 0.386)
-2.133***
( 0.451
251,036
1,302,930

-2.470***
( 0.359)
-1.219***
( 0.373)
-0.838*
( 0.434)
251,036
1,302,930

-2.861***
( 0.538)
-4.148***
( 1.257)

-3.564***
( 0.484)
-2.820***
( 0.503)
-3.158***
( 0.582)
153,664
797,230

191.218***
( 22.971)
157.990***
( 27.426)
-0.982
( 31.355
252,718
1,310,057

162.148***
( 21.972)
125.625***
( 27.127)
-61.718*
( 31.659)
252,718
1,310,057

186.910***
( 34.152)
233.577***
( 79.416)

-0.012***
( 0.002)
-0.013***
( 0.002)
-0.003
( 0.003
254,578
1,320,322

-0.012***
( 0.002)
-0.011***
( 0.002)
-0.003
( 0.003)
254,578
1,320,322

-0.011***
( 0.003)
-0.011*
( 0.006)

0.014***
( 0.002)
0.015***
( 0.003)
0.009***
( 0.003
254,578
1,320,322

0.014***
( 0.002)
0.014***
( 0.003)
0.006**
( 0.003)
254,578
1,320,322

0.009***
( 0.003)
0.037***
( 0.008)

66,952
392,458

67,042
392,934

67,570
396,173

67,570
396,173

234.466***
( 28.241)
262.298***
( 33.189)
94.218**
( 37.981)
155,233
803,911
-0.015***
( 0.003)
-0.015***
( 0.003)
-0.006**
( 0.003)
156,379
810,348
0.019***
( 0.003)
0.024***
( 0.003)
0.016***
( 0.004)
156,379
810,348

Notes: The table above re-estimates the regressions of Table 2 under alternative specifications. Column 1 presents the baseline
specification of Table 2, column 2 includes individual fixed effects, column 3 limits the sample to a balanced panel (cases from
March 2008 to March 2014 and with relative month r = −36 to 36), and column 4 restricts the sample to individuals with no
prior eviction cases.
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Table G.2: DiD estimates under alternative specifications: moves and neighborhood
quality

I. Move Zipcode
1-Year Effect
3-Year Effect
5-Year Effect
Number of individuals
Number of observations
II. Neighborhood poverty rate (×100)
1-Year Effect
3-Year Effect
5-Year Effect
Number of individuals
Number of observations

Baseline

Indiv. f.e.

Balanced Panel

No prior cases

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.004
( 0.005)
0.003
( 0.006)
0.000
( 0.006
115,023
770,472

0.004
( 0.006)
0.003
( 0.006)
-0.004
( 0.007)
115,023
770,472

0.014**
( 0.007)
0.007
( 0.008)

0.003
( 0.007)
0.002
( 0.007)
-0.005
( 0.008)
86,175
455,523

0.202***
( 0.066)
0.127
( 0.085)
0.090
( 0.103
115,022
790,598

0.162**
( 0.068)
0.249***
( 0.082)
0.156*
( 0.092)
115,022
790,598

0.223***
( 0.084)
0.323***
( 0.109)

72,849
270,740

72,845
270,669

0.254***
( 0.084)
0.133
( 0.108)
0.073
( 0.130)
86,174
467,604

Notes: The table above re-estimates the regressions of Table 3 under alternative specifications. Column 1 presents the baseline
specification of Table 3, column 2 includes individual fixed effects, column 3 limits the sample to a balanced panel (cases from
March 2008 to March 2014 and with relative month r = −36 to 36), and column 4 restricts the sample to individuals with no
prior eviction cases.
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Figure G.1: Selection into eviction court

Notes: The figure above plots estimates of Equation G.1. The only control used is calendar year of the credit file. The omitted
month is -48. Overlaid is a parametric specification where the right hand side variables include a cubic in relative month in
the months leading up to eviction filing (r < 0), a cubic in relative month for the months following eviction filing (r ≥ 0), and
these two cubics interacted with eviction case outcome, and these cubics interacted with an indicator for being in the court
sample. We use a random 50 percent subset of our 10 percent random sample in the regressions underlying these plots.
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Figure G.2: Components of unpaid bills: types of collections and government agency
debt

Notes: The figure is constructed as in Figure 6. The top four panels display four types of collections debt (utilities, medical,
banking/financial/credit union, retail). Medical collections are only available as a separate category from years 2013, 2015,
2017. The bottom left panel reflects the presence of outstanding government agency debts (including default student loans,
tax liens, unpaid child/family support).
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Figure G.3: Event studies: heterogeneity by case type

Notes: The figure is constructed as in Figure 6, separated by case type.
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Figure G.4: Event studies: heterogeneity by prior cases

Notes: The figure is constructed as in Figure 6, separated by whether the individual had a prior eviction case or not.
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Figure G.5: Event studies: heterogeneity by multi versus single-headed household

Notes: The figure is constructed as in Figure 6, separated by whether the eviction court case names multiple individuals as
signatories on the lease or only one individual. Note the number of signatories of the lease may not correspond exactly to the
number of household heads.
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Figure G.6: Event studies: heterogeneity by prime versus subprime borrowers at
baseline

Notes: The figure is constructed as in Figure 6, separated by subprime versus prime credit score – determined by a credit score
cutoff of 600 – in the credit record two periods prior to eviction filing.
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Figure G.7: Event studies: disaggregating dismissals by type

Notes: The figure is constructed as in Figure 6, but separating the eviction dismissal outcome into “dismissed with prejudice”
and “other dismissal”.
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H

Appendix: IV analysis

H.1

Construction of judge stringency

Sections 3.3 and 6.2 provide details on sample restrictions and the construction of judge stringency
used in the paper. This subsection evaluates alternative constructions of the judge stringency
variable. All measures are leave-out estimates adjusted for district-year fixed effects and are
calculated using the same sample unless otherwise stated. Table H.1 shows the 2SLS estimates
of evictions on the outcomes associated with financial strain using five alternative constructions
of judge stringency. The first row constructs a rolling average for each judge based on the
prior 50 and next 50 cases. The second row calculates stringency by judge-year, but only for
judges that see at least 100 cases that year. The third row constructs stringency by judge
rather than judge-year. The fourth row calculates judge stringency by judge, year, and case type
(single vs. joint action). The final row estimates stringency by judge and case type (single vs.
joint action). Across the 5 specifications, the point estimates are broadly similar to the main
results of the paper. The main specification also falls in the middle of the alternate estimates
except for inquiries 37-60 months out, where the main specification is more negative than other
specifications.
While we use a continuous measure of judge stringency throughout the paper, Table H.2
provides several specifications using judge fixed effects directly as our instruments, which, for the
most part, produce similar point estimates. The first row uses judge dummies, the second row
uses judge-by-year dummies, the third row uses interacted judge-case-type dummies, and the
fourth row uses judge dummies with statistically predicted time breaks. There are trade-offs to
each of these specifications. Given seventeen years of data, some judges drift in their stringency
over time, which will be missed using judge dummies, yet using judge-by-year dummies creates
a very large number of instruments, many of which have correlations close to 1. The final
specification uses conditional inference trees using filing date to identify partitions of the data
that best predict case outcomes, and then includes dummy variables for each judge partition. The
last approach substantially reduces the number of instruments compared to the judge-by-year
case, while still allowing stringency to potentially vary over time for each judge, but suffers from
the fact that it first uses the data to identify partitions. Overall, results are qualitatively similar
for all specification except for the specification including judge-by-year dummies which has large
standard errors, as would be expected when including many highly correlated instruments.

xlvii

Colle
ction
s (13
-36)

No R
ev. (
13-36
)

No R
ev (3
7-60)

Acco
unts
(13-3
6)

Acco
unts
(37-6
0)

Inqu
iries
(13-3
6)

Inqu
iries
(37-6
0)

-0.04
(0.04)

-307.26 -1037.34∗∗
(482.67) (493.48)

0.09∗
(0.05)

0.03
(0.05)

-0.38
(1.58)

0.18
(1.42)

0.58
(4.59)

-8.19∗∗
(3.59)

Stringency (req 100 cases per year)
-9.33
-7.69
-0.03
(8.16)
(9.11)
(0.03)

-0.05
(0.05)

-11.42
-622.66
(471.75) (582.83)

0.09∗
(0.05)

0.12∗
(0.06)

3∗∗
(1.35)

0.84
(1.35)

4.43
(3.49)

-6.71∗
(3.91)

Stringency (no year):
-7.51
(8.46)

-0.07∗
(0.04)

-0.08
(0.05)

383.08
-247.19
(492.82) (578.46)

0.12∗∗
(0.06)

0.11∗
(0.07)

3.35∗
(1.72)

0.74
(1.44)

8.64∗∗
(4.37)

-3.84
(4.34)

-0.02
(0.03)

-0.07∗∗
(0.03)

-150.57
(406.62)

-117.47
(431.78)

0.12∗∗
(0.05)

0.15∗∗
(0.05)

4.61∗∗
(1.21)

1.97
(1.31)

10.77∗∗
(3.86)

-0.93
(3.42)

Stringency by case type (no year):
-16.49∗∗ -22.55∗∗ -0.04
(6.28)
(7.27)
(0.03)

-0.06∗
(0.03)

355.4
(387.52)

118.24
(418.48)

0.12∗∗
(0.05)

0.12∗∗
(0.05)

3.6∗∗
(1.35)

2.23∗
(1.23)

10.57∗∗
(4.19)

1.19
(3.43)

Rolling avg stringency:
-12.64
-18.51∗∗
(7.74)
(6.77)
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-5.26
(9.87)

Stringency by case type:
-21.85∗∗ -31.61∗∗
(6.62)
(7.33)

Colle
ction
s (37
-60)

Auto
(37-6
0)

-0.12∗∗
(0.04)

specification

(13-3
6)
Auto

Cred
. Sco
re (3
7-60)

Cred
. Sco
re (1
3-36)

Table H.1: Robustness of IV estimates to construction of judge stringency

Notes: This table shows 2SLS estimates based on alternative constructions of the judge stringency measure. “Rolling avg stringency” calculates judge stringency using a rolling average of
the 50 prior cases and the next 50 cases (excluding own case). “Stringency (req 100 cases per year)” requires a judge sees at least 100 cases per year in order for their year-specific stringency
measure to be calculated and included in the IV analysis. “Stringency (no year)” calculates a single measure of judge stringency rather than year-specific measures of judge stringency.
“Stringency by case type” calculates judge stringency separately for single action and joint action cases each year. “Stringency by case type (no year)” calculates judge stringency separately
for single action and joint action cases, with a single number per judge rather than calculating the number for each year. Except for the differences listed above, all regressions otherwise
follow the same sample restrictions and specifications as the regressions in Section 7. “Auto” is an indicator for having any auto loan or lease. ‘Collections” is the amount in collections. “No
Rev.” is an indicator for having no revolving line of credit such as a credit card. “Accounts” is the number of sub-prime loans (such as pay-day loans) held by the individuals. “Inquiries”
is the number of inquiries for sub-prime loans made by the individual.

No
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Judge dummies:
-7.33
-1.62
-0.04∗
(5.48)
(6.35)
(0.02)
Judge-by-year dummies:
-29.57
106.97
-0.56
(70.49)
(144.55)
(0.66)
Judge-by-case-type dummies:
-14.94∗∗
-14.15∗∗
-0.02
(4.08)
(5.14)
(0.02)
Judge dummies with time breaks:
-8.49∗
-9.2
-0.05∗∗
(4.63)
(6.06)
(0.02)
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Table H.2: Robustness of IV results to using judge fixed effects directly

Notes: The table above reports the coefficient on eviction from the 2SLS regressions using judge dummies in the first stage rather than the
continuous measure of judge ruling stringency used in Sections 6 and 7. “Judge dummies” includes a single dummy for each judge. “Judge-byyear dummies” includes judge-by-year dummies. “Judge-by-case-type dummies” includes judge dummies interacted by case type (single or joint
action). “Judge dummies with time breaks” first estimates a conditional inference tree (Hothorn et al., 2006) for each judge using a date to
predict evictions. Conditional inference trees use a recursive partitioning algorithm similar to CART, but it additionally addresses the tendency
of recursive partitioning algorithms such as CART to overfit the data. The algorithm additionally requires bins of at least 10 continuous cases.
The first stage is then run using a fixed effect for each identified bin. This allows multiple fixed effects over time for judges whose stringency
varies over time, without introducing many highly correlated fixed effects for judges whose stringency does not vary over time as is the case
when using judge-by-year dummies.

H.2

Robustness checks for the first stage

This section provides the first stage regression of eviction on judge stringency and a number
of additional robustness checks to the sample selection and modeling assumptions made in the
paper. Table H.3 reports the first stage regression run on the sample of court cases meeting the
IV-analysis requirements laid out in Table D.1.
Table H.4 documents how the first stage regression of residual judge stringency changes under
a number of alternative specifications. The first row provides the main specification, the second
row controls for residual judge stringencies in granting continuances, judgment amount in joint
action cases, and granting stays.
If serving the defendant takes much longer than expected, a new court date can be assigned
that does not always correspond to the same judge. In the third row of Table H.4, we construct
an alternative judge stringency measure based on the first judge observed in the case history
rather than the judge assigned at filing. Rows 4 to 7 use alternative sample selection criteria.
Row 4 includes all cases, including cases against businesses, row 5 restricts cases to judges who
see more than 100 cases that year, row 6 excludes cases where the court record does not show the
tenant ever being served,59 and row 7 includes all judges rather than those who see more than
10 cases. Lastly, rows 8 and 9 estimate the first stage using a split sample. Row 8 estimates the
first stage using stringency constructed from single action cases on eviction in joint action cases,
while row 9 does the opposite. Across all of our robustness checks, we find that the coefficient on
residual stringency remains similar to the main specification, positive, and statistically significant
with small standard errors. These checks demonstrate that our first stage is robust to adding
additional controls, imposing alternative sample selection criteria, adjusting the method for
identifying the first judge assigned to the case, and estimating stringency using a split-sample
approach.60

59

For a case to proceed the tenant must be served, or the judge must allow for an ex-parte judgment to be made
after they determine a sufficient effort at serving the defendant has been made. In a number of cases, the plaintiff
voluntarily dismisses the case after multiple attempts at serving the defendant, which could happen, for example, if the
defendant moves.
60

Frandsen et al. (2019) establishes that, even if monotonicity is violated, informative causal effects can still be
recovered if an “average monotonicity” condition holds, for which they propose regressions similar to those reported in
Table H.4.
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Table H.3: First stage on full analysis sample

Eviction
0.715∗∗∗
(0.027)
Ad damnum
0.00000∗∗∗
(0.00000)
Median rent
−0.068∗∗∗
(0.006)
Pct black (tract) 0.102∗∗∗
(0.006)
Male
0.008∗∗∗
(0.001)
Black
−0.017
(0.014)
No attorney
0.154∗∗∗
(0.006)
Constant
0.490∗∗∗
(0.016)

Stringency

Observations
R2
F Stat
Partial F Stat

508,543
0.019
86.681
1158.9

Notes: ∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01. The table above reports the first stage of the regression. Standard errors
are robust and clustered at the judge-year level. The regression includes district-year fixed effects, but they are
excluded from the table. “Partial F-Stat” reports the F-statistic for the coefficient on stringency.
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Table H.4: Specification check on stringency in first stage

Sample
Main
Controlling for other judge chars.
Alternate first judge construction
All cases
Excluding judges <100 cases
Including cases never served
Including judges <10 cases
Single-Action stringency on Joint-Action cases
Joint-Action stringency on Single-Action cases

Coefficient

Standard Errors

P-Value

Observations

0.715
0.725
0.729
0.630
0.805
0.725
0.674
0.294
0.949

0.027
0.028
0.024
0.027
0.025
0.027
0.029
0.027
0.092

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

508, 543
506, 971
498, 559
576, 042
497, 853
458, 451
509, 169
396, 819
101, 460

Notes: This table shows the coefficient on our measure of residual judge stringency for a number of alternative specifications. For
restrictions affecting the sample selection, the stringency measure is recalculated on that sample. Standard errors are clustered
at the judge-year level. The “Controlling for other judge chars” specification includes controls for the judge’s propensity to
grant stays and continuances, average case length, and their average judgment amount difference (which is defined as the ruling
amount minus the ad damnum in joint action cases ending in an eviction order). The alternate first-judge construction assigns
judge using the first judge named in the docket after the tenant has been served.
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H.3

Exclusion restrictions checks

The exclusion restriction requires that judge stringency affects tenant outcomes only through the
eviction decision. This assumption could be violated if judges affect tenant outcomes through
dimensions other than the eviction order, and these other dimensions are correlated with their
tendency to evict. In this section we provide several pieces of evidence that the exclusion
restriction is not violated in our setting. The main concern in this empirical setting is that,
conditional on an eviction order, judges additionally make decisions about how much the tenant
must pay. In addition, judges affect two other potentially relevant aspects of the case: they can
grant continuances that provide the tenant additional time to seek legal advice or aid, and they
can grant stays of eviction orders, which delay when the landlord can file the eviction order
with the Sheriff’s Office. For each of these, we construct a measure of residual judge stringency
following the same approach we used for eviction stringency with two exceptions. First, residual
judgment amount is calculated as the residual variation of the judgment amount minus the ad
damnum amount at case filing for joint action cases ending in eviction. Second, residual stays
granted is similarly restricted to cases ending in eviction orders.
Table H.5 reports the correlations between the four residual stringency measures. Judge
eviction stringency has a low correlation with all four other stringency measures, with the
largest correlation being a correlation of 0.098 between eviction stringency and residual judgment
amount. This suggests that there is little relationship between the four measures.
Table H.6 provides additional evidence that the three alternative stringency measures have
little effect on the case outcome and do not predict eviction stringency. The first column
regresses the eviction indicator on all four stringency measures, case and defendant controls,
and district-year fixed effects. Eviction stringency remains an important determinant of the
case outcome, while judgment amount stringency and continuance stringency are also weakly
statistically significant predictors of eviction. The second column runs the same regression,
but with eviction stringency as the left-hand-side variable, and we find that none of the other
stringency variables are statistically significant predictors. This further suggest that there is no
relationship between a judge’s propensity to evict, and their impact on other dimensions of the
case.
Table H.7 regresses log judgment amount on eviction stringency for joint action cases ending in
an eviction with a positive money judgment. The first column runs the univariate regression, the
second column additional controls for log ad damnum amount, and the third column additionally
controls for case and defendant characteristics. All three specifications control for districtyear fixed effects. Across specifications residual eviction stringency is statistically insignificant,
suggesting that a judges’ residual stringencies do not predict their judgment amounts in joint
action cases ending in evictions.
Tables H.8 and H.9 reproduce the IV estimates for a subset of the financial strain outcomes
accounting for judgment amount. Panel A shows that controlling for residual stringency in
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judgment amount has little impact on the first stage. Panel B shows estimates for (i) running the
reduced form including judgment amount stringency, (ii) running the IV regressions controlling
for judgment amount stringency, and (iii) jointly instrumenting for both the eviction order and
judgment amount have little impact on the point estimates.

Table H.5: Correlations between residual stringency measures

Residual
Residual
Residual
Residual

stringency
continuance
judgment amount
stays granted

Stringency

Continuance

Amount

Stays

1
-0.070
0.098
0.051

-0.070
1
0.039
0.008

0.098
0.039
1
0.081

0.051
0.008
0.081
1

Notes: This table shows correlations between various measures of residual judge behaviors. Residuals are leave-out means with
district-year fixed effects removed.
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Table H.6: Case outcomes on judge stringency measures

Dependent variable:
Evicted

Eviction Stringency

(1)

(2)

Stringency (eviction)

0.723∗∗∗
(0.028)

Stringency (amount)

0.00001∗
(0.00000)

0.00001
(0.00001)

Stringency (continuance)

−0.063∗
(0.033)

−0.110
(0.072)

Stringency (stays)

−0.024
(0.050)

0.120
(0.111)

0.018
0.018

0.018
0.017

R2
Adjusted R2

∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01

Note:

Notes: ∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01. The first column shows coefficients from the regression of the eviction dummy on the four
judge stringency measures. The second column regresses judge eviction stringency on the three other judge stringency measures.
All stringency measures are leave-out averages adjusted by district-year fixed effects. Both regressions include controls for case
and defendant characteristics and district-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the judge-year level are
reported in the parentheses.
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Table H.7: Log judgment amount on judge stringency

Log judgment amount:
Stringency

(1)

(2)

(3)

−0.031
(0.109)

−0.032
(0.085)

−0.033
(0.087)

0.772∗∗∗
(0.003)

0.741∗∗∗
(0.003)

Log ad damnum

Constant

7.186∗∗∗
(0.011)

1.803∗∗∗
(0.023)

2.634∗∗∗
(0.040)

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2

255,770
0.095
0.094

255,770
0.621
0.621

198,510
0.609
0.609

Note:

∗

p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Notes: ∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01. This table shows regression of log judgment amount on judge stringency for
joint action cases ending in a judgment for eviction. The first column includes only stringency and district-year
fixed effects. The second column additionally controls for log ad damnum amount. The third column additionally
controls for the standard set defendant characteristics. All results are for joint action cases ending in an eviction.
Standard errors are clustered at the judge-year level.
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Table H.8: Testing the exclusion assumption: financial strain
A: First stage
First stage

Stringency:
eviction order

(1)

(2)

0.646∗∗∗

0.649∗∗∗
(0.037)

(0.035)

Stringency:
judgment amount
Additional controls
Number of observations

0.006
(0.005)
Yes
232,834

Yes

B: OLS and IV with additional stringency
Credit Score

Panel I: Reduced Form
Stringency: eviction order

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

-9.067*
( 4.822)

-7.228
( 4.887)

133.910
( 308.343)

27.903
( 334.861)

-0.039*
( 0.022)

-0.037*
( 0.022)

-0.157
( 0.629)
-14.151*
( 7.459)

Stringency: judgment amount
Panel III: Evicted and Judgment Amt.
Eviction order
Judgment amount (1000s)

Auto Loan

(2)

Stringency: judgment amount
Panel II: Evicted
Eviction order

Collections Bal.

(1)

-11.225
( 7.660)

-13.022
( 37.986)
209.391
( 482.336)

-0.093
( 0.630)

43.445
( 521.178)

0.001
( 0.002)
-0.060*
( 0.035)

-13.278
( 39.339)

-0.057*
( 0.034)
0.001
( 0.002)

-10.728
( 8.974)

117.005
( 654.878)

-0.063*
( 0.038)

-0.211
( 1.426)

-30.688
( 91.857)

0.002
( 0.005)

Notes: This table tests the exclusion assumption underlying the IV analysis. Panel A, column 1, shows the first stage of the
main IV regression and, in column 2, the first stage with the additional stringency measure: residualized judgment amount
stringency. Panel B.I shows the reduced form regressions of the outcome measure in the column heading on stringency measures,
with all controls and district-year fixed effects. Panel B.II shows the IV regression of the outcome measure in the column heading
controlling for the second stringency measure. Panel B.III shows the IV regression with two endogenous variables on the right
hand side (eviction order and judgment amount) and the two stringency instruments.
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Table H.9: Testing the exclusion assumption: moves and neighborhood quality
A: First stage
First stage

Stringency:
eviction order

(1)

(2)

0.631∗∗∗

0.632∗∗∗
(0.040)

(0.038)

Stringency:
judgment amount
Additional controls
Number of observations

0.005
(0.006)
Yes
213,729

Yes

B: OLS and IV with additional stringency
Any Move

Panel I: Reduced Form
Stringency: eviction order

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.052
( 0.043)

0.025
( 0.043)

-1.252*
( 0.656)

-1.340*
( 0.693)

0.004
( 0.029)

-0.008
( 0.031)

-0.000
( 0.004)
0.084
( 0.069)

Stringency: judgment amount
Panel III: Evicted and Judgment Amt.
Eviction order
Judgment amount (1000s)

Eviction Case at Diff. Address (36 mo.)

(1)

Stringency: judgment amount
Panel II: Evicted
Eviction order

Neighborhood Poverty Rate

0.040
( 0.069)

-0.009
( 0.071)
-2.027*
( 1.062)

-0.001
( 0.004)

-2.150*
( 1.137)

0.005*
( 0.003)
0.007
( 0.046)

0.004
( 0.079)

-0.012
( 0.049)
0.005*
( 0.003)

0.044
( 0.077)

-2.169
( 1.392)

-0.034
( 0.055)

-0.002
( 0.010)

0.009
( 0.186)

0.011
( 0.007)

Notes: This table tests the exclusion assumption underlying the IV analysis. Panel A, column 1, shows the first stage of the
main IV regression and, in column 2, the first stage with the additional stringency measure: residualized judgment amount
stringency. Panel B.I shows the reduced form regressions of the outcome measure in the column heading on stringency measures,
with all controls and district-year fixed effects. Panel B.II shows the IV regression of the outcome measure in the column heading
controlling for the second stringency measure. Panel B.III shows the IV regression with two endogenous variables on the right
hand side (eviction order and judgment amount) and the two stringency instruments.
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H.4

Monotonicity checks

In our context, monotonicity requires that a defendant receiving a stricter judge would have a
weakly higher eviction probability. Given that the overall first stage estimate is positive, one test
of the monotonicity assumption is that the first stage estimates should be non-negative for any
subsample, e.g., by race or neighborhood income quartile. Our data allows detailed subsamples,
including interactions between judge characteristics and individual characteristics.

Basic monotonicity checks Table H.10 shows the coefficient on stringency61 from the
regression on being evicted on stringency and various controls, but restricted to a number of
different subpopulations. Specifically, if judge stringency for any subpopulation were negatively
related to eviction, it would provide evidence that monotonicity of judge leniency does not hold.
The first row shows the coefficient from the full sample, while the remaining rows show the
coefficient by case type, gender, attorney status, and race. Across all subsamples the coefficient
on stringency keeps the same sign, providing evidence that monotonicity is not violated.

Judge-tenant interaction monotonicity checks To better explore potential monotonicity violations, we hand-collected data on judge characteristics. Using information from
judge profiles in Sullivan’s Judicial Profiles (2017) supplemented with additional online sources,
demographic information was compiled on 176 of the judges who presided the most cases in our
sample. Using this data, gender was determined based on their biographies in Sullivan’s Judicial
Profiles. Sullivan’s Judicial Profiles is the only reference guide with profiles for all judges serving
in Illinois. For each judge, we determined gender based on the use of feminine or masculine
pronouns used in their respective biographies. Based on conversations with the people behind
Sullivan’s Judicial Profiles, the biographies are created based on surveys they send to the judges,
and the gender of the pronouns for each judge’s biography is determined based on the judge’s
self-chosen gender. We were able to identify gender for all 176 judges.
Based on conversations with the Cook County law library officials, there are no references
that provide consistent race data on judges, nor were there any reference that contained pictures
of all judges. Perceived race of judge was coded by research assistants using photos of the judges
found online. For each judge, we required at least two different reputable sources that provide
an image of the judge and also specifically mention the judge’s name in relation to the picture.
Two research assistants compiled links to pages containing images of the judges, and then both
research assistants independently coded the race of the judge based on the two pictures of the
judges. The values are black, white, Hispanic, Asian.62 If either research assistant was uncertain
of the race based on the picture, race was coded as missing. There was no disagreement on race
61

Specifically, the leave-out mean of a judge’s stringency adjusted for district-year fixed effects.

62

Puerto Rican is coded as Hispanic.
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when pictures were able to be found, and in many cases race was additionally confirmed in the
associated text of the selected source. Perceived race was coded for 117 of the 176 judges.63
Table H.11 shows the breakdown of judges by race and gender. In particular, we see that
sub-sampling judges based on gender and on being white or black provides us with enough data
to adequately interact these characteristics with tenant characteristics. Each of these judge
subsamples has at least 30 judges and over 100, 000 cases in total. In contrast, the sample only
includes 8 Hispanic judges and a combined caseload of less than 20, 000 cases, suggesting that
cross interactions between Hispanic judges and tenant characteristics will most likely suffer from
a small sample size.
Table H.12 shows the coefficient for stringency from the regression of the case outcome
on stringency and various controls, restricted to a number of different subpopulations that
now include interactions between tenant and judge characteristics. Restricting our focus to
the columns for male, female, white, and black judges, we see that all interactions result in
positive judge stringency coefficients (all statistically significant at the 0.01 level), supporting
our monotonicity claim. Perhaps unsurprisingly, cross interactions between Hispanic judges
and tenant characteristics are mixed. To understand this results, we look more carefully at the
p-values and number of observations for Hispanic judges × tenants in Table H.13. In particular,
because we only require coefficients to be non-negative, if the negative coefficients are not
statistically significant, we lack sufficient information to argue that these subsamples do indeed
violate the judge monotonicity assumption.

63
Only two of the judges considered were identified as Asian and are excluded from our analysis due to the small
number of judges.
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Table H.10: Testing the monotonicity assumption

Sample

Coefficient Standard Errors

Main
Joint Action
Forcible Entry and Detainer
Males
Females
No attorney
Attorney
Black
Hispanic
Larger landlords
Smaller landlords

0.715
0.631
1.036
0.663
0.753
0.726
0.376
0.798
0.807
0.540
0.948

0.027
0.028
0.071
0.033
0.032
0.029
0.133
0.033
0.076
0.032
0.049

P-Value

Observations

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.005
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

508, 543
406, 943
101, 600
219, 430
289, 113
489, 844
18, 699
272, 629
63, 556
331, 268
194, 084

Notes: The table above reports the coefficient on judge stringency by subpopulation (robust standard errors
clustered at the judge-year level), p-values, and the number of observations included in the regression. “Black”
and “Hispanic” are imputed using each defendant’s last name and census tract. Imputation defines a tenant as part
of the group if the estimated posterior probability of being of that race is greater than 0.75. “Smaller landlords”
are those with 5 or fewer cases ever appearing in the sample, and “larger landlords” are those with more than 5
cases appearing in the sample.

Table H.11: Judge characteristics breakdown
Sample

Male

Number of Judges
111
Number of Total Cases 365655
Stringency Diff. (10-90)
0.071

Female

White

65
77
149056 233754
0.076
0.072

Black Hispanic
30
195965
0.075

8
19898
0.034

Notes: Table shows characteristics of the judges most prevalent in the sample. “Stringency Diff. (10-90)” reports
the percentage point difference between the 10th and 90th percentile of judge stringency for each group.
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Table H.12: Monotonicity checks, two-way interactions
Pro Se Tenants
All
Male
Female
White
Black
Hispanic

Male Judges

Female Judges

White Judges

Black Judges

Hispanic Judges

0.689
0.608
0.751
0.455
0.829
0.770

0.704
0.728
0.686
0.591
0.754
0.671

0.613
0.558
0.656
0.454
0.754
0.773

0.704
0.737
0.680
0.588
0.743
0.760

-0.372
-1.082
0.224
-3.392
0.617
0.312

Notes: The table above reports the coefficient on judge stringency by defendant characteristics interacted with
characteristics of the judge for cases assigned to the most common judges in the data.. Sample is restricted to
defendants without lawyers. “Black” and “Hispanic” are imputed using each defendant’s last name and census
tract. Imputation defines a tenant as part of the group if the estimated posterior probability of being of that race
is greater than 0.75.

Table H.13: Monotonicity checks: Hispanic judges
Pro Se Tenants
All
Male
Female
White
Black
Hispanic

Coefficient P-Value
-0.372
-1.082
0.224
-3.392
0.617
0.312

0.744
0.372
0.833
0.005
0.534
0.713

Observations
19477
8673
10804
2529
10482
2612

Notes: Table replicates the results from Table H.12 for Hispanic judges, additionally providing p-values and
observations for each regression.

H.5

IV results by subpopulation

This section provides OLS and IV estimates splitting the data across four different sets of
observable characteristics. Table H.14 shows results for outcomes related to financial strain while
Table H.15 shows results for residential mobility and neighborhood poverty.
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Table H.14: Heterogeneity in the effect of eviction (13-36 months)
Panel A.

Credit Score

No Open Revolving Account

Total bal. collections

Any Auto Loan or Lease

Any Payday Inquiry × 100

Any Payday Account × 100

Panel B.

Credit Score

No Open Revolving Account

Total bal. collections

Any Auto Loan or Lease

Any Payday Inquiry × 100

Any Payday Account × 100

Joint Action
(IV)

(OLS)

(IV)

-9.103***
( 0.441)
[ 545.294]
0.041***
( 0.003)
[ 0.557]
470.755***
( 26.478)
[3,108.304]
-0.044***
( 0.002)
[ 0.209]
-1.439***
( 0.227)
[ 15.182]
-0.719***
( 0.089)
[ 2.528]

-9.157
( 8.977)

-7.365***
( 0.713)
[ 553.754]
0.022***
( 0.005)
[ 0.538]
331.237***
( 42.593)
[2,834.336]
-0.027***
( 0.004)
[ 0.158]
-0.478
( 0.377)
[ 12.034]
-0.178
( 0.136)
[ 1.630]

-30.528***
( 9.833)

No Open Revolving Account

Total bal. collections

Any Auto Loan or Lease

Any Payday Inquiry × 100

Any Payday Account × 100

Panel D.

Credit Score

No Open Revolving Account

Total bal. collections

Any Auto Loan or Lease

Any Payday Inquiry × 100

Any Payday Account × 100

0.084
( 0.061)
-17.067
( 560.276)
-0.093**
( 0.045)
1.386
( 5.015)
3.384*
( 1.906)

Multi-headed household

0.093
( 0.108)
827.413
( 688.794)
0.022
( 0.053)
19.276***
( 5.405)
1.600
( 1.968)

Single-headed household

(OLS)

(IV)

(OLS)

(IV)

-8.614***
( 0.719)
[ 560.927]
0.039***
( 0.005)
[ 0.508]
355.183***
( 43.894)
[2,761.125]
-0.029***
( 0.004)
[ 0.209]
-1.087***
( 0.373)
[ 13.938]
-0.576***
( 0.150)
[ 2.297]

-21.499
( 14.490)

-8.785***
( 0.396)
[ 542.526]
0.037***
( 0.003)
[ 0.567]
467.346***
( 24.341)
[3,147.231]
-0.044***
( 0.002)
[ 0.196]
-1.310***
( 0.216)
[ 14.708]
-0.614***
( 0.083)
[ 2.359]

-10.897
( 7.378)

Panel C.

Credit Score

Single Action

(OLS)

0.211*
( 0.123)
-1215.897
(1,013.967)
-0.024
( 0.085)
0.085
( 8.841)
1.306
( 3.076)
No prior cases

0.052
( 0.055)
607.596
( 581.373)
-0.073*
( 0.039)
7.440*
( 4.105)
3.382*
( 1.804)
Prior case

(OLS)

(IV)

(OLS)

(IV)

-9.757***
( 0.488)
[ 556.302]
0.042***
( 0.003)
[ 0.521]
461.068***
( 27.903)
[2,839.541]
-0.043***
( 0.002)
[ 0.210]
-0.731***
( 0.280)
[ 21.039]
-0.767***
( 0.105)
[ 3.369]

-21.567*
( 11.058)

-6.679***
( 0.473)
[ 529.541]
0.029***
( 0.004)
[ 0.613]
403.165***
( 35.999)
[3,455.794]
-0.035***
( 0.003)
[ 0.179]
-0.332**
( 0.143)
[ 2.770]
-0.100**
( 0.050)
[ 0.473]

-5.410
( 7.925)

0.086
( 0.072)
789.816
( 592.953)
-0.010
( 0.054)
8.852
( 6.378)
5.142*
( 2.808)

Above median poverty neighborhood

0.085
( 0.077)
-464.856
( 672.496)
-0.116***
( 0.044)
0.100
( 2.490)
0.115
( 0.926)

Below median poverty neighborhood

(OLS)

(IV)

(OLS)

(IV)

-6.608***
( 0.399)
[ 528.794]
0.019***
( 0.003)
[ 0.621]
372.804***
( 25.029)
[3,142.816]
-0.039***
( 0.002)
[ 0.165]
-1.642***
( 0.286)
[ 15.686]
-0.604***
( 0.082)
[ 2.320]

-15.073**
( 7.196)

-10.426***
( 0.545)
[ 563.286]
0.056***
( 0.004)
[ 0.492]
540.400***
( 35.034)
[2,973.240]
-0.039***
( 0.003)
[ 0.230]
-0.842***
( 0.277)
[ 13.432]
-0.583***
( 0.099)
[ 2.370]

-14.610
( 13.295)

0.141**
( 0.065)
700.539
( 500.010)
-0.103**
( 0.040)
4.078
( 4.388)
1.590
( 1.556)
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0.010
( 0.093)
-507.593
( 903.870)
-0.011
( 0.075)
8.133
( 6.705)
4.666
( 2.912)

Notes: The table shows OLS and IV estimates of the impact of eviction for four key subsamples indicated in the column heading, including (I.)
joint action versus single action cases, (II.) multi-headed households versus single-headed households (based on whether there are one or multiple
individuals named on the lease), (III.) whether the individual has a prior case or not, (IV.) whether the tenant’s address at eviction is above or
below the median neighborhood poverty rate in the sample. All regressions include the full set of controls and district-year fixed effects. Robust
standard errors are clustered at the judge-year level. The non-evict mean of the subsample is reported in brackets below the estimates.

Table H.15: Heterogeneity in the effect of eviction (25-47 months)
Panel A.

Move Zipcode

Neighborhood poverty rate (×100)

Panel B.

Move Zipcode

Neighborhood poverty rate (×100)

Joint Action
(IV)

(OLS)

(IV)

0.039***
( 0.003)
[ 0.735]
0.528***
( 0.077)
[ 16.219]

-0.110
( 0.068)

0.038***
( 0.006)
[ 0.719]
0.188
( 0.132)
[ 18.474]

0.211**
( 0.099)

Neighborhood poverty rate (×100)

Panel D.

Move Zipcode

Neighborhood poverty rate (×100)

-2.080
( 1.727)

Multi-headed household

-0.941
( 1.816)

Single-headed household

(OLS)

(IV)

(OLS)

(IV)

0.036***
( 0.006)
[ 0.735]
0.390***
( 0.111)
[ 14.609]

-0.007
( 0.113)

0.041***
( 0.003)
[ 0.731]
0.488***
( 0.069)
[ 17.326]

-0.021
( 0.066)

Panel C.

Move Zipcode

Single Action

(OLS)

-1.908
( 2.458)
No prior cases

-1.627
( 1.277)
Prior case

(OLS)

(IV)

(OLS)

(IV)

0.039***
( 0.003)
[ 0.735]
0.451***
( 0.078)
[ 15.816]

-0.060
( 0.073)

0.042***
( 0.004)
[ 0.727]
0.442***
( 0.088)
[ 18.294]

0.043
( 0.075)

-1.998
( 1.598)

Above median poverty neighborhood

-1.328
( 1.732)

Below median poverty neighborhood

(OLS)

(IV)

(OLS)

(IV)

0.037***
( 0.004)
[ 0.730]
0.001
( 0.069)
[ 22.457]

-0.083
( 0.079)

0.045***
( 0.003)
[ 0.733]
0.344***
( 0.074)
[ 11.544]

0.093
( 0.096)

-1.095
( 1.360)

-3.202*
( 1.826)

Notes: The table shows OLS and IV estimates of the impact of eviction for four key subsamples indicated in the
column heading, including (I.) joint action versus single action cases, (II.) multi-headed households versus singleheaded households (based on whether there are one or multiple individuals named on the lease), (III.) whether
the individual has a prior case or not, (IV.) whether the tenant’s address at eviction is above or below the median
neighborhood poverty rate in the sample. All regressions include the full set of controls and district-year fixed
effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the judge-year level. The non-evict mean of the subsample is
reported in brackets below the estimates.
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H.6

Alternative definition of treatment

Throughout the paper, we define the treatment as an eviction order. Yet, as we show in Appendix
Section D.3, many dismissed cases may still involve the tenant paying the landlord or moving.
This section provides alternative results which calculate alternative instruments and alternative
treatment based on whether the case was dismissed with prejudice. Cases dismissed with prejudice
result in no eviction order and bar the landlord from bringing a future case against the tenant
related to the same concern or disagreement. Thus, this form of dismissal could be considered
a success for the tenant. Similarly, the instrument is recalculated as the leave-out mean of an
indicator for the judge dismissing a case with prejudice adjusted for district-year fixed effects.
Tables H.16 and H.17 report alternative IV results for this definition of treatment. The OLS
estimates are similar in magnitude but, as expected, have the opposite signs; having a case
dismissed with prejudice increases the tenant’s credit score, decreases their balance in collections,
and decreases their access to revolving credit. The IV results are imprecise with no statistically
significant results, likely driven by the fact that only a small fraction cases are dismissed with
prejudice.
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Table H.16: The effect of the case being “dismissed with prejudice” on financial strain

Non-evicted mean

OLS: Dismissed with Prejudice

IV: Dismissed with Prejudice

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

534.393
( 72.662)
0.602
( 0.485)
3,558.757
(4,676.298)
0.160
( 0.363)
13.919
( 34.615)
1.898
( 13.645)

12.645***
( 1.349)
-0.064***
( 0.007)
-616.286***
( 56.896)
0.027***
( 0.005)
-0.389
( 0.483)
-0.017
( 0.206)

6.629***
( 0.929)
-0.042***
( 0.006)
-423.355***
( 49.503)
0.018***
( 0.005)
-0.145
( 0.471)
-0.020
( 0.205)

6.434***
( 0.917)
-0.040***
( 0.007)
-433.074***
( 49.418)
0.016***
( 0.005)
-0.014
( 0.453)
-0.014
( 0.194)

-42.510
( 68.893)
0.255
( 0.432)
-7628.850
(4,626.774)
0.048
( 0.287)
-11.573
( 32.439)
-2.212
( 15.448)

543.815
( 75.340)
0.584
( 0.488)
3,366.803
(4,613.546)
0.164
( 0.366)
13.054
( 33.689)
2.075
( 14.253)

10.858***
( 1.731)
-0.045***
( 0.009)
-516.756***
( 75.081)
0.026***
( 0.008)
0.006
( 0.496)
0.011
( 0.201)

4.497***
( 1.235)
-0.027***
( 0.008)
-374.954***
( 67.754)
0.020**
( 0.008)
0.317
( 0.489)
0.016
( 0.199)

4.614***
( 1.230)
-0.025***
( 0.008)
-370.938***
( 69.487)
0.018**
( 0.007)
0.416
( 0.466)
0.012
( 0.192)

38.108
( 65.330)
-0.539
( 0.473)
1,247.582
(5,890.321)
0.324
( 0.403)
10.086
( 29.878)
-9.584
( 11.179)

Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes

I. Financial Strain: 13-36 mon.
Credit Score
No Open Revolving Account
Total bal. collections
Any Auto Loan or Lease
Any Payday Inquiry × 100
Any Payday Account × 100
II. Financial Strain: 37-60 mon.
Credit Score
No Open Revolving Account
Total bal. collections
Any Auto Loan or Lease
Any Payday Inquiry × 100
Any Payday Account × 100
Additional controls
Complier re-weighted

Notes: The table above reports OLS and two-stage least squares results of the impact of eviction on measures of financial
strain. Column 4 presents an OLS regression on residual stringency. The analysis sample has N = 225, 794. The dependent
variable is listed in each row. Two-stage least squares models instrument for eviction using the judge stringency measure based
on decisions in other cases, as described in the text. All specifications control for district-year fixed effects. Robust standard
errors are clustered at the judge-year level.
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Table H.17: The effect of the case being “dismissed with prejudice” on moves and
neighborhood quality

Non-evicted mean

OLS: Dismissed with Prejudice

IV: Dismissed with Prejudice

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.606
( 0.489)
17.597
( 10.033)

-0.020**
( 0.008)
0.131
( 0.136)

-0.019**
( 0.008)
0.381***
( 0.126)

-0.018**
( 0.008)
0.342***
( 0.128)

-2.080
( 2.337)
50.233
( 50.097)

0.762
( 0.426)
17.366
( 10.086)

-0.019*
( 0.010)
0.098
( 0.165)

-0.016
( 0.010)
0.359**
( 0.149)

-0.014
( 0.010)
0.371**
( 0.156)

0.253
( 0.939)
27.082
( 25.470)

0.237
( 0.425)
0.172
( 0.377)

-0.006
( 0.009)
-0.006
( 0.007)

0.001
( 0.009)
0.001
( 0.007)

-0.002
( 0.009)
-0.000
( 0.007)

2.251
( 1.408)
-0.110
( 0.738)

Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes

I. Outcomes 13-36 months after filing
Move Zipcode
Neighborhood poverty rate (×100)

II. Outcomes 37-60 months after filing
Move Zipcode
Neighborhood poverty rate (×100)

III. Future Eviction Cases
Any Eviction Case (36 mo.)
Eviction Case at Dif. Address (36 mo.)
Additional controls
Complier re-weighted

Notes: The table above reports OLS and two-stage least squares results of the impact of eviction on measures of number of
moves and neighborhood quality. Column 4 presents an OLS regression on residual stringency. The dependent variable is
listed in each row. Two-stage least squares models instrument for eviction using the judge stringency measure based on rulings
in other cases, as described in the text. All specifications control for district-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are
clustered at the judge-year level.
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H.7

Characterizing compliers

We next explore characteristics of compliers, following Abadie (2003) and Dahl et al. (2014), to
interpret our LATE estimates.
In the eviction setting, compliers are those whose eviction court judgment would have been
different had their case been assigned to the most lenient instead of the most strict judge. By
the monotonicity and independence assumptions,
πc ≡ P r(Ei |Zi = z̄) − P r(Ei |Zi = z) = P r(Ei (z̄) − Ei (z) = 1),
where z̄ represents the strictest judge, and z represents the most lenient judge, and Ei is an
indicator for being evicted.
The always takers represent the tenants who would be evicted, even by the most lenient
judge, hence
πa ≡ P r(Ei = 1|Zi = z) = P r(Ei (z̄) = Ei (z) = 1)
and the never takers are those who would not be evicted, even by the most strict judge,
πn ≡ P r(Ei = 0|Zi = z̄) = P r(Ei (z̄) = Ei (z) = 0).
Table H.18 shows the share of tenants in eviction court in the three categories. Following
Dahl et al. (2014), we use a flexible analog of the first stage regression, where we perform a local
linear regression of the eviction indicator on estimated judge stringency, including a vector of
interacted district and year fixed effects. Our baseline choice of z̄ is the top 1 percentile of judge
stringency and of z is the bottom 1 percentile of judge stringency.
Columns 1-3 adopt a linear specification of the first stage regression. Under this specification,
we calculate π̂a = α̂ + γ̂z and π̂n = 1 − α̂ − γ̂ z̄ and π̂c = γ̂(z̄ − z). We find approximately 59
percent always-takers, 10 percent compliers, and 31 percent never-takers. The relative sizes of
these groups are not highly sensitive to the choices of specification and stringency threshold.
Next we study the characteristics of compliers, including individual, case, and neighborhood
characteristics. For characteristic xk , we use the relationship:

P r(xki = 1|ei (z̄) − ei (z) = 1)
P r(ei (z̄) − ei (z) = 1|xki = 1)
=
P r(xki = 1)
P r(ei (z̄) − ei (z) = 1)
E[ei |Zi = z̄, xki = 1] − E[ei |Zi = z, xki = 1]
=
.
E[ei |Zi = z̄] − E[ei |Zi = z]
We estimate the numerator by first estimating the first stage regression of eviction on judge
leniency with district × year fixed effects for the sample with xki = 1, and constructing β̂(z̄ − z)
using the coefficient estimate on judge leniency, β̂, and using values z̄ and z from the local linear
model shares with 1 and 99 percent judge leniency thresholds. The denominator is constructed
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analogously, but with β̂ obtained from the first stage regression without the xki = 1 sample
restriction.
Table H.19 presents the relative likelihood of characteristics. The table does not reflect
significant differences between the complier population and the overall eviction court population.

Table H.18: Sample shares by compliance type

Linear model

Always Takers
Compliers
Never Takers

Polynomial

1%

1.5%

2%

1%

1.5%

2%

0.59
0.10
0.31

0.59
0.09
0.32

0.60
0.08
0.32

0.59
0.09
0.31

0.59
0.08
0.32

0.60
0.08
0.32

Notes: The table above depicts the shares of tenants in eviction court who are always takers, never
takers, and compliers. The three left columns adopt a linear model for estimating the effect of judge
stringency on eviction, and the right columns adopt a third-order polynomial specification. The
column headings indicate the threshold for determining the most stringent and least stringent judge.
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Table H.19: Complier characteristics ratios

Pr(X=x)

Pr(X=x|complier)

P r(X=x|complier)
P r(X=x)

Joint Action

0.829
(0.001)

0.747
(0.019)

0.901
(0.023)

Defendent w/o Attorney

0.961
(0.000)

0.964
(0.011)

1.003
(0.011)

Female

0.539
(0.001)

0.555
(0.021)

1.030
(0.039)

Black

0.351
(0.001)

0.397
(0.019)

1.132
(0.053)

Age 21 to 39

0.517
(0.001)

0.535
(0.026)

1.034
(0.049)

Age 40 to 59

0.369
(0.001)

0.377
(0.023)

1.022
(0.062)

Age 60 and up

0.073
(0.001)

0.060
(0.013)

0.818
(0.184)

Neigh. Above Median Pov.

0.506
(0.001)

0.622
(0.028)

1.230
(0.056)

No prior cases

0.614
(0.001)

0.556
(0.023)

0.906
(0.038)

Notes: This table presents the sample distribution, complier distribution, and relative likelihood for different
subgroups. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses are obtained using 500 replications.
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Appendix: MTE analysis

This section estimates the marginal treatment effects of evictions to better understand how
effects depend on the unobservables affecting the eviction decision. Consider the selection
model Y = (1 − E)Y (0) + EY (1) where Y (j) = µj (X) + Uj and the eviction indicator is given
by E = 1{µE (X, Z) − UE ≥ 0}. X are observable characteristics, Z is the judge stringency
instrument, and the error terms are continuous random variables. As discussed in Heckman
and Vytlacil (2007), we can normalize the distribution of UE to be uniformly distributed
between 0 and 1 conditional on X, which implies that µE (X, Z) is equal to the propensity score
p(X, Z) ≡ P r(E = 1|X, Z). We can write the marginal treatment effect as:
M T E(x, p) = E[Y (1) − Y (0)|UE = p, X = x],
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where UE represents unobserved characteristics of the defendant that affect the court ruling.
Following Brinch et al. (2017) and Bhuller et al. (2019), we assume that the treatment effects
are separable into observed and unobserved components which, combined with the assumptions
regarding the instrument maintained in this paper, implies that the MTE is point identified over
the support of p(X, Z).
Figure I.1 shows the estimated distributions of eviction probabilities for those who were
and were not evicted, where the probability is estimated using a flexible logit specification
described in the figure notes. Following Bhuller et al. (2019), we calculate the MTE only over
the range of probabilities where there is support in both distributions by restricting the analysis
to probabilities between the 1st percentile of the evicted distribution and the 99th percentile of
the not evicted distribution.
Figures I.2 and I.3 plots the marginal treatment effects by eviction probability or, equivalently,
the effect by latent resistance to eviction (conditional on appearing in eviction court) using local
cubic polynomial regression. While the estimates are noisy, we see that the marginal treatment
effects on credit scores, having no revolving credit, and amount in collections are largest for
individuals with unobservables that make them more likely to be evicted, though our estimates
are negative over the full distribution for which their is common support in both the evicted
and not-evicted populations. For the other outcomes considered, the MTEs are largely flat, and
somewhat imprecisely estimated.
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Figure I.1: Common support of eviction propensity scores

density
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Note: Probabilities are estimated using a logistic regression of case out come on a polynomial of age, gender, an indicator for
being African American, an indicator for being a joint action case, the ad damnum amount, lagged credit score, lagged amount
in collections, and lagged indicator for having any auto loan or lease plus interactions between female, African American, joint
action case, and ad damnum amount. All these covariates are interacted with judge stringency, and we additionally control for
stringency squared, stringency cubed, and district-year fixed effects. The model is estimated on the sample of cases linked to
credit reports used in the IV analysis. The blue density represents the density of estimated eviction probabilities for those not
evicted while the red density represents the density for those evicted.
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Figure I.2: Marginal Treatment Effects

MTE(p) = E(Y1 −Y0|U=p,X =X)

MTE(p) = E(Y1 −Y0|U=p,X =X)
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Note: Figure shows the treatment effects by latent resistance to treatment (eviction). Higher probabilities represent those with
unobservables that make them less likely to be evicted (i.e., more resistant to treatment). The MTE estimates are based on
the local IV approach of Brinch et al. (2017) using a local poly cubic polynomial specification. The bandwidth for the local
polynomial regression is estimated following Ruppert et al. (1995). The grey ribbons in the figure show 90% confidence intervals
based on 200 bootstraps. The model is estimated on the sample of cases linked to credit reports used in the IV analysis restricted
to a trimmed sample with common support.
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Figure I.3: Marginal Treatment Effects
Amount in Collections (13-36 and 37-60 months)
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Note: Figure shows the treatment effects by latent resistance to treatment (eviction). Higher probabilities represent those with
unobservables that make them less likely to be evicted (i.e., more resistant to treatment). The MTE estimates are based on
the local IV approach of Brinch et al. (2017) using a local poly cubic polynomial specification. The bandwidth for the local
polynomial regression is estimated following Ruppert et al. (1995). The grey ribbons in the figure show 90% confidence intervals
based on 200 bootstraps. The model is estimated on the sample of cases linked to credit reports used in the IV analysis restricted
to a trimmed sample with common support.
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Appendix: Alternative measures of residential mo-

bility
The mobility results in Section 7 use data from Experian, which are measured at the ZIP code
level. This appendix section provides an alternative analysis using InfoUSA data on address
histories. InfoUSA is a commercial database that includes address data and basic information
about residents. InfoUSA collects data from different marketing sources including real estate
and tax assessments, utility connections, voter registration files, and other commercial sources.
Addresses are standardized and verified using the Delivery Sequence File. Kennel and Li (2009)
compares the coverage of the Census Bureau’s Master Address File (MAF) and InfoUSA address
data and finds that 16.1% of the addresses in the MAF do not match an exact address in InfoUSA
and 5.7% of InfoUSA addresses do not match an address in the MAF.
The advantages of InfoUSA data are that it includes exact address, a unique individual ID,
and the exact timing at which InfoUSA obtained information on the address of an individual
(either confirming their current address or providing a new address). The main disadvantages
are that address information is infrequently updated for our sample and has a relatively low
match rate with our court sample. Using snapshots from 2006 to 2017, we observe the last
confirmed address as well as the date at which that address was last confirmed. In a given year,
the InfoUSA data contains an updated address information confirming a resident’s address or
providing a new address in a given year 41.3% of the time.

Matching: An individual from InfoUSA was considered a match with an individual from the
eviction data set if the InfoUSA individual: (1) had matching addresses (same ZIP code, street
name, and street number as listed in eviction filing records), (2) had same first and last name,
and (3) the InfoUSA data was within 48 months of the eviction case date. In order to account
for potential differences in spelling of names as provided to InfoUSA and to the eviction court,
we fuzzy matched names using Jaro-Winkler distance, and required that the distance be less
than 0.2. We then kept the match with the smallest last name distance, and, in the event of a
tie, the smallest first name distance.
After implementing the matching procedure described above, we are able to match 134, 621
individuals from the eviction data set with InfoUSA, of which 116, 756 are in our IV sample of
the eviction data set. Thus, we match approximately 30% of the evictions IV sample with court
addresses in 2006 or later, which is when the InfoUSA data begins. Although the match rate may
seem low, we stress that the population of individuals facing eviction are a highly marginalized
population that is difficult to track. As such, the problem may not be with the quality of the
InfoUSA data, but rather due to the simple difficulty of tracking these marginalized individuals.
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Moves within ZIP codes: Using the InfoUSA data, we estimate what proportion of
observed moves occur within ZIP code. Using the match sample, we find that 26.7% of observed
moves were within ZIP code for the sample over the time window.64 This suggests that the main
analysis, which considers ZIP code mobility, underestimates overall mobility.

Tracking populations at risk of eviction: Tracking the mobility of low-income households is difficult because of the limited sources of data. Moreover, low-income households may
be less likely to update their address with the United States Postal Service and more likely to
have alternative living situations where they may not be listed on a lease or utility bill. Using
the linked eviction records and a random sample of individuals from Cook County, we find that
households with eviction cases filed against them are 37% less likely to have updated address
information in a given year than a random sample from Cook County, with this number being
slightly larger for individuals whose cases ended in eviction. Overall, this highlights the difficulty
of tracking individuals at risk of eviction.

Alternative estimates of eviction on mobility Exact addresses allow us to better
measure unit-level mobility, but the InfoUSA data is also much more likely to not be updated in
any given year. To address missingness in the data, we define three outcomes: “New address”
which is an indicator for whether there is any new address information, “Same address” which is
an indicator for whether there is any confirmation that the individual is at the same address,
and “No update” which is an indicator for whether there is no updated information of either
kind. For the first two outcomes, we additionally construct an imputed version which assumes
an individual has moved out if we see a new household move in to the exact unit.
Looking at the OLS estimates, evicted households are two percentage points less likely to be
observed at the same address, eight percentage points more likely to be observed at a new address,
and 6 percentage points more likely to not have no updated address information. Imputed results
are similar, but with a much higher baseline move rate for the control group of 70 percent. OLS
results are similar when looking over a longer time horizon, though evicted tenants are not
statistically significantly more likely to be seen at a new address. The IV results using judge
stringency are largely uninformative because of large standard errors. Overall, these results
suggest that evicted individuals are somewhat more likely to move, but that they are also more
likely to not have new address information, which could suggest alternative living arrangements
such as staying with a friend or at a shelter.

64
We find that 28% of observed moves prior to the eviction filing are within ZIP code and 25% of moves after the
eviction filing are within ZIP code. Numbers are similar regardless of the outcome of the eviction case.
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Table J.1: The effect of eviction on mobility (InfoUSA)

Baseline
I. Outcomes (1-24 months):

Imputed

C. Mean

OLS

IV

C. Mean

OLS

IV

New address

0.212
0.335

0.036∗∗∗
(0.003)
-0.046∗∗∗
(0.003)

-0.114
(0.072)
0.056
(0.045)

No update

0.472

-0.034
(0.062)
-0.014
(0.069)
0.019
(0.077)

0.702

Same address

0.022∗∗∗
(0.003)
-0.084∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.058∗∗∗
(0.004)
OLS

IV

C. Mean

OLS

IV

0.005
(0.004)
-0.086∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.064∗∗∗
(0.004)

-0.058
(0.066)
-0.014
(0.071)
0.024
(0.074)

0.796

0.026∗∗∗
(0.003)
-0.034∗∗∗
(0.002)

-0.022
0.065)
0.036
(0.039)

II. Outcomes (1-48 months): C. Mean
New address

0.250

Same address

0.368

No update

0.425

0.146

0.110

Notes: Table shows mobility results using InfoUSA data. “New address” is an indicator for any new address in the time
window, “Same address” is an indicator for any confirmation of same address in the time window, and “No update” is an
indicator of no updated address information in the time window. “C. Mean” is the control mean. The “Imputed” columns
use additional information on if a new household moves into the exact address, indicating that the prior household moved.
Standard errors are clustered at the judge-year level.
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